

THE CONCEPT OF BEING IN HEGEL AND HEIDEGGER

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ABSTRACT

The task which this dissertation takes up is that of a comparison between Hegel's conception of Being and that of Heidegger. As to the significance of this problem, it is suggested that secondary literature on the subject is scarce and usually regards these philosophers as holding opposite views, especially with reference to the concept of Being. The hypothesis guiding the inquiry throughout is a suggestion of Professor Gadamer's according to which Heidegger's thought constantly circles that of Hegel.

In the Introduction the problem is stated and points of view are proposed in terms of which it assumes a significance for both the interpretation of Hegel and Heidegger and ontological discussion in general. A wide range of secondary literature is brought into view and it is found that commentators are by no means in agreement both as to the meaning of "Being" and as to the relation in which Heidegger stands to Hegel. Preliminary suggestions are made as to the "traits of Being" with the intention of so understanding the term "Being" that it becomes a visible concept and a legitimate subject of inquiry.

The paper is divided into parts along Hegelian lines: I. Being as immediate, II. Being as determinate,

III. Being as absolute. This division is defended by pointing out that to proceed in this way does not do violence to Heidegger's thought. In each part, Hegel and Heidegger are juxtaposed so as to facilitate a direct comparison. The Introduction closes with a brief review of theological attempts to bring the concept of Being into doctrines of God and this is meant as a further undergirding of the proposed project.

Part I begins with the first chapter of Hegel's Logic, "The Doctrine of Being," where the abstract concept of Being is proposed as the beginning of his dialectical-philosophical procedure. Heidegger's starting-point is compared with it. Detailed analyses of the immediate concept of Being in Hegel's Logic and Phenomenology follow and Heidegger's analyses and attempted refutations of the doctrine are examined. The result is that, on this point, the two disagree fundamentally as regards method and content.

Part II begins with an exposition of the notion of determinate Being as an ontological problem with a look at some arguments of Aristotle. An exposition of this notion is then given as it appears in Hegel's Logic and Phenomenology and Heidegger's corresponding doctrines of "Dasein" and "Vorhandenheit" are compared with it. The notion of determinate Being is seen to be divided into the concepts "thing" and "self". The result of this

chapter is that points of agreement may be found, especially with regard to the structure of the self, but that as to the disagreements, especially with regard to the nature of "thing", account must be taken of the fact that Hegel's discussion of it forms a preliminary, though constitutive moment in his dialectical procedure and not the final standpoint.

This final term is taken up in Part III. Hegel's distinctive conception of absoluteness and the Absolute and similar conceptions among his immediate predecessors are brought into view. Again, the notion of the Absolute is examined with reference to Hegel's Logic and Phenomenology. Thereupon, Heidegger's own interpretation of Hegel's Absolute is compared with Hegel's own account. Finally, Heidegger's own quest for the meaning of Being as such is seen as a series of inconclusive probes having, however, a definite direction. The result of Part III is that Heidegger takes up a much more congenial position in this connection than he does in connection with immediate and determinate Being. This is made possible by the fact that Hegel seems to have entertained several different conceptions of Being.

In conclusion it is suggested that the Hegelian and the Heideggerian final terms, absolute Spirit and perousis respectively, have much in common. This may be seen by comparing their respective basic schemata (Hegel: being-in,

-other-than, -for, and -in-end-for itself; Heidegger: Being, being, concealment, and perousia). When it is seen that these schemata hold fully only for the final terms and that any one element taken in isolation is an abstraction from the total view, then Hegel and Heidegger come very close to each other. It is suggested further that, for both, the self mirrors the Absolute (Being), since the schemata also describe the structure of the self, though in a secondary, participatory way. The self may therefore be taken as the paradigm of Being. Finally, problems are raised as to the interpretation of Hegel and Heidegger and some suggestions are given as to the significance of the comparison for some Christian doctrines.

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PREFACE

This dissertation is meant as a contribution to the discussion of the concept of Being, a concept which is not only central to philosophical and theological thinking, as it should be, but also plays an essential role in human language in general. Yet it has in recent times seldom been taken up as a subject of study on its own. This study might therefore be regarded as response to Heidegger's call for a renewal of interest in this notion of Being.

The two thinkers which are here taken into consideration are often thought to stand on opposite philosophical poles. Yet, no detailed and systematic work is available in which this opposition between them is elaborated. The study here given follows a suggestion of Professor Gadamer (Heidelberg) to the effect that Heidegger's thought constantly circles that of Hegel and has much in common with it.

I gratefully acknowledge the help of Professor Kevin Wall, without whose encouragement this dissertation would not likely have been brought to completion. I also wish to thank the other members of the examining committee, Professors Foster, Retshow, Osborne, and McCoy for their help and criticism.

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INTRODUCTION

The topic of this paper is a rather straightforward one: a comparison of the views of two philosophers, Hegel and Heidegger, concerning one single concept, Being. One need not look far in order to notice that this concept occupies a central place in the writings of both. This is especially true of Heidegger, who has said himself that literally everything he has done philosophically has been done for the purpose of clarifying it. Thus, in a letter to Frings he says, "it is this question (of the meaning of Being) -- and it alone -- which determines my thinking and its limits."¹ To a somewhat lesser extent, this is also true of Hegel, the first chapter of whose Logic is devoted to the doctrine of Being. It would therefore seem initially feasible to undertake a comparison of what each had in mind when speaking of Being.

However, such a comparison involves some special problems. These are due partly to Heidegger himself and partly due also to an inherent intractability of the concept of Being itself. In the first place, Heidegger's general interpretation of the history of philosophy would seem to stand against a direct comparison with Hegel insofar as he regards Hegel's system as the consummation of a mis-directed metaphysics deriving from Plato, the complete

elaboration and systematization of a metaphysics which was to have been effectively brought to a close by Nietzsche. Moreover, if the concept to be compared between them is that of Being, the difficulty of the comparison appears in its most radical form, since the traditional metaphysics was, in Heidegger's view, characterized by the oblivion of Being (Seinsvergessenheit).² In the Introduction of Metaphysics he goes so far as to say, "In Sein und Zeit the question of the meaning of Being is raised and developed as a question for the first time in the history of philosophy."³

If this is true, it would be misguided to regard Hegel and Heidegger as engaged in the same project or enterprise. The contrast is often put in terms of the distinction between essentialism and existentialism.⁴ Assuming the validity of this distinction in advance, the next move would consist in eliciting the essentialist and the existentialist elements, thus finding the former predominating in Hegel and the latter in Heidegger. While such a procedure might have its pedagogical value, it cannot be adopted here. Rather, it seems more useful to regard the cogency of the distinction as a question to be settled from the texts themselves. Moreover, Heidegger has himself been reluctant to distinguish his position in this way.⁵ Thus, the essentialist-existentialist distinction neither facilitates nor rules out the proposed

comperison. On what ground and from what point of departure can a comperison then proceed?

Some clues may be found in such secondary literature as exists in which Heidegger is studies in relation to Hegel. While critical studies, commentaries and summeries dealing with Hegel and Heidegger individually are many, those in which they are related to each other are few indeed. These latter fell into three general classes:

(1) Those in which an exposition and eveluation is given of Heidegger's placement of Hegel in the history of metaphysics and of his conception of metaphysics in general. Here the discontinuities tend to be emphasized (Collins, Marx, Richardson, Lengen).⁶

(2) Those in which Hegel and Heidegger are seen as engaged in the same or in much the same ontological project. Here the continuities are emphasized (Gadamer, Meulen).⁷

(3) Finally, those in which an approach is adopted which Heidegger has himself initiated in the study of philosophers and poets of the past, viz., hermeneutic re-interpretation. Here an attempt is made to go behind the texts towards a certain Hinterdenken⁸ which is expected to disclose the ontological kernel of which these writers were themselves perhaps only dimly aware.⁹

Each of these approaches have good foundations in Heidegger's own writings. A brief look into these commentaries might therefore suggest some hypotheses as to the comperability of Heidegger with Hegel.

The most direct and straightforward approach is, of course, to direct attention to those passages in Heidegger's writings which either deal expressly with Hegel or in which differences of opinion and points of agreement are clearly evident. These may be set forth broadly and in a preliminary way as follows:

(1) The determination of Being, especially in the Introduction to Metaphysics, insofar as it is first, immediately, and preconceptually apprehended.¹⁰

(2) The reduction of time to existential temporality in Being and Time and its significance for the meaning of Being.¹¹

(3) The facticity of Dasein as against the dialectical deduction of existence in Hegel's doctrine of essence.¹²

(4) The "topic" of ontology as set forth, for example, in Identity and Difference.¹³

(5) The interpretation of the essence (Wesen) of Being¹⁴ as the presence or presencing (Anwesen) of Being, as in Hegel's Concept of Experience.¹⁵

(6) The interpretation of Absolute Knowledge (Wissen) as the awareness and "unconcealment" (Erschlossenheit) of the Truth of Being.¹⁶

(7) The more general question as to "traits"¹⁷ or "predicates"¹⁸ of Being in view of doctrines as to the indefinability of 'Being'.¹⁹

These issues will be taken up in the appropriate contexts in the course of the following exposition.

This last point (#7) leads into the question how the problematic ("the meaning of Being") is to be set up and in what sense 'Being' can be regarded as a viable concept. Some initial clues must be available as to the sort of concept we are dealing with. Such clues may be taken as questions to be asked of the texts before us. In view of widespread current suspicion in regard to the meaningfulness of speaking of Being "in general" or "as such," it would be helpful to introduce some preliminary points of view from which access may be gained into the problematic itself.

At the risk of presuming to fit Heidegger's thinking into an Hegelian straight-jacket, it will be useful to follow Hegel's broad division of topics. Thus, we can distinguish between (a) Being as immediately apprehended or thought, which, following Hegel, can be called "abstract Being", (b) Being as mediated, i.e., determinate being, essence and existence, and (c) the full plenitude of Being, absolute Being. This division appears in Hegel not merely as a convenient device to be used for purposes of exposition, but as a dialectically necessary movement of consciousness (as in the Phenomenology of Mind) and of categorical thought (as in the Science of Logic). In any case, the division appears to correspond to three moments or aspects of the general problematic of Being.

And its application with respect to Heidegger does not seem to do violence to his own intentions, as we shall see.

The justification of the project here attempted will then depend upon these three points: First, the relevant critical literature should have left open the legitimate possibility of a systematic comparison between Hegel and Heidegger, particularly in regard to "Being". Secondly, that concept of Being, intractable as it is, must be initially and in a preliminary way shown to be a viable one. Thirdly, the division of the inquiry along Hegelian lines must be justified in relation to Heidegger's ontological standpoint.

1. The Comparability of Hegel and Heidegger in the Critical Literature

References to Hegel appear frequently in Heidegger commentaries, but for the most part such references are made incidentally and in the interest of an exposition of Heidegger's views. Extended treatments of their relationship have as yet not often been done. Most frequently Hegel is introduced in the context of Heidegger's interpretation of the history of metaphysics and otherwise in order to distinguish an "essentialist" position from an "existentialist" one. Only rarely are they compared systematically, bringing corresponding doctrines specifically into view, and hardly ever is this done in order to discover continuities between them.

It seems clear, to be sure, that this is due in large part to Heidegger himself, who has called for a "destruction" of the metaphysics represented by Hegel. On the other hand, Heidegger's own constant attempts to carry out an Auseinandersetzung with Hegel indicate that there is another side to the relationship. The notion of "destruction" in connection with Heidegger's attitude to the history of philosophy will occupy us at a later point below. But it may be said here that it also involves a certain kind of appreciation. Heidegger has always insisted that, while the question of Being had, in his view, been forgotten, a dim awareness of it remained and can be traced in past writings. He is justly famous for his profound attempts hermeneutically to distill from the writings of philosophers and poets of the past what conceptions of Being underlay their thought, perhaps doing some violence to the texts in the process. Heidegger's relation to Hegel is thus more complex than it may at first glance seem.

Jen van der Meulen, in the only available full-length Hegel-Heidegger comparison,²⁰ seeks what he calls a "middle" between them. Hans-Georg Gadamer calls attention in a recent essay to similarities in their points of view and in their respective historical positions.²¹ An essay is to be published in English by Joen Stembough on the metaphysics of Hegel and Heidegger as part of a collection edited by F.G. Weiss.²² Otherwise, William J. Richardson²³

and Werner Marx²⁴ have included extensive treatments of Heidegger's relation to Hegel in their general works on Heidegger's thought. Professor Kleus Hartmann's comparative study of Hegel and Sartre could also be cited, in which he sets forth the role played by Hegelian concepts in the ontology of Sartre.²⁵ A similar study might well be carried out in regard to Hegel and Heidegger, although Heidegger does not make use of Hegelian terms as explicitly as does Sartre, preferring instead to use his own technical language. The possibility of the comparison here proposed lies thus very close at hand.

Of all Heidegger commentators, it is surely Gadamer, who, more than anyone else, seeks to shift Heidegger into the framework of Hegel's thought. Having been a student under Heidegger himself, he was, by his own account, from early on in his life both excited and irritated by Hegel's dialectic.²⁶ By 1970 he had reached this conclusion: "Es ist auffällig genug, mit welcher Beherrlichkeit Heideggers Denken um Hegel kreist." There may be found, moreover, certain "Entsprechungen, die Heideggers Denken unleugbar zu dem Hegelschen Denken zeigen." These are surprising assertions made against an almost overwhelming background of contrary opinion. He is careful to note nevertheless, that Heidegger has himself to this day constantly sought to find ways to mark off his own position from that of Hegel, but found himself again and again in the neighborhood of

the Hegelian philosophy. Likewise, he says, those who from the Hegelian side sought to resist Heidegger's existential-ontological claims or proposals have grudgingly had to recognize points at which Heidegger's thinking and Hegel's seem to flow together. Though this might sound odd, "dest ist gewiss nicht zufällig oder von ungefähr." So, for example, he mentions the opposition between Hegel's Weltvernunft and Weltgeist, on the one hand, and Heidegger's early insistence on the finite character of the disclosure of Being in Dasein. The apparent opposition is mitigated if we regard Heidegger's Kehre not so much as an event in his intellectual development, but as a systematic part of his general ontology. This Kehre, Gadamer holds, consisted of a step beyond the "Stellung der Seinsfrage im Seinsverständnis des Daseins" and can therefore be seen as a movement in the direction of Hegel, who had expressly taken the dialectic of Spirit beyond the configurations of subjective spirit, beyond consciousness and self-consciousness. The directions in which they move tend to converge. If Heidegger does regard Hegel's philosophy as a kind of Zuspitzung der Seinsvergessenheit, it might be possible to interpret Hegel's "Absolute Idea" as essentially much the same notion as Heidegger's Sinn von Sein. Two examples may be cited from Gadamer.

(1) Heidegger has referred to Hegel's idea of Being as the "indeterminate immediate" and says that for this

Hegel "keeps looking in the same direction as ancient ontology."²⁷ But in so doing, "he no longer pays heed to Aristotle's problem of the unity of Being as over against the multiplicity of 'categories' applicable to things." How then can Hegel's conception of Being correspond in any way to that of Heidegger? Gadamer answers:

Wenn Sein als das unbestimmte Unmittelbare den Ausgangspunkt der Logik bildet, dann ist zwar der Sinn von Sein gewiss als die 'absolute Bestimmtheit' festgesetzt.

It is, of course, clear, that the meaning or truth of Being in Hegel is not exhausted in its first, immediate representation, but is to be found in the next higher dialectical stage (essence) and ultimately in the Whole: "The Truth is the Whole."²⁸ Thus, the meaning of Being (to use Heidegger's expression) is for Hegel not to be found in its initial character of indeterminate immediacy. On the other hand, the meaning of Being is for Heidegger not to be found in a notion of absolute determinacy, but can be glimpsed always only along the way (unterwegs), in the process of "authentic" or "essential" thinking and being. But Gadamer replies that Hegel's dialectic contains an "essential ambiguity" by which the all-encompassing synthesis, which the dialectic claims to achieve, involves an unresolved tension even in the Absolute, a movement back and forth from in itself to for itself, apart from which the Absolute would be reduced again to the dead, empty identity of Spinoza and Schelling. Hegel does not

permit us, therefore, "den Begriff des Genzen und in letzter Konsequenz den Begriff des Seins von der totalen Bestimmtheit her zu denken."

2. Gadamer further tells us of a private seminar which he attended with Heidegger.* The topic of discussion was Hegel's proposition, "the truth of Being is Essence" (Die Wahrheit des Seins ist des Wesen).²⁹ Heidegger's purpose in introducing this sentence was to ask if Hegel had not said more than he was aware that he had said. Hegel had reference here to Plato and Aristotle, who had made the transition from the undifferentiated conception of Being in Parmenides to the logos oriented metaphysics of form and substance.³⁰ Hegel now proposes a similar transition, i.e., from Being to Essence. His reliance on Greek philosophy points up the reason why Hegel apparently said more than he consciously meant. If we replace "Wahrheit" with aletheia, "Sein" with to on or (as Langan suggests³¹) on he on, and "Wesen" with ousia, then we have what Heidegger himself wants to say about Being, that is if his etymology can be trusted. Wahrheit des Seins then includes in its meaning Eigentlichkeit (authenticity, ownness), Unverborgenheit (unconcealedness), Echtheit (genuineness, authenticity), Bewahrung (confirmation, preservation, taking care of), and Sein is

*Judging by the content, the text of Heidegger's presentation in this seminar was published under the title "The Onto-Theo-Logical Nature of Metaphysics" together with Identity and Difference (op. cit.).

then understood as An-Wesen (presence-ing). This lies at the center of Heidegger's conception of Being. It may also be for such reasons, as Heidegger suggests, that in bringing Being to expression, we always express more than we understand propositionally and conceptually.

Gadamer's relentless efforts to bring Heidegger more and more into an intimate relation with Hegel reflect the fact that he is so thoroughly fascinated with both of them at the same time. These predilections have led him to move carefully, exploring various points of departure (art, play, language, hermeneutics, theology, ontology, history) in an effort to burrow beneath what might seem apparent and easily acceptable at first glance. Such a thinker could hardly be satisfied with glib typologies of philosophical stand-points such as abound among the various anthologies and summaries of "existentialism."

Yet, one cannot quite write off men like James Collins, who has given an account of peculiarly existentialist themes,³² or Etienne Gilson, who has drawn the contrast between Hegel and philosophy of existence as sharply as could be possible.³³ Although, curiously, Gilson does not mention Heidegger by name, his account of Hegel's ontology is interesting for our present purposes.

"No one," he says, "can even compare in importance with the a priori deduction of existence by Hegel." The reason for taking on such a task as the deduction of existence is that "everything in the world has to be

susceptible of an exhaustive justification." Thus Hegel's emphasis on Reason, as Klaus Hertmann says, since "die Vernunft ist das Moment der Legitimation."³⁴ And Marcuse, with his penchant for shock-effect, echoes the same point when he lays down the principle, "what exists deserves to perish," and when he claims that reason, as against positivism, consists in "the Great Refusal to accept the facts."³⁵ Hegel's devaluation of existence (by which is here meant the positive givenness of that which is) appears most clearly in his conception of God, in connection with whom "existence should not even be mentioned," since, on the contrary, "God is both the most concrete and the fullest of all essences..."³⁶

The thesis which Gilson wishes to set forth in his discussion of Hegel's ontology is that, while existence does find a place in that ontology, it is the concept of existence rather than and at the expense of actual existence. Gadamer had appealed to Hegel's statement, "Die Wahrheit des Seins ist das Wesen," in order to bring Heidegger into the vicinity of Hegel's philosophy. Similarly, but for the opposite purpose, Gilson appeals to Hegel's doctrine of essence as the foundation of existence: "das Wesen als Grund der Existenz."³⁷ Gilson wishes to argue that this doctrine identifies Hegel's system as a thoroughgoing essentialism, such a triumphant one that existence effectively disappears

into the concrete essence which is the actual overcoming of appearance and reality. So, the essence of Hegel has not only explained existence a priori; it has explained it away.

A reaction was bound to come in the name of existence and it was not long in coming. And the reaction was to take the form of a revolt against philosophy itself, since philosophy was thought to have as one of its standing aims the elimination of existence. This was Kierkegaard's point (so Gilson in any case) in distinguishing between knowing Christianity and being a Christian. He was thus a "pure existentialist" for the very reason that there can be no such thing as an objective philosophy of existence. In contrast to the existing person, Hegel's "concreteness" still remains pure abstraction; for the existing person of Hegel himself found no place within his own system. Accordingly, Kierkegaard can say:³⁸

What confuses the whole doctrine about being in logic is that people do not notice that they are always operating with the 'concept' of existence. But the concept of existence is an ideality and the difficulty is, of course, whether existence can be reduced to a concept.... An individual man has not after all a conceptual existence.

Similar statements abound in mid-19th century literature.

Karl Marx, for example, says,³⁹

When reality is depicted, philosophy, as an independent branch of activity, loses its medium of existence. At the best its place can only be taken by a summing-up of the most general results, abstractions which arise from the observation of the historical development of humanity.

A more forceful objection is brought against Hegel's system of Reason by Schelling. A system of Reason is bound to collapse existence into essence, since it can accomodate existence as idea only and, as against actual, positive existence, it is bound to entertain it as a possibility, as Seinkönnen.⁴⁰ Constantin Frantz summarizes the argument as follows:⁴¹

Die reine Vernunftwissenschaft geht lediglich auf die Essenz der Dinge, oder was in Beziehung auf die Erkenntnis der Begriff der Dinge genannt werden kann. Denn ~~der~~ der Essenz nach sind die Dinge selbst noch innerhalb der Vernunft, insofern sie aber existieren sind sie eben--wie das Wort Existenz selbst besagt--aus ihrer Essenz herausgesetzt oder herausgetreten, und damit auch aus dem Bereich der reinen Vernunft, deren Kompetenz folglich aufhört, wo das Reich der Existenz beginnt....

The attacks of Kierkegaard, Marx, and Schelling against what they regarded as Hegel's game of concepts hark back to an ancient, time-honored distinction between the real and the rational. Hegel's synthesis of the real and the rational, of Being and Notion, is not under attack so far as it goes. The point is that individual existence (Kierkegaard), social reality as it is objectively found (Marx), and the positive actuality of the actual⁴² (Schelling) are simply left out of account. The real, they said, cannot be conjured up through the sorcery of dialectical reason; this is a bewitchment rather than knowledge. The real, the actual, the positively existing must be given in some other way; it is encountered "immediately" and "blindly" as a given positum, that is

to say apart from and prior to any dialectical negations and their mediations.

On the other hand, one might argue with Klaus Hartmann⁴³ that it is precisely a conceptual philosophy which Hegel set out to construct. To that extent, his thinking is "transcendental" rather than "existential" or even "ontological". Nevertheless, the argument of Schelling holds that for this reason Being is reduced to a Seinkönnen since it does not include positive existence. It was in this way that Schelling inaugurated the post-Hegelian existentialist criticism of the speculative philosophy as early as 1833-5.⁴⁴

It is, no doubt, from this point of view that Heidegger is placed within the general "existentialist" movement. Such terms as "facticity," "thrownness" and Befindlichkeit (to say nothing of "anxiety" and "freedom towards death") indicate his affinity with Kierkegaard and Schelling. Thus Löwith can say, "In Schelling, the problem of being in the anti-Hegelian movement arrived at a point where Heidegger once more took it up."⁴⁵

If Löwith is right, we would be well advised to look for oppositions between Hegel and Heidegger, if not to abandon the comparison altogether. We have in fact reached a point on the opposite side of Gadamer's position on this question. The issue is more complex, however.

When the contrast is drawn between philosophy of essence and of existence, there often follow some mitigating qualifications. In Tillich's view, for example, existentialism does not exclude "what is essentially given," but only recognizes a conflict between it and what exists. "For me," he says, "essentialism and existentialism belong together...It is impossible to be a pure essentialist..." On the other hand, "a pure existentialism is impossible..." Pure essentialism leads to "the metaphysical arrogance of Hegel," who saw himself "sitting on the throne of God," and pure existentialism reduces to the "silence of solipsism." Moreover, "to describe existence one must use language" and language is by its very nature essentialist, since it deals with universals.⁴⁶ This is, in fact, Hegel's main point in the opening chapter in the Phenomenology.

A similar point is made by William A. Luijpen:⁴⁷

In the philosophy of Hegel -- the black sheep in Kierkegaard's works -- and in scientism, man was scientifically discussed in such a way that the original, irrepeatable, unique and exceptional character of human subjectivity simply disappeared under verbiage.

On the other hand,

Anyone who philosophizes about man can hardly avoid the use of universal and necessary judgments to indicate the universal and necessary structure of man.

Aside from problems which arise in connection with the terms "essentialism" and "existentialism," the cogency of the distinction is thrown in doubt by Heidegger's own

self-interpretation in relation to Hegel and by the Heidegger-interpretations of Richardson and van der Meulen. Theodore Kisiel, commenting on Werner Marx's Heidegger and the Tradition, goes so far as to say "that for Heidegger the question of Being is still a question of essence..."⁴⁸

Following Heidegger's Hegel's Begriff der Erfahrung, Richardson outlines some points of continuity and discontinuity. One might be surprised to find that Heidegger endorses Hegel's conception of "absolute Awareness" ("Awareness" for Wissen) and identifies it with Being. The problem now becomes, "What is the nature of Being as Awareness?" Not surprisingly, Being as Awareness becomes "emerging into presence" or "non-concealment". A similar point was made by Gadamer.

An interesting further implication of this doctrine of Being as absolute Awareness or coming into presence involves the conception of truth. When Hegel claims that the dialectical truth of the finite is the infinite (qualitatively conceived), he has in mind the "Notion (which) shows itself eternally in that activity whereby Being is posited as identical with itself."⁴⁹ The Notion which shows itself as infinite Being is the Truth of finite being. This is not altogether different from Heidegger's Unverborgenheit and Erschlossenheit as Truth and Anwesen as Being, or, as Richardson says, "that by which beings appear, shine-forth in truth." Being, in

the fullest sense, thus becomes event or advent (Sein als Ereignis, bzw. Geschehen) in both Hegel and Heidegger. As event, "it needs a domain wherein it may shine-forth." And "such a domain pertains to its very essence."⁵⁰ This domain is Dasein, the "clearing of Being," in which Being comes to presence and in which it is let-be as itself. Thus, Heidegger quotes Hegel to the effect that the Absolute is "in and for itself already close to us of its own accord," and comments, "This pointer merely refers us back specifically to that relation with the Absolute in which we are already."⁵¹

In spite of these correlations, Heidegger sees in Hegel a recalcitrant, indeed a triumphant reduction of Being to consciousness, to Be-wusst-sein, thus to the knowing of a cogitatio. While it is no longer a matter of intellect adquired to object, not in absolute Awareness, though the relation takes place and is progressively sublated along the way towards absolute Awareness, knowledge remains in Hegel caught up in a subject-object relation. Richardson's point is that Hegel's theory of knowledge and metaphysics failed to transcend the tradition of Cartesian "Subjectism", but is in fact a consummate expression of it.

One might wish that Richardson had more often taken into account several works by both Hegel and Heidegger at the same time, so that more cross-references would appear in his book. In connection with Hegel's alleged

"subjectism", for example, one might wish that some reference had been made to Hegel's differentiation of transcendental and absolute idealism in his discussion of Kant.⁵² It might be difficult to sustain the charge of subjectism (and, for that matter, perhaps also even that of idealism, subjective or objective) in this light.

Similarly, while Richardson ~~makes~~ use of Heidegger's Hegel's Concept of Experience, one might also refer to Being and Time. A juxtaposition of these works would raise some special problems in connection with the problem of Heidegger's relation to Hegel as well as to others. Richardson speaks of the "reversal" (Kehre) in Heidegger's thought (to which we have already referred). In the light of Gadamer's discussion of this point (above) one might well have some misgivings as to this translation of "Kehre" as "reversal". In any case, prior to the reversal, on Richardson's view, Heidegger proceeded from Dasein to Being and afterwards from Being to Dasein, or, as the book's title itself says, from Phenomenology to Thought. So, expectably, a noticeable difference exists between Being and Time and Hegel's Concept of Experience (ca. 1926 and 1942) regarding Heidegger's attitude towards Hegel and his hermeneutic procedure in general. In Being and Time he seeks to carry out a kind of existential reduction (not dissimilar to Husserl's phenomenological reductions) of metaphysical ideas to their existenti-ell

roots, as in his criticism of Hegel's conception of time. In Hegel's Concept of Experience, however, it is not so much a matter of existential reduction as it is an attempt to translate Hegelian ideas into the language of Dasein, Being and Presence, which he had by this time forged. Such a translation is justified on the ground that his own language "can serve to bring into its own light another man's thought in order to liberate this thought into the fullness of its own essence."⁵³ The difference in hermeneutic procedure may reflect a certain shift of view, such as has been called a reversal or Kehre, though this is possibly an exaggeration. This interpretation would seem to lead to the conclusion that it is primarily the existential component of Being and Time which separates Heidegger from Hegel, and that with a later shift in Heidegger's point of departure an affinity with Hegel appears which had not been apparent in Being and Time. While Richardson's discussion would seem to lead to this conclusion, it is also true that Heidegger has, in later writings, differed with Hegel on points other than either that of subjectism or existential reduction.⁵⁴

For the same reasons that the so-called "reversal" or the "turn" (as Kisiel and Murray Greene more happily translate it⁵⁵) should not be overemphasized, we should also be careful not to make too much of a consequent difference in hermeneutic procedure. Meulen, for one,

sees an analogy between Being and Time and the Phenomenology of Mind. Both of these works were written early in their authors' careers and both were followed by other works proposing to deal with the ends towards which these early works moved, i.e., Hegel's logical works and Heidegger's various probes in the direction of an "essential thinking" of Being.

In both Being and Time and the Phenomenology of Mind, there is first given a preliminary exposition of method. In both cases, the method is not incidental or "external" to the subject-matter, but constitutes the coming-to-be of the understanding of Being, which is at the same time Being's presencing of itself (Heidegger) and the Entfaltung of absolute Awareness in and through the various configurations of spiritual life, which is at the same time the absolute Spirit's coming to be itself (Hegel). "Denn die Methode ist der Bau des Ganzen in seiner reinen Wesenheit."⁵⁶

In both cases, moreover, the method is developed through the configurations of finite being or finite consciousness insofar as such being or consciousness is split, inauthentic, other-than-itself. It is not accidental, within the framework of the problematics of these two works, that Heidegger's way to the Truth of Being begins with Dasein and that Hegel's pilgrim's journey to the awareness of the Absolute begins with consciousness. In both cases, the process is carried out by way of several

steps (stufenweise) leading towards the Truth (be it of Being or of absolute Awareness). Both regard the end of the process as already present in each step and both regard it as present as yet implicitly. In Heidegger, the pre-ontological understanding of Being is first not aware of itself as an understanding of Being, but of Dasein as its own being qua existence. In Hegel, the various configurations of consciousness and self-consciousness, of subjective and objective spirit, are not in themselves explicitly aware of themselves in their necessary relation to the Idea, i.e. as moments of the process as a whole.

When turning to the discontinuities, Meulen arrives at the same conclusions as does Richardson. Hegel had called his phenomenology a "Wissenschaft des erscheinenden Geistes". So far there does not seem to be much of a problem, since Heidegger had also refused to separate "appearance" from "that which appears".⁵⁷ Yet, Hegel goes on to call his phenomenology "Wissenschaft der Erfahrung des Bewusstseins." Here a difference comes to the foreground, at least on Meulen's view. Phenomenology has now forfeited its task of illuminating the Being of beings and is restricted to Being in its Vorgestelltsein, its re-presentation. Thus,

Denn zwar ist die Erfahrung des Bewusstseins des Subjekt des Wissens, aber dieses Wissen ist noch erst in der subjektiven Gewissheit des Vorstellens befangen und in der jeweiligen Gestalt dessen, was ihm das Wahre ist, verstrickt.⁵⁸

Wissen, then, so long as it is restricted to consciousness (conceived, in this case, in a wider sense than it is in the first part of the Phenomenology), will not achieve an awareness of Being. It is still caught up in a Cartesian subject-ism, as Richardson had said. Again, as in the case of Richardson, one might wish that some further reference had been made, in this connection especially to the distinction between Vorstellung and Begriff as well as Verstand and Vernunft.⁵⁹ Still, this is the same objection which is found in Schelling and Kierkegaard, viz., that "reality" or the "object of knowledge" is thought as ideas, rather than "encountered" or "enacted" in "living experience". But this is all Hegel ever pretended to be doing, as Klaus Hartmann says.⁶⁰

This brief survey is intended to bring out some of the issues which have been raised by commentators on the Hegel-Heidegger relationship. If anything has been established, it is that the problem is very complex indeed. As to the comparability of Heidegger with Hegel, there appear to be several issues coming out of the work that has already been done. Aside from historical issues concerning their respective position in the 19th and 20th centuries,⁶¹ Gadamer has also raised the question of the determinability of Being, immediate as well as absolute, and has held that the determination of Being is very similar in Heidegger and Hegel. Gilson, on the other hand, has

argued that existence must be included in the conception of Being, and this is the chief contention of the whole of his book, Being and Some Philosophers.⁶² The fault of Hegel is said to be his exclusion of existence from Being, and the fault of Kierkegaard was said to be exactly the same, i.e., to see existence in opposition to a concept of Being ("existence versus Being"), but this was done, as against Hegel, in the interest of affirming the priority of existence. With sees Heidegger as an outgrowth of Schelling's positive philosophy, emphasizing Heideggerian notions like facticity and thrownness. Tillich, like Gilson, does not mention Heidegger (probably for political reasons, although in Gilson's case, there may be other reasons⁶³), but holds that the distinction between existentialism and essentialism is in need of serious qualification. Luijpen agrees with Tillich here. Essence and existence complement each other in Being, but are distinguishable and in conflict with each other in finitude, in any case, so far as existence is fallen, disrupted essence. Schelling objected that Hegel could only be in a position to conceive of Being as a concept (to which Hegel would, of course, gladly agree) and thus as a possibility to be rather than actual existence. Richardson, agreeing with Gadamer and closely following Heidegger's own exposition in one work, Hegel's Concept of Experience, finds continuities between Hegel and Heidegger in the conception of Being, Truth, and the Absolute. Agreeing,

on the other hand, with Kierkegaard and Schelling, he finds discontinuities between a philosophy of consciousness (Hegel) and a philosophy of Being (Heidegger). The one is in the tradition of Cartesian Subjectism and the other is, for Heidegger, a "new beginning",⁶⁵ though one might have compunctions about the newness of that beginning, as Collins points out with reference to St. Thomas and Werner Marx with reference to Aristotle. Meulen, with Gadamer and, to some extent, with Richardson, sees Heidegger engaged in the same enterprise as is Hegel, Hegel's Absolute Idea being in intention the same as Heidegger's Sinn von Sein. Phenomenology is in both cases the same project, namely the attempt to reach this understanding of the meaning of Being and the Absolute. He repeats, however, the same point which is made again and again, that Hegel's thinking revolves around re-presentations, concepts, abstractions, while Heidegger sought to "let" Being reveal itself through the phenomena.

In view of the variety of interpretations -- a variety which is all the more impressive since so few interpretations exist -- the legitimacy of the present project is underscored even by a cursory look at the secondary literature. A further contribution to the discussion is thus very much a possibility.

2. The Question of Being

Not only do the commentaries display a variety of differing emphases and conflicting viewpoints, but the basic concept of Being, around which the discussion must turn, remains vague as a philosophical theme. The word "being" is a perfectly familiar one in ordinary discourse and judgments of being are constantly made with regard to entities experienced or thought. We seem to agree, moreover, under what conditions we can legitimately say of an entity that it is or exists. From the point of view of our ordinary, everyday dealings with things, those agreed upon conditions seem to combine the perception of the entity in question with an assumption of the veracity of the perception, within limits of verification also tacitly agreed upon. It would seem plausible therefore to say that the question of being is settled once these conditions of the word's applicability have adequately been described. Thus, philosophers have sometimes persuaded themselves that the large questions as to the "essence" of Being as such are unproductive or even meaningless.⁶⁶

No one will deny that knowing how to speak a language involves knowing how to use its existential terms, and no one will deny the legitimacy of an inquiry into the conditions of their use, or that such an inquiry could be called a species of ontology.⁶⁷ On the other

hand it would be difficult to deny that both Hegel and Heidegger had something else in mind. The difference may be seen from two formulations given by Heidegger himself.

And the ontological task...is precisely of such a sort as to require that we first come to an understanding of 'what we really mean by this expression "Being"'.⁶⁸

Our aim in the following treatise is to work out the question of the meaning of Being and to do so concretely.⁶⁹

Rudolph Schmitt has pointed out that these two questions are quite different.⁷⁰

The first concerns the meaning of an English (or German) word. The second concerns the state or condition of being. The first is a question about a word in a particular language and thus can only be answered by someone who knows that language. The second is a question not about anything linguistic at all and answering it does not require that one knows a particular language. The difference between these two questions illustrates the difference between what philosophers call "using an expression" and "mentioning an expression."

The expression "state or condition of being" is an unhappy one since it blurs over some further distinction which would need to be made. At this point in the exposition it will suffice, however, to point up the fact that we are dealing with Being "concretely" rather than linguistically.* It is Heidegger's task in Being and Time to formulate the question of Being "concretely" and it turns out to be a difficult task indeed. This is no

* "He who attempts this sort of thing does not just busy himself with merely verbal significations; he must venture forth into the most primordial problematic...." (BT, p. 127)

less true of his later work, in which he sets out again and again to raise the question properly and the task is never quite concluded.

While, for Heidegger, we are not yet in a position to formulate the question of Being precisely, nevertheless "the meaning of Being must already be available to us in some way."⁷¹ We must assume that we are sufficiently familiar with Being, in general, and with our own being, in particular, to be able to recognize that there is a question to be asked. Our problem is not whether there is a question to be asked, but rather how it is to be asked. The very familiarity of is and to be points up also the primacy of the question. St. Thomas had already argued that "An understanding of Being is already included in conceiving anything which one apprehends in entities."⁷² Similarly, Heidegger has argued that unless we knew what to be means, no discourse could be possible at all. Unless we could "differentiate in advance between being and non-being," we would not be able to "determine whether a thing, presumed to be at some place and time, is or is not."⁷³

This pre-conceptual, pre-ontological awareness and understanding of Being gives rise to the attempt to understand it conceptually, ontologically.

As we have intimated, we always conduct our activities in an understanding of Being. Out of this understanding arise both the explicit question of the meaning of Being and the tendency that leads us

towards its conception. We do not know what 'Being' means....But this vague average understanding of Being is still a fact.⁷⁴

It is therefore no defect if an ontology is incapable of formulating the question satisfactorily in advance. We are here faced with the ancient problem again: If we know what we are asking about, then we need not ask, and if we do not know, we cannot ask.⁷⁵ Heidegger has seen this circular state of the question very clearly.⁷⁶ The question of Being has the peculiarity that question and answer form, so to speak, the same tapestry. The problem is then, not to set down a question -- perhaps regarding it as the question of Being -- to which the subsequent explanations would constitute a response, but to gain access into the ontological circle. This is in fact the procedure Hegel also recommends. He has often warned against proceeding in philosophy on the model of mathematics, setting down principles, definitions and questions, or, as he puts it, "a string of desultory assertions and assurances."⁷⁷

Some such "assertions and assurances" must nevertheless be made here, if only because the two main foci of this paper are widely held to be in doubt, i.e., the comparability of Hegel and Heidegger and the visibility of the concept of Being. Neither of these foci can be conclusively established in an Introduction, but must await the subsequent, more substantive expositions. The

reference to Hegel's recommendations is intended to indicate that both Hegel and Heidegger agree on the circular character of this sort of inquiry while leaving open the possibility of a progressive clarification of concepts. We are concerned in this Introduction to present some reflections which will give some warrant to the project here presented.⁷⁸

If Heidegger places great emphasis on the primacy of the question of Being, we can expect him to give some formulations of it. And if Hegel is to be brought into view within the context of these formulations, we can expect to find him going beyond his own initial statements as to the "emptiness" of the concept of Being. On both of these counts, we have definite leads to follow.

The following statement by Hegel would seem to place him entirely outside the framework of Heidegger's thought:

But the simple determination of being is in itself so meager that, if only for that reason, there is no need to make such a fuss about it.⁷⁹

If this were all that Hegel had to say about it, there would be no need to go any further. Moreover, Claud Welch has said that unity is Hegel's highest concept.⁸⁰ Further, Hegel himself had said that Spirit is "the grandest conception of all."⁸¹ Gilson might be right, therefore, in saying that Hegel's system represents a devaluation of Being.⁸²

While in the beginning Being appears as the "immediate," "abstract," "simple relation-to-self," it is "infected with

the urge to carry itself further." In itself it is already "the concrete totality," "the Notion," "the Absolute" though yet implicitly. As "being-for-self" it takes on a "mediating determination," which is "in its truth a relation or relationship" (Beziehung--Verheltniss). Finally, "the Notion that comprehends itself" and "abides with itself" is "fulfilled Being,...Being as the concrete and also absolutely intensive totality."⁸² The conception of Being in Hegel is thus not limited to the first or immediate sense of it. This was brought out already by Heidegger, Gadamer, and Richardson, as we have seen. A Hegel-Heidegger comparison can then be an internal one, focusing on issues inherent and intrinsic in the course of their thinking, rather than an external one, such as would have to be the case were we to compare, say, Heidegger with Hume.

Heidegger insists throughout that the formulating of the question of Being is to be done progressively and step by step and is essentially bound up with a simultaneous progressive, step by step understanding of Being from the pre-ontological to its conceptual articulation. And this is indeed what happens in his writings through a great number of probing statements of it. Of these we may list four formulations which can be taken as representing basic types of ontological thinking.

(1) "According to the tradition, the question of Being is understood by philosophy to be of being as being

(nach dem Seienden als Seienden). It is the question of metaphysics."⁸³ Insofar as metaphysics "does not go back to its ground," i.e., to an interpretation of Being (Sein), it constitutes the forgottenness of Being.

(2) "Being is always the Being of a being."⁸⁴ "What is asked about (is) the Being of beings."⁸⁵ This Being is no longer conceived as the "totality of beings," whether as aggregate or genus, nor is the task of explicating the Being of beings a matter of delineating "its various domains" (the reference is clearly to Husserl's "regional ontologies"). "Being is the transcendens pure and simple."⁸⁶

(3) In Nietzsche I Heidegger distinguishes between the question of the Being of beings and the question, "Was ist dieses Sein selbst?" and adds:⁸⁷

Es ist die Frage nach dem "Sinn des Seins", nicht nur nach dem Sein des Seienden; und "Sinn" ist dabei genau in seinem Begriff umgrenzt als dasjenige, von woher und auf Grund wovon das Sein überhaupt als solches offenbar werden und in die Wahrheit kommen kann.

(4) In the essay, "The Onto-Theo-Logical Constitution of Metaphysics," Heidegger goes a step even further. "For us," he writes, "the topic of thinking is the same, therefore Being, but Being with regard to its difference to being....For us the topic of thinking...is the difference qua difference."⁸⁸ This recalls a much earlier piece of writing, Vom Wesen des Grundes, in which the

difference of Being (Sein) and being (Seiendes) is called "the ontological difference".⁸⁹ The topic of thinking is now no longer "des Sein selbst" and "des Sein überhaupt als solches," but the ontological difference. Oddly enough, he credits Hegel with "thinking Being with regard to being," though the expression "with regard to" could mean either "the Being of beings" or "Being as being" (nrs. 1 & 2 above).

It remains a problem for the interpretation of Heidegger if #2, #3 and #4 consist of different questions. In Being and Time, #2 and #3 are treated as the same question, but in Nietzsche they are said to be distinct questions. Another indication as to the difference between #2 and #3 is the use of "transcendence" in The Question of Being⁹⁰ as a relationship of being with Being "starting from the former and going towards the latter." We shall see that these notions, viz., Sein, Sinn von Sein, Sein des Seienden, Differenz, Transzendenz, as well as Lichtung des Seins, Wesen des Seins, and the like, are very close together in meaning. And it is surely Heidegger's intention that this sort of vocabulary should find its validity, not in criteria of clearness and distinctness, but in its power to "stir our Dasein by the question of Being."⁹¹

3. The Traits of Being

The question of Being was raised in its most radical and fundamental form in recent times by Heidegger. This accounts for the fact that in the attempt to formulate the question, we have relied primarily on Heidegger's work. In so doing, we have found that great difficulties arise for that attempt, and that is for the very good reason that the question's formulation depends upon a concomitant progressive understanding of Being. The question cannot, therefore, be formulated in advance and independent of that understanding. The expression, "the question of Being", does not state a question, but is a name for a question which has been given many formulations. Each of the four formulations given above already presupposes a certain ontology. Thus, the difficulties encountered in formulating the question arise out of the fact that we have as yet no clear conception of the object of the question, viz., Being. "Of course 'Being' has been presupposed in all ontology up till now, but not as a concept at one's disposal -- not as the sort of thing we are seeking."⁹² Consequently, we are faced with the circularity of question and answer which we have already noted.

Yet, the subject-matter (die Sache) or topic cannot be left entirely indeterminate. The direction of the inquiry must approximately be indicated. We require some

preliminary determination of traits of Being⁹³ if only to defend the legitimacy of our topic.

We have up to this point already supposed some traits of Being, though without criticism. For one, we have supposed, with St. Thomas and Heidegger, that Being, "before aught else, falls under apprehension, the notion of which is included in all things whatsoever a man apprehends."⁹⁴ The first trait of Being is thus that it is included in all that is apprehended and is thus inescapable.

We have supposed, further, that a difference obtains between Being and being, the "Being-ness" of things and the things that are. Heidegger's "ontological difference" is also drawn by Nicolai Hartmann:⁹⁵

Sein und Seiendes unterscheiden sich ebenso wie Wahrheit und Wahres, Wirklichkeit und Wirkliches, Realität und Reelles. Es gibt vieles, was wahr ist, aber das Wahrsein selbst an diesem Vielen ist eines und dasselbe....Des Wirklichen gibt es vielerlei, die Wirklichkeit an ihm ist eine, ein identischer Seinsmodus. So auch ist es mit dem Seienden und Sein.

In der Ontologie bezeichnet das Sein im Unterschied vom Seienden, dem Dasein und Sosein einzelner Dinge das Existieren von Dingen überhaupt, das 'Sein des Seienden', das 'Identische in der Mannigfaltigkeit des Seienden'. Man muss nur die Unterscheidung vor Augen haben. Und das bedeutet, dass man nicht etwa nach einem einheitlichen Seienden hinter der Mannigfaltigkeit alles Seienden zu fragen hat--das würde von vornherein das suchen nach einer Substanz, einem Absoluten oder sonst einem Einheitsgrunde bedeuten, und dieser müsste ja selbst wiederum ein Sein haben--, sondern nach dem was das schlicht ontisch verstandene Generelle darin ist. Das aber ist das Sein.

That this passage contains difficulties of its own is quite evident. The general point remains nevertheless and that is that there are analogies available to us by which the proposed distinction between Being and beings becomes intelligible enough to allow us to focus attention on the meanings attaching to Being, rather than to the several determinations distinguishing particular beings. This distinction is the guiding thread of Heidegger's thought throughout. Thus,

Being, as the basic theme of philosophy, is no class or genus of entities; yet it pertains to every entity. Its 'universality' is to be sought higher up. Being and the structure of Being lie beyond every entity and every possible character which an entity may possess.³⁶

A second trait of Being is then its difference from being. When Hartmann speaks of "des schlicht ontisch verstandene Generelle" an ancient Aristotelian problem arises again: How are we to conceive of the generality (universality) of Being? If Being is to be distinguished from beings (individual substances), how are we to conceive of it? Aristotle aims at proving that Being is not a genus, but that it is a relational concept (between essence and existence, potentiality and actuality, substance and accident, etc.). Being cannot be a genus since the differentiations of a genus are extraneous to the genus, but there is nothing extraneous to Being. For a genus, such as animality, there are certain differences which distinguish the genus from other genera. These differences

are extraneous to the genus, since they are not themselves beings (animals). But they have being and any differences which serve to differentiate have being, since anything that is has being. Therefore, whereas the differences of Being have themselves being, but the differences of a genus are not themselves members of the genus, Being is not a genus.⁹⁷

The distinction between Being and beings was made in the interest of increased clarification, but it might have the opposite consequence. One of its consequences is that 'being' does not denote a being, any number of beings, or the totality of beings, that is if by "totality" we mean the sum or aggregate or genus of all beings. (Other meanings of "totality" are of course available, i.e., Hegel's "intensive totality" or "qualitative infinity".) Apart from such denotations, however, it may be possible to set down traits of that which is in such a way that they may be said to be signified by "Being". But we are then again caught up in the same aporia we have met with above in regard to the indefinability of Being, at least in terms of genus and difference. It seems that we are reduced either to silence or partiality, since any determination of Being involves an exclusion which is implied in that very determinateness.* Nevertheless, as Heidegger says, "the indefinability of Being

*Cf. Spinoza to Jerig Jellis (Letter 50): "As then figure is nothing else than determination, and determination is negation, figure, as has been said, can be nothing but negation."

does not eliminate the question of its meaning; it demands that we look the question in the face."⁹⁸ To "look the question in the face" is not to attempt merely a nominal definition (p. 28 above), but as Kevin Wall, following Hegel, says, to look to "the inner constitutive principles" and "the ontological truth of the thing considered."⁹⁹

Several avenues of escape from this apparently aporetic situation have been suggested. Both Hegel and Heidegger have addressed themselves specifically to this problem. The problem may be put simply by asking how, given the absolute indeterminacy of Being, anything can be said of it. Their detailed strategies will occupy our attention at a later point. Our purpose here is nothing more than to raise some points in favor of an attempt to consider the concept of Being thematically.

We recall, in the first place, that Hegel had said that Being, as immediately conceived, is "infected with an urge to carry itself further". Rather than regarding the indeterminacy-indefinability of Being as an aporia bringing ontological reflection to a halt, progress is possible if we regard it as the first, or as Hegel put it, the immediate conception of Being, i.e., as the beginning rather than the end. When Being is seen as no-thing and in this sense equivalent to Nothing, thought is dialectically set in motion rather than brought to a halt. The pure indeterminacy of Being is aporetic for

formal thinking (retiocination--das Resonieren),¹⁰⁰ and this points to the necessity of a sort of dialectical thinking in which aporists become manageable.

Moreover, it is sometimes proposed that a term is meaningful only if it has a significant opposite. Whether this is a necessary condition for the meaningfulness of any term whatever could be argued. Sidney Hook has argued that the term "Being" is not meaningful on this criterion, since it does not have a significant opposite.¹⁰¹ For Hegel, "Being" has an opposite term, viz., Nothing, but the latter is as devoid of meaning as is "Being". So also, Parmenides and Plato have argued that "not-being" is unthinkable.¹⁰² On the other hand, Heidegger suggests two senses in which "Nothing" can be said to be a meaningful term.

First, with respect to particular beings, it is possible to think and speak meaningfully of their not-being. Otherwise, it would be possible only to speak and think meaningfully of things insofar as they are, a view which Bertrand Russell seems once to have held.¹⁰³ An argument to the effect that we can speak meaningfully of the not-being of things is implicit in Heidegger's statement of the fundamental question of the Introduction to Metaphysics: Why are there beings rather than nothing?¹⁰⁴ This question had already been raised by Schelling¹⁰⁵ and Leibniz¹⁰⁶ and is implicit in any philosophy which recognizes

the contingency of all things.¹⁰⁷ G.R. Vick has formulated the argument as follows:¹⁰⁸

By raising the question...Heidegger brings to mind the possibility that existent things might not have been; and of course, in light of the possibility that a designated thing might not have been, the fact that it is (as G.E. Moore has insisted), is significant, and a sentence expressing this fact meaningful.

Vick is using the word "existence" here in the common sense of it, which is usually rendered as "to be present at hand" (Vorhandenheit) by Heidegger. (We avoid speaking of the existence of things for the moment because the word has a specific technical meaning in Heidegger.) Moreover, Heidegger is speaking of Seiende (things which are) rather than Sein (Being). Nevertheless, the suggested opposite of the fact that things are at all is the possibility that nothing be at all, a conceivable possibility. Moreover, it may be said that the not-being of anything, that there be nothing at all would be less surprising than the fact that something is at all. Thus we have doctrines of divine creation and of the "Mystery of Being".¹⁰⁹

Secondly, having entertained the possibility of the not-being of anything, Heidegger insists that such nothingness is indeed very important in our experience.¹¹⁰ Nothingness has a greater significance in experience than does the ontic absence of any one thing or any number of things, and a greater significance also than potentiality (me-ontic nothingness). Nothingness (ouk-ontic nothingness) takes on an ontological meaning as a determination or

dimension or character (Bestimmung) of the finite being we experience as our own. It takes on the existential character of a threat and is experienced in anguish (Angst). As against both a sense-datum empiricism and a rationalist metaphysics, Heidegger wishes to point to a larger field of experience, which would include the experience of Being and Nothingness and which presses in upon us no matter how tenaciously some epistemologies insist on ruling it out.

If from a logical point of view we can say that the term "Being" has a significant opposite, viz., Nothing, difficulties arise when, from a more properly ontological point of view, we attempt to inquire into their relationships. We can (and have) distinguished several senses in which "Being" can be meant and can expect corresponding variations in the meanings of "Nothing". These variations will, of course, need to be brought out when dealing with Hegel's dialectic of Being-Nothing-Becoming and of the life of the Absolute for itself. The senses of "Nothing" allowed by Heidegger will have to be taken into account in relation to his discussions of anguish, of existential possibility, and of the "veiling" of Being ("Das Nichts ist der Schleier des Seins"). In any case, at this point the warning cannot be overemphasized that, when it is said that "Nothing" logically functions as the opposite of "Being", it does not so function ontologically, at least not for that reason. The latter involved many complex considerations which arise independent of the former.

Heidegger's warning that the supposed indefinability of "Being" should not lead us to declare a stalemate in ontology is repeated by John E. Smith in a recent article. In it he offers some helpful proposals.¹¹¹

First, with respect to the inescapable concept of Being, let me say that for me it must embrace two features; on the one hand, it means the fact that there is something which stands out from and against nothingness, and, on the other, it means what it is that constitutes this standing out. The second feature will be recognized as the object of the perennial ontological quest to find, in the suggestive expression of Ernest Hocking, a predicate for Being.

Smith goes on to list three such predicates which he deems appropriate: insistence, persistence, and expression.

These comprehend "the ancient doctrine that Being is power."¹¹²

In the tradition, a large number of predicates of this kind have been suggested: form, substance, act, unity, spirit, ground, independence, irreducibility, simplicity, and so forth. For our purposes, the important point coming out of Smith's article is that in each case of ontological predication "every such characterization must fall short or prove inadequate because of the very exclusion implied in its determinateness." Further, "there is no single concept by itself rich enough to express the Being we seek to express when we attempt to give it a predicate."

The purpose of these arguments, distinctions, and general reflections is not to present a theory, but to point up some features of the concept of Being and the question as to its meaning. These features are cited

provisionally and hypothetically and are intended to lay open the possibility of an inquiry which has "Being" as its theme and to ward off from the beginning that attitude, expressed sometimes even by some theologians, of which Hegel had said that, "while calling itself fear of error, (it) makes itself known rather as fear of truth."¹¹³

For this purpose, the following traits of Being have been given:

- (1) The meaning of Being is first understood in all apprehension of things and is a necessary condition for the intelligibility of all language and discourse. (Aristotle, St. Thomas, Heidegger, and even Hegel)
- (2) Being is distinguishable from being, from the multiplicity of finite beings. (Hertmann, Heidegger) This is Heidegger's ontological difference.
- (3) The unity of Being is not to be conceived as the unity of a genus. Nor is it to be conceived as a quantitative totality. But this does not reduce us to silence. (Aristotle, Well, Heidegger)
- (4) The indeterminacy of Being is pregnant with its own transcendence (mediation) and does not leave us hopelessly bound up in aporisms. (Hegel)
- (5) Logically, "Being" has a significant opposite term, i.e., "Nothing". The latter is significant insofar as the not-being of things is conceivable and insofar as nothingness, though not a datum of experience, is experienced. This does not mean that Nothing (oukon) is an ontological principle over against Being. (Vick, Heidegger)
- (6) It is possible to give predicates of Being with the proviso that no one of them exhausts its meaning. (Smith, Heidegger)

We now proceed to the organization of the steps by which

Hegel and Heidegger will be compared. Even apart from the Hegel-Heidegger comparison, the six points here listed would count as a charter for ontology as a legitimate field of study.¹¹⁴

4. Divisions of the Inquiry

Rather than proceeding by giving an exposition of Hegel and Heidegger separately, it seems more useful to arrange the body of the paper according to topics. The comparison can then be done in a more direct and straightforward way and in close connection with specific issues. The exposition is divided into three chapters, each dealing with an aspect of the general topic: (1) Being as Immediate, (2) Being as Determinate, and (3) Being as Absolute. This division will be recognized as a distinctively Hegelian one, though it does not exactly follow Hegel's division of his Logic into Being, Essence, and Notion. Several reasons may be cited in favor of this procedure, none of which are meant to imply, however, that this is the only legitimate approach or even that it is the best.

First, if there is a sense in which Being is apprehended, conceived or understood in a first, immediate or pre-conceptual way, the first question to be broached is how it is so apprehended, conceived or understood. The question concerns not only the modality of apprehension, conception or understanding but what it is, what content

(if any) it can be said to exhibit. For Heidegger, Being is first said to be understood "pre-ontologically" and this is analogous to Hegel's notion of "immediacy". This is not to say that there are no differences in their respective interpretations of immediacy, for it turns out that what is so understood is construed quite differently between them.

Questions of pre-ontological or immediate knowledge also raise the difficult problem how to make a beginning in ontological reflection of this kind. If, as both Heidegger and Hegel agree, ontology has a circular character, how are we to gain access into the circle? The controversies over starting-points among post-Kantian Idealists are famous enough.¹¹⁵ Hegel finds his in the immediacy of the abstract concept of Being and Fichte his in the immediate positing of the finite ego. In both cases the starting-points are recognized as abstractions, but are used provisionally as a way of entry into the real plenitude of Being. Heidegger's approach is quite different, as is that of modern phenomenology in general,¹¹⁶ where the concrete fullness of Being, rather than the abstraction, is the starting-point. Nevertheless, as we shall see, both in Hegel and in Heidegger, whatever the starting-point chosen, it has the character of immediacy. On this question, then, Hegel and Heidegger are eminently comparable.

Secondly, when a distinction is made between Being and beings, the question arises as to the relation between them, or, more significantly, as to the extent to which being may be said to be a relation to Being, to be constituted by a mode of to-ness to Being.¹¹⁷ A constant concern of Heidegger's is formulated in the title of the book What is a Thing?¹¹⁸ and it is not accidental that this should be a primary concern of his. In this book, he is chiefly concerned with Kant's construction of our knowledge of physical objects. But the problem had already appeared in Being and Time under the categories of "Reality" and in the concepts of Vorhandenheit and Zuhandenheit.

If, moreover, as in #6 above, predicates, names, modifications, prepositions, relations are used to signify Being, such determinations of Being lead, by a Hegelian argument, to Being as determinate, determinate being. Whether this is a slight of hand or constitutes a genuine dialectical argument is not at issue here. The point is that, for Hegel no less than for Heidegger, determinate being, entities, Dasein constitute essential aspects of the problematic of Being. Thus, Hegel has tried to deduce actuality (Wirklichkeit) from the unity of essence and appearance and determinate being in general from the dialectic of Being-Nothing-Becoming.¹¹⁹ Similarly, Nicolai Hartmann has spoken of the Wesen des Seins as Einheit von Dasein und Sosein (existence and essence) on the ground that Dasein and Sosein are modalities of Being,

which as modalities of Being cannot be identified with it. Thus we have the difference of Sein from Seiendem, where the latter consists of determinate beings constituted by the coincidence and difference (composition) of essence and existence. When Heidegger holds that, in our awareness of Being, we are "angewiesen auf das Seiende," he echoes the same general point, although the transition from Being to being and from being to Being is differently construed.

The difference may be seen in their different uses of the word "Dasein". In Hegel it is a general concept distinguishable from Existenz, while in Heidegger it is neither a general concept (since it has the character of Jemeinigkeit) nor is distinguishable from existence. Beyond things as objects known, the key issue of Being and Time is the nature of such being that knows itself as being, i.e., Dasein, a being which reflects upon itself as being. We find again that there is a concept in Hegel which lies very close to Heidegger's "Dasein", and that is self-consciousness, though a different word is used. In each case, the fact that an entity is aware of itself as existing (in both cases the word "exist" is appropriate) makes a difference as to the mode of being attributable to it, though the entity in question, by virtue of being an entity, is still a determinate one (ein bestimmtes Seiendes).¹²⁰ Heidegger, for example, approvingly cites Max Scheler to the effect that "A person is not a thing,

not a substance, not an object."¹²¹ Again, the mode of Being which determinate entities have, whether "things" or "persons", can with good reason form the subject-matter of a separate chapter.

The third step we propose to take is the transition from determinate being to what we have provisionally called "absolute Being" and to inquire into the nature of the latter insofar as this can be made out from the Hegelian and Heideggerian texts. The bulk of Heidegger's later work may be understood as an attempt to reach a knowledge of the Being which he had sought in Being and Time. He says so plainly himself.¹²² The Geheimniss of Being is there to be brought to light in a conjunction of its mystery and hiddenness and its presence as the home (Heim--Geheimniss) of Dasein. Such a being-at-home with Being may be seen as functioning in Heidegger much like the Absolute does in Hegel. Hegel himself was fond of the image of being bei (often translated "at home") precisely in connection with our absolute knowledge of the unity of Being.¹²³

If Being cannot be left as an abstract concept, neither can it be left with the multiplicity of finite beings. The necessity of a third step may be seen from the distinction itself between Being and beings and recalls the famous ancient problem of the One and the many. But its importance also appears very decisively in modern

existentialism. When Sartre refuses to recognize a unity between the pour soi and the en soi in terms of a Hegelian An-und-Fürsichsein, he does not reject the meaningfulness or the desirability of this third step, but only that it gets us to a truth about reality.

The word "absolute" may be inappropriate here since it may be taken to connote relationlessness. Thus, Bradley says, in thinking of the Absolute, "thought can understand that, to reach its goal, it must get beyond relations,"¹²⁴ it must "pass entirely beyond the relational point of view."¹²⁵ It may be for such reasons that Heidegger does not wish to speak of Being as "absolute", "unconditioned", or relationless, though he does on occasion refer to Hegel's Absolute as having relational characteristics.¹²⁶ And in his exposition of Hegel's Absolute, it is precisely these relational characteristics by which it is said that Being is to be thought. It may be argued still that Hegel's Absolute is not absolute, since it has such characteristics,¹²⁷ be they "inner" or internal, that is to say dialectical, and not to be construed, on Hegel's account, as diminishing the unity and wholeness of the Absolute. What these considerations indicate is that we need to ask what it is that Hegel means or can mean by "absolute," how the Absolute can be said to be both absolute and related. It may turn out that the attempt to do so will involve insuperable difficulties. But these are nevertheless distinct questions, i e., what does Hegel mean? and is he right?

A further reason which may be adduced to defend an attempt to compare Hegel's concept of the Absolute and Heidegger's concept of Being is that both involve or even constitute a return to the beginning. The beginning already contains the whole implicitly and is now brought to fruition in the Concept (Hegel). What is known in the beginning is an existenti-ell way is now made the theme for ontological "essential thinking", a disposition of attentiveness allowing Being to shine through the beings. (Heidegger) The return to the beginning may, for all that, also confer a certain elegance to the strategy here proposed.

Reference has already been made to commentaries by Gadamer and Richardson in which some of these several points of comparison have been pursued. The proposal here suggested is therefore not without authority. These divisions certainly do not correspond exactly between Hegel and Heidegger, but it seems fairly clear that they do not constitute arbitrary impositions upon the texts and they suggest some interesting correlations in any case, by which a comparison might proceed.

5. A Note on Theologians

It would seem fairly clear that of all theoretical disciplines theology is the one which has the greatest stake in the visibility and the intelligibility of the concept of Being. Thus, Aristotle held that the science

of theology "must be prior and must be first philosophy, and universal in this way, because it is first. And it will belong to this to consider being *que* being--both what it is and the attributes which belong to it *que* being."¹²⁸ Though he reminds us that "we must not seek a definition of everything but be content to grasp the analogy,"¹²⁹ first philosophy studies Being *que* Being and becomes theology.

From a Christian point of view, St. Thomas Aquinas had said that "He (God) is supremely being...since He is Being itself" and again, "this name He Who Is, is the most proper name of God...for it does not signify some form, but Being itself....The Being of God is His very essence." Going still further, he says, "This name He Who Is is the name of God more properly than this name God...."¹³⁰ This thesis has some foundation also in Christian scriptures, although it is probably impossible to claim that there can be an exclusive or unitary biblical theology. The relevant passages are famous enough and do not require exposition here.¹³¹ Etienne Gilson makes much of the Exodus passage as does St. Thomas. It is in this passage that God is identified ("I am that I am") and in St. John's Gospel the incarnation of the Word of God is connected with this identification of the Being of God.¹³² It would seem, therefore, that a biblical case could be made in support of St. Thomas' thesis, though it is certainly not a matter

we should insist upon here, since the point at issue does not stand or fall on such grounds.

It seems odd that theologians themselves often greet such attempts at ontological theology with misgivings. Several reasons might of course be given in favor of such misgivings: Being can as little be positively described as can God -- in both cases we are consigned to negations, analogies, and partial attributions; "Being" is as mysterious and unwieldy a notion as is "God"; "Being" does not have the personal connotations which we might want to include in the meaning of "God". "Radical" theologians claim that this mode of thinking about God is outdated, though they themselves freely indulge in it, claiming at the same time to have broken with the past. Barthians claim that such "natural" or "rational" theology detracts from God as revealed. God is, as Barth says, "who He is in the act of His revelation," "who in the Bible is called God and Lord."¹³³

On the other hand, when similarities are found between "Being" and "God", one might say that this counts in favor of the identification of Being and God. If all that can be said of Being can also be said of God and if all that can be said of God can also be said of Being (including the attribute "personal"), the two terms will be identical in meaning. The problem is whether this is the case. More than that, if the use of the term

"Being" in place of "God" highlights and clarifies certain aspects which remain confused in the theological as well as the ordinary use of the term "God", then we have achieved an advance in theological understanding. Indeed, one of the motives for recent attempts to interpret "God" in terms of "Being" is that the concept of God is thought to have become problematical. The substitution of "Being" for "God" is plausible only if the notion of Being can be made out to have greater significance and intelligibility than the notion of God has come to have. The proposal is in fact widely debated especially in connection with Heidegger's thought.¹³⁴ The fact that the issue is widely debated -- and without conclusion -- is sufficient reason for taking it up again. Indeed, theologians should be the last to avoid it.

On the negative side, Hegel had already said that "God" is a much richer concept than is "Being".

And in the case of Being, we are speaking of nothing concrete (he writes): for the concept of Being is utterly abstract. So far then, the question of the Being of God...is of slight importance.¹³⁵

Gilson comments that "to say of God that He is, is to pay him poor homage."¹³⁶ For, as Hegel had said, God is "a being which is in itself concrete above all measure."¹³⁷ It is interesting to notice that Hegel here rejects the identification of God and Being for the same reason that St. Thomas accepts it. Thomas held that "the less determinate the names are, and the more universal and absolute

they are, the more properly they are applied to God," and approvingly quotes Damascene as saying, "He who Is is the principal of all names applied to God; for...it contains being itself as an infinite and indeterminate sea of substance."¹³⁸ Hegel now rejects this application of Being to God by reason of its very indeterminacy.

Hegel is, of course, speaking of Being only in one sense of the term, namely the abstract concept which is first or immediately thought. It is also clear that St. Thomas intends a great deal more under Being as the primary name of God than mere indeterminacy.¹³⁹ Moreover, that Hegel developed the notion of Being in the direction of greater concreteness is fully documented by Professor Buckley¹⁴⁰ and has already come out of the earlier discussion.

Another attempt to avoid the word "Being" can be found in much of the so-called "process theology". It is apparent that in Process and Reality A.N. Whitehead seeks to avoid the word¹⁴¹ and uses instead words like "entity" and "concrescence". Charles Hartshorne, likewise, has said that he prefers "individuation" over "being"¹⁴² and praises pragmatism for reinforcing the antipathy to verbal exaltations of "being".¹⁴³

One of the sources of this antipathy is quite clearly Whitehead's emphasis on becoming, process, and the like. When "being" occurs in Process and Reality, it always occurs in a statement in which it is linked to "becoming",

while the latter word appears independently and much more frequently. This emphasis is, of course, in the nature of the metaphysics presented there, i.e., in the "principle of Process".¹⁴⁴ Being is understood in terms of becoming and process and is, apparently for this reason, held to be superfluous.

That a static view of Being has been held in the past is of course true. It is sometimes attributed wholesale to the ancient Greeks. John Macquarrie has pointed out, however, that this is historically an exaggeration¹⁴⁵ and has also insisted that such a view of Being is not only systematically unnecessary, but is in fact an error to be avoided.¹⁴⁶ John E. Smith goes so far as to say, "I would categorically reject the identification of Being with the static or with the exclusion of time and change."¹⁴⁷ Paul Tillich, moreover, argues that "Being-as-such has neither static nor dynamic implications" on the grounds that (1) the polarity of dynamics and form characterizes finite being and (2) "Being precedes any special qualification."¹⁴⁸ "Being comprises both becoming and rest... both the static and dynamic elements."¹⁴⁹ Such a view seems to lie very close to Whitehead's notions of the primordial and the consequent natures of God. When Tillich says that "the divine life inescapably unites possibility and fulfilment"¹⁵⁰ and Whitehead distinguishes between the "absolute wealth of potentiality" (God's primordial nature) and the "principle of concretion"

(God's consequent nature) in the total nature of God, their respective doctrines tend to converge.

If Being "precedes any special qualification," and if we then go on to specify what it is not -- not another particular being, not a property, not a class or genus, not a substance, not the sum of beings¹⁵¹ -- we might wonder what help the concept can provide for theology. Although we might wish to say the same of God, the term "Being" is still "getting used here in just as mysterious and unintelligible a manner as was ever the word 'God'.¹⁵² This apparent impasse may be found not only in philosophical theology of this kind, but also in some contemporary and ancient philosophy. Gerhard Huber has pointed out that in Heidegger's ontology the meaning of Being becomes more and more elusive as we move from the phenomenology of Dasein to the Being which is said to be disclosed there.¹⁵³ We may be angewiesen auf das Seiende, but that which is thus veiled im Seienden remains beyond our grasp. A similar development occurs in Platonism. If Plato's theory of Ideas removed Being to a place beyond the immanence of physis (des Seienden), so a Ground of Being, a transcendent Absolute (in this case the Good) is posited beyond Being (ousia), a transcendence higher than Being in dignity and power,¹⁵⁴ the knowledge of which cannot be a discursive or an eidetic one. Such a view was to be further developed (gesteigert) by Plotinus, where the

One, the absolute origin of all being, transcends all the plurality and determination which Being involves and becomes a matter of a thorough-going negative ontology. (It will be recalled that in the neo-Platonist scheme, when Being is introduced, so is plurality.) This development accordingly resulted in the paradox that the genuine object of philosophical knowledge, be it the One, or Being as such or in general some final source of that which is, is pushed into the transcendent Jenseits of unknowability.

If this be our situation, we might well ask with Plato, "has anyone a right to say positively what he does not know?"¹⁵⁵ And many who insist on the inscrutability of God might well ponder this question. Yet, the impasse which appears here has a peculiarity by virtue of which it is impossible to leave it at that. The consequence would be that all theological discourse and, for that matter all discourse, would be reduced to unintelligibility. This is true in the case of the concept of Being and perhaps also for other concepts, particularly Unity and other transcendentals, although it is not true of accidents which things might have. For, as Macquerrie, echoing both Heidegger and St. Thomas, says, "we know too that often what lies closest to us is furthest from our explicit awareness."¹⁵⁶ While theoretically it may be difficult to see a way out, practically and existentially a solution is not only demanded, but an understanding of Being is already in some sense given.¹⁵⁷

It ill behooves theologians to ignore the question of Being, no matter how fashionable they might wish to be. Much contemporary theology is concerned with this question and most traditional theology turned around it. It has always been the standing aim of theology to find the theos in the mythos and to express the theos in some form of logos.¹⁵⁸ Of logoi there are many, i.e., the historical, the ethical, the existential, the linguistic, etc., but the ontological remains fundamental:

Despite all that has been said about the language of Being being outmoded, about its no longer being expressive or significant in contemporary experience, about its being hopelessly confused and unintelligible, that language must still be regarded as the basic logos, because all the other logoi are forced to appeal to it, even against their will or when their proponents try hardest to escape from or deny the dependence they have upon it. The main argument in support of the claim that the ontological logos is fundamental among the logoi is that ultimately every one of these logoi must refer back to the being of God.¹⁵⁹

Smith's argument seems to assume that the theos is known in advance, perhaps through the mythos, and much can be said in favor of that. We then look around for logoi by which to express the theos and we find that the ontological one is the most fundamental. If nothing else were said, this would be enough to place the concept of Being into the center of theological reflection. Heidegger, however, goes further. In Being and Time he often insists that his fundamental ontology has nothing to do with theology. In an essay written at about the same time¹⁶⁰ he defines

theology as a positive science which, like chemistry, has its own object of study and equally requires an ontological underpinning. The relation of theology to ontology is thus the same as the relation of chemistry to ontology. In the later Letter on Humanism the situation of theology changes. Although it is still said that the meaning of the word "God" cannot be understood except "out of the Truth of Being", the idea of the Holy mediates between them.¹⁶¹

Erst aus der Wahrheit des Seins lässt sich das Wesen des Heiligen denken. Erst aus dem Wesen des Heiligen ist das Wesen von Gottheit zu denken. Erst im Lichte des Wesens von Gottheit kann gedacht und gesagt werden, was das Wort 'Gott' nennen soll. Oder müssen wir nicht erst diese Worte alle sorgsam verstehen und hören können, wenn wir als Menschen, das heißt als ek-sistierende Wesen, einen Bezug des Gottes zum Menschen sollen erfassen dürfen? Wie soll denn der Mensch der gegenwärtigen Weltgeschichte auch nur ernst und streng fragen können, ob der Gott sich nahe oder entziehe, wenn der Mensch es unterlässt, allererst in die Dimension hineinzudenken, in der jene Frage allein gefragt werden kann? Das aber ist die Dimension des Heiligen, die sogar schon als Dimension verschlossen bleibt, wenn nicht das Offene des Seins gelichtet und in seiner Lichtung dem Menschen nahe ist. Vielleicht besteht das Auszeichnende dieses Weltalters in der Verschlossenheit der Dimension des Heiligen. Vielleicht ist dies das einzige Unheil.

It has often been remarked that the later Heidegger displays some strong mystical tendencies. In the quoted passage, he calls for certain dispositions to be nurtured as a condition for intuiting a divine presence as well as a divine absence. A clue as to the kind of disposition he has in mind may be had by noting the difference

between "hineindenken" and "rechnen", to think one's way into, rather than to calculate, "verstehen" rather than "entziffern".¹⁶² This "essential thinking" is at once a quest and a willingness to receive. The receptive side (erfahren dürfen) and the deliberate side (sorgsam verstehen und hören) are given equal weight, indeed so much so that the two are one and indistinguishable in the act of understanding. Moreover, it is quite clear here, that the holy, as well as the truth of Being and divinity, is not an object or entity or fact or state of affairs which is to be known, understood or thought about.¹⁶³ We are not here concerned with a matter to be objectively known, but with a depth-disposition of things and likewise of ourselves into which an "understandingly" ek-sisting being might have the grace to be permitted to penetrate. Only then can the question of the essence or presence of divinity be asked, and only then that of the meaning of the word "God".

If Heidegger is right as to this transition from Being through the Holy and Divinity to the meaning of the word "God", then one would expect theologians to be concerned with the meaning of Being. It is a curious fact that, while many of them are in fact concerned with it, especially from a Catholic point of view,¹⁶⁴ others are not only not concerned with it, but greet the suggestion with a condescending smile. If this is a reaction to

Heidegger's approach, one might wonder what reaction to expect to Hegel's much more extravagant claims, i.e., to have laid bare "die Wahrheit, wie sie ohne Hülle an und für sich selbst ist" and to have expressed "den Inhalt (of the Logic), der die Darstellung Gottes ist, wie er in seinem ewigen Wesen...ist."¹⁶⁵ The reaction has been, as is well known, an overfastidiousness and overcautionsness which, as Smith says, "is a luxury which we can ill afford."¹⁶⁶

In this lengthy Introduction the following points have been made:

(1) Hegel and Heidegger are comparable in regard to several issues. A contrast is there to be sure, but it has been emphasized more by commentators than by Heidegger himself.

(2) The question of Being is not only theoretically legitimate, but is existentially a most important question, if not the most important one.

(3) Heidegger has at least four formulations of the question of Being. He credits Hegel with having asked at least one of them: the Being of being.¹⁶⁷

(4) Drawing from sources in the history of philosophy and from some contemporary ontology, it is possible to delineate more closely the nature of the concept of Being by noting several traits by which it can (and should) be thought.

(5) Loosely following Hegel's organization of his Logic, one can compare Hegel and Heidegger in terms of

substantive ontological doctrine (rather than, say, evaluating Heidegger's interpretations of Hegel). This may be done by distinguishing three moments or aspects of the general topic: Being as immediate, as determinate, and as absolute.

(6) Reflection about Being has been regarded in the past as a fundamental (if not the most fundamental) task of theology. And it is not foreign to contemporary theology. One would expect, therefore, that theologians would welcome attempts to deal with this issue.

I. BEING AS IMMEDIATE

1. Hegel's Problem of Making a Beginning

At the beginning of the long preface to his Phenomenology of Mind, Hegel inveighs against the practice of beginning philosophical work with extended prefaces. It is a misunderstanding of philosophical method, he says, to begin with prefaces containing references to the writings of others, specifying what has been taken over from them, stating premises and assumptions, defining concepts, previewing conclusions to be arrived at, and the like. Hegel himself, however, begins almost every one of his published works as well as his lectures with lengthy prefaces. The content of these prefaces consists invariably of an overview of what is to follow in the body of the work and of its function in his system as a whole.¹ The latter is to be expected if Hegel's philosophy consists of a unified system of which the various individual works are parts. When, on the other hand, our problem is how to begin philosophizing at all with a view to gaining knowledge of truth, no prior statement of theses and methods and purposes can replace "the real subject-matter which is not exhausted in its end, but in working the matter out," in becoming "absorbed" in it, and participating in "the process of arriving at it."² The

conclusion of the process if merely the "naked corpse of the truth" and misses the necessity of all moments in the process which together make up the life of the whole.³

These polemics against commonly followed procedures and the insistence upon beginning without the encumbrances of presuppositions, premises, definitions are not meant merely as a pedagogical technique, but as given in the nature of philosophical thinking. The problem of making a beginning in philosophical thinking is thus a systematic and essential one.

The problem is raised in the opening chapter of the Phenomenology of Mind entitled "Sense-Certainty" and especially in The Science of Logic and in the corresponding first part of the Encyclopedia in its three editions (1817, 1827, 1830). It is there raised as the problem of making an absolute beginning. In the more specialized works (Philosophy of History, Philosophy of Right, Philosophy of Religion, etc.), the beginning depends on previous expositions of the system and is thus not the same problem. In the Phenomenology, the whole of which can be regarded as an introduction to the total system,⁴ the subject-matter is "das erscheinende Wissen,"⁵ knowledge as it appears and develops from simple sensation to "absolute knowledge". The beginning is therefore made with the presumably irreducible certainty which simple sensory data seem to provide. In the Logic we have to do with

pure thought, as the word "logic" itself indicates, apart from the material of modes of consciousness (as in the Phenomenology) and apart from judgments into which thought-determinations might enter. It "is logical (in that) it is enclosed within pure thought."^{5a} Consequently, the beginning here will be found in a universal (in einem allgemeinen) concept, which as it turns out is Being.

An exhaustive account of the beginnings of Hegel's thought would include those seminal ideas which are found in his early writings and come to fruition in the later, fully developed system.⁶ We are not, however, concerned with his intellectual biography, but with the systematic problem. Consequently, we ask why the making of a beginning is a problem for Hegel at all and in what sense the beginning is said to be absolute.

Hegel offers his arguments in the opening chapter of Book I, "The Doctrine of Being," which is entitled "With What shall the Science begin?" The arguments are elaborated again in the closing chapter of the same work, The Science of Logic, which is entitled "The Absolute Idea". Much of Hegel's argumentation turns on the meaning of the word "beginning". That Being should form the beginning of Logic, and that, as beginning, it have the appropriate characteristics, is deduced by analysis from the notion of a beginning itself to such an extent that Findley will say the argument is tautologous.⁷ Hegel would not see this as a defect, however.

The only demand, at this initial point, is "that a pure beginning be made." A "pure" beginning is one which does not involve "any determination relatively to anything else." If a beginning is made at some point which presupposes reference to anything other than itself, it is not absolutely a beginning. The very idea of a beginning implies that "it may not presuppose anything." Otherwise, the beginning would include "a distinguishing and an interrelationship of distinct moments, and consequently a mediation." Insofar as it involves mediations, it cannot count as a beginning. This follows from the meaning of "beginning". "We have only to see what is contained in such an idea."⁸

The basic feature of any beginning at all is that it be immediate. As beginning, it cannot be mediated through anything other than itself. That is to say, if anything should (überhaupt) count as beginning, it is necessarily unmediated, immediate. So far the argument is strictly tautologous, as Findley says. But much more needs to be said. In the first place, the above statements, while perfectly true (one might say, trivially true), require some qualification within Hegel's own system. Thus,

What philosophy begins with must be either mediated or immediate, and it is easy to show that it can be neither the one nor the other; thus either way of beginning is refuted.

...there is nothing, nothing in heaven or in nature or mind or anywhere else which does not equally contain both immediacy and mediation, so that

these two determinations reveal themselves to be unseparated and inseparable and the opposition between them to be a nullity.

It may seem that Hegel is here taking two contradictory positions at once: the quest for an immediate beginning and a denial of its possibility. Everything depends on understanding that these two assertions do not mutually vitiate and cancel each other, but that both are involved in and indeed constitute the same movement. This is a movement by which immediacies are mediated so that the one leads into and supersedes the other. And this expresses more than anything else what is the "essence of Hegelian thinking."¹⁰

The problem, how to affirm contradictory theses simultaneously, appears as a difficulty for a kind of thinking which Hegel calls "Understanding". "Thought, as Understanding, sticks to fixity of characters and their distinctness from one another" and treats them "as having a subsistence and being of their own," as "separate" and "independent," rather than as "one-sided," "limited" and "abstract". It thus regards what appears in thought as contradiction "as a mere negation." Dialectical thought, on the contrary, does not leave any thesis "in its isolated validity," but is "the indwelling tendency outwards by which the one-sidedness and limitation of the predicates of understanding is seen in its true light," i.e., within the context of a larger movement.¹¹

The concept of mediation is not new with Hegel, although he, perhaps more than anyone else, has made it into a rule of logic. Hegel himself and Johannes Hoffmeister have given detailed accounts of it from the history of philosophy and religion.¹² According to Hoffmeister, "Die Geschichte der Philosophie ist daher im Wesentlichen eine Geschichte der Versuche denkender Vermittlung."¹³ A closer determination of the meaning of "mediation" and "immediacy" may be had by asking what doctrines he wishes to oppose and what role these concepts play in Hegel's own point of departure.

It has often been claimed that immediate modes of cognition are available to us. In the Encyclopaedia, Hegel refers especially to Kant, Jacobi, and Descartes as having held variations of this view. In the Phenomenology, the attack is leveled primarily against the intuitionism of Romanticism. Similar arguments are given elsewhere in the Science of Logic and in the Lectures on the History of Philosophy.

What all of these doctrines have in common is the principle that "immediate knowledge is to be accepted as a fact."¹⁴ What it is that is so known as a directly given and irreducible fact, its content, varies among these philosophers. But underlying these differences as to content, the Cartesian principle is always assumed that all knowledge must rest on a basis not susceptible to doubt.

Such knowledge is presumed to be intuitively given and is therefore independent of thought or concepts, since the latter constitute mediations. In Descartes' case, it is the "I which thinks". In the case of empiricism, the underivative (immediate) character of sense impressions, simple ideas of sensation, sense-data, and the like implies that no error can be made in regard to them and this becomes the point of certainty on which the edifice of human knowledge is to be built. "Thoughts are only thoughts, meaning that it is sense perception which first gives them filling and reality and that reason left to its own resources engenders only figments of the brain."¹⁵ Kant shared the view that veridical knowledge is "bound up" with sensation, although he found the source of the objective and intersubjective validity of knowledge of objects (with it, objects of knowledge) in the universality and necessity of the concepts by which objects are thought (schematized categories), and not on what may be given in sensory receptivity. The latter, for Kant, yields only a "rhapsody of perceptions" without unity.¹⁶ Likewise, religious claims to "inner experience," "inner revelation," "inspiration" pretend to be exempt from method and logic and begin, like a shot from a pistol, from faith.¹⁷ Much the same can be said of those who begin with principles or definitions, ready-made, innate, and self-evident.¹⁸ This was the essential defect

in the philosophy of Spinoza.¹⁹ As for Romanticism, it "wents from philosophy not so much insight as edification."²⁰ "All these forms," Hegel concludes, "agree in adopting as their leading principle the immediacy, or self-evident way, in which a fact or body of truths is presented in consciousness."²¹

On the basis of these claims to immediacy, it is already possible to list a number of characteristics which a point of departure, so far as it is to be immediate, must have: it must be underived and irreducible, directly given, intuitive, indubitable, self-certifying. Hegel does not wish to speak in these terms, however, for when we speak of the given, the intuited, the indubitable, or the self-certifying we assume two mistaken hypotheses. First, we seem to assume that some fact or truth, existential or logical, is given immediately (such as "God is" or "I am"). On analysis, however, we find that such claimed immediacies are either the result of a background of prior, but tacitly assumed reflection or are not clearly and distinctly conceived and validated on the level of immediacy.²² Secondly, the attempt to construe an immediately given datum (if any such can be found at all) as in itself possessing "a content which is true" assumes again the standpoint of the understanding, "with its pass-words 'Either--or'."²³ It assumes a double exclusiveness, the one between it and other truths,

beliefs, or judgments, and the other, more generally, between immediacy and mediation.

The denial of such exclusive dichotomies is foundational to all of Hegel's thought. Thus, "It is no less obvious that immediate existence is bound up with its mediation."²⁴ In Hegel's system, there is no state of knowledge which is immediate. He seeks an immediate beginning for philosophical thought, but this beginning does not constitute a knowing of some truth, but rather a starting-point on the way towards knowledge. How is the immediate beginning then to be understood?

While the beginning must be immediate, as the word "beginning" already indicates, this immediacy can be of different sorts. Its nature depends upon the movement which it is to begin. It is immediate in relation to the movement which begins with it. In relation to their offspring, for example, the seed and the parents are "immediate and initial existence," though they are in their turn generated. A beginning is not thereby less immediate for being, on its part, generated and in that sense mediated.²⁵

The character of the beginning and of its immediacy thus depends on what follows it, that of which it is to count as the beginning. Throughout Hegel's development of his system, immediacies arise out of prior dialectical processes and issue into further mediations.²⁶ Consequently, when we are dealing with an absolute beginning,

as it occurs in the beginning of the Science of Logic, it will be the beginning of a movement which is itself absolute. This is in fact the case. The absolute beginning is the beginning of the "absolute Method".²⁷

The term "method" in the expression "absolute Method" is not to be taken as referring to an instrument or technique or merely to a way of gaining knowledge. The absolute Method is at once the process of following out, in the intellect, the system of steps which constitute the Logic, and it is the Absolute itself, in its knowing itself as absolute. "From this course the method has emerged as the self-knowing Notion that has itself, as the Absolute, both subjective and objective, for its subject matter, consequently as the pure correspondence of the Notion and its reality, as a concrete existence that is the Notion itself."²⁸

The exposition of the nature of the Absolute, "of what Being is in and for itself,"²⁹ must be left until later (Part III). For present purposes it will be sufficient to anticipate some ideas apart from which the conception of an absolute beginning cannot be understood. An anticipation of the end is necessary, since the end is the total process, and it is this total process for which the beginning we are seeking is to be the beginning. If the nature of the beginning is determined by the nature of the movement it sets in motion, the latter must be brought into view if the former is to be understood.

The absolute Method is the Selbstbewegung des Absoluten. This self-movement proceeds from beginning (Anfang) through development (Fortgang) and return (Rückkehr). The beginning is immediate and indeterminate; the development is a progressive filling and determining of content; the return returns to the beginning but now having appropriated the intermediary determinations into itself and the total movement as itself. Logic, or "the Theory of Thought," consists in this tripartite movement:³⁰

- I. In its immediacy: the notion implicit and in germ.
- II. In its reflection and mediation: the being-for-self and show of the notion.
- III. In its return into itself, and its developed abiding by itself: the notion in and for itself.

In and for itself the Absolute is the double movement of Fortgang and Rückkehr. The structure of this movement, which is the Absolute itself, is the Logic. It is the absolute Method. It is therefore clear that the absolute Method does not represent a final and last configuration of the Absolute, as if in some sense it signified a finished and attained result, now independent of its becoming. There is no such finished result of the Logic. From the absolute standpoint--the standpoint from which the total becoming of the Absolute is comprehended as the Absolute itself--there is no first or last, but an organic and dynamic unity of thought and being, form and content, i.e., the Notion. "The essential requirement

for the science of Logic is...rather that the whole of the science be within itself a circle in which the first is also the last and the last is also the first."³¹

Because this is a circular and absolute movement, the problem of an absolute beginning arises. The word "absolute" has two broad meanings in Hegel's writings. In reference to the "absolute Method" ("Method" is capitalized since it is not merely a technique or "manner of cognition", but the life of the Absolute) and to "the Absolute", it means relation-to-self. Relation-to-self may be concrete or abstract. Abstract relation-to-self is indeterminate universality (as, e.g., Being as the highest genus) and forms the beginning of the Logic. Concrete relation-to-self is the character of the universal which comprehends all reality as itself, the total movement of all moments in its own self-realization, and is thus called "the Absolute". In the concrete sense, therefore, "absolute" does not imply relationlessness, though in the case of the Absolute, there is no relation to any reality subsisting independently and apart from it. Should the Absolute stand in such a relation, it would not be absolute.

On the other hand, the word "absolute" also has another meaning in Hegel, i.e. abstract. A thought is abstract if it is entertained in isolation, "in itself" alone.³² It also means undervived, as in "absolute beginning". It also means contentless, simple, that is

to say unmediated. These latter senses of "absolute" (which are variations on the meaning of "abstract") point to our present problem: how can there be an absolute beginning for philosophical (Hegelian) thought?

This much has already been said: the nature of the beginning reflects the nature of the movement it begins. We have before us now the outlines of that movement. It is an absolute movement in the first sense mentioned, i.e. the concrete. Precisely for this reason, its beginning must be absolute in the second sense, i.e. in the abstract sense. This necessity comes out of the meaning of "beginning", as Findley has said. If a beginning is to be made to the 'absolute' movement, it must be underived, simple and without composition, i.e., immediate. The beginning must have opposite characteristics to those which the movement which it begins has. But this is so precisely because the movement which it begins has the characteristics which it has, i.e., mediatedness, composition, derivation, complexity, determinateness. How can this be conceived?

It seems apparent that we need to go beyond Hegel's own expositions in order to see what he himself is doing. We refer therefore to different but complementary interpretations, the first taken from Jacob Loewenberg³³ and the other from Professor Kevin Well,³⁴ and, for that matter, from Nicolai Hartmann.³⁵

In "The Comedy of 'Immediacy'" Loewenberg is concerned with the starting-point of the Phenomenology of Mind, but his point also applies to the Logic. Hegel's argument, he writes, "involves a continuous thread of reflective experiments... intent upon showing the logical incongruity of recurrent types of human experience and knowledge." At each stage in the process, one of these types is examined from the point of view of a certain scepticism. Its claims to adequacy are shown to be false. This is not an unqualified scepticism, but a therapeutic one which is carried out in the interest of what Hegel regards as the truth. Nor is this scepticism like Descartes' methodological doubt, for the claimed types of knowledge are considered ex intra, the position is assumed as if it were true. The position is assumed "for itself," examined on its own terms from within, and this is done in order to see if it contains elements which are not allowed by its own claims to knowledge. The presence of such elements will destroy the position and the attempt to account for them leads to a different position, so that the original position sublates itself into another. Each experiment therefore is a pose, an impersonation of the incongruous, and the whole process a "comedy of errors". The beginning is made from a "seeming obviousness," with what is speciously self-evident. The logical incongruity of the beginning (its claim to immediacy and its inherent elements of mediation) gives rise to the dialectical necessity of its own sublation.

Although Loewenberg seems to overemphasize the negative character of the whole dialectical process, he is clearly aware, as he shows in another essay,³⁶ that the process is a development of the truth, and a procession from end of the Absolute. Each stage has its own truth, though it is a partial one because of its 'logical incongruity', and its own partial truth comes to expression in its subsequent stage.

When, therefore, it is claimed that the "logical beginning," and the phenomenological one as well, is immediate, simple, and undetermined, this claim is to be taken, following Loewenberg, as a provisional stance, a pose and an impersonation. In a sense, it would then be true to say that Hegel does not mean what he says and that Hegel knew it. Hegel proposes an absolute beginning, but it is essentially not absolute, since, by including its own mediation, it contains virtually, implicitly, and potentially the further steps in the process and indeed the totality of the process. But this is not a defect, on Hegel's view, since it is only from the 'absolute standpoint' that 'we' know this. The beginning assumes that a world can be deduced or "declinated" from it. If this were not so, nothing would come of it and it would not constitute the beginning of anything. The vacuity of the beginning is not absolute nothingness, but full of the rest. The end is in the beginning, but the end is provisionally bracketed for the purpose of making a beginning.

The wealth of the total process is already there in the beginning, but not on those terms. That is the point of the dialectic: to unfold that wealth beyond the terms in which it is initially put forth.

Now, the Logic takes up the structure of thought itself apart from the configurations of "appearing knowledge" (as in the Phenomenology), i.e., the Idea in its purity. This is equally an array or web (Gefüge) of progressive determinations, but this time of concepts. So, the problem of making a beginning arises in the form of the question, What is the first category?³⁷

The categories are categories of the Absolute and therefore categories of all being and thought. This is assumed from the first: the unity of thought and being or, in Hegel's terms, of Notion and Being. The overriding principle, one can say, of Hegel's philosophy is that the Absolute reflecting upon itself sees in that act itself in and as all that is. The dialectical deduction of the categories proposes to exhibit what is eternally in the Absolute by means of a sequence of successive steps. For Logic, the beginning can therefore not depend on our subjective/ingenuity, but must be that category which is ~~absolutely~~ universal (for it makes the 'logical' beginning) and absolutely abstract (for it cannot have determinations) but implicitly contains the movement which follows from it (for it is to be a beginning from which something shall

emerge, "von dem etwas ausgehen soll"³⁸). Why "Being" should be this first category and what supporting arguments Hegel gives will form the subject-matter of a subsequent chapter ("Abstract Being in the Logic"). We will also have to inquire whether and what historical presuppositions (Aristotle, Plotinus, Kant) underlie these problematics of Beginning and Being as Hegel has set them up. For the present, we have considered the reasons why there is a problem of making a beginning for Hegel. These reasons involve and are involved in Hegel's total system, so that it became necessary to give an overview over that system. Against this background, it will be possible to proceed at a more rapid pace in what follows.

2. Heidegger's Two Beginnings

In Nietzsche I Heidegger speaks of "the first beginning" and "the other beginning."³⁹ The theory of the two beginnings has been considered by commentators only relatively recently,⁴⁰ but it is central to Heidegger's philosophical concerns, in which ontology and the history of ontology are always closely interwoven. Indeed, he constantly speaks of the history of the theory of Being as a history of Being.⁴¹ In the theory of the two beginnings history and ontology come together.

This theory is prompted by the notion of "Kehre" or turn, which is a more familiar one than is the notion of "two beginnings". The turn has variously been interpreted:

(1) As a break in Heidegger's intellectual development from the phenomenology of Dasein to the thinking of Being as such. In a general way, this turn may be seen by comparing Being and Time with the Introduction to Metaphysics. Yet, in answer to Richardson's direct question, "How is the turn to be thought?" Heidegger denies that this is the way to understand it. Such an interpretation would be an equivalent to an entirely misguided interpretation of the relation between Hegel's Phenomenology and Logic, as if these represented a break in his intellectual development.

(2) As a systematic step in Heidegger's quest for Being which had already been anticipated in Being and Time. It is a turn to the thinking of Being as such, having the phenomenology of Dasein as an integral, though preparatory foundation. This is, in fact, the way Hegel interprets the relation between the Phenomenology and the Logic.⁴²

(3) As at once a return to the beginning of the phenomenology of Dasein (the already first given understanding of Being) and an advance beyond it towards an explicit understanding of and being with (bei -- being at home with) Being. This movement is similar to Hegel's Rückkehr through Fortgang to Anfang, and it has interesting dialectical features, though lacking the element of negation. This is going to turn out a basic difference between Hegel and Heidegger.

(4) As a turn in the history of philosophy, inaugurated by Heidegger, by which a new or "other" beginning is made in the quest for Being after a long history of metaphysical thinking. But this turn is simultaneously a return to intimations of Being already had by the pre-Socratics (but also by Aristotle) and an illumination of the ground of metaphysics itself, which had in the subsequent history become concealed within metaphysics. This interpretation recalls the Hegelian view of the history of philosophy as a development of the Notion, as a progressive sublation of the one-sided anticipations of the absolute philosophy, although it is quite different.

The first beginning, that of the ancient Greeks, consists of an original feeling of unity with nature and the dissolution of this unity. Human being is regarded as dwelling in a home (the world) out of which all beings come to be. This intimate being at home in the world is lost with the dissolution of the unity of Being and being. Philosophically, the dissolution takes place when Being is explained through and as being, instead of understanding being from Being.⁴³ Being is reduced to being; the difference is lost from sight. The subsequent 'history of Being' is determined by this dissolution, by a dissimulation (verstellen) of the Being of beings. The result of that history is the modern standardization and technical culture. The world is now regarded as an inventory of objects which are subject to manipulation and calculation.⁴⁴

In contrast, the new beginning will be characterized by openness to things, co-dwelling with things in the world as a home, a unity in which beings are permitted to be (are "let be") themselves and to speak for themselves. These terms are not defined by Heidegger and, in fact, must resist definition on pain of forfeiting the mood they express. We re-appropriate our being as shepherds of Being, caring for things themselves and letting them come to presence as themselves.⁴⁵

This is the vision of the 'other' beginning. Nevertheless, its realization is still 'at the beginning', not yet even quite underway. The post-turn thinking has as yet no definite identifiable term, but it is hopefully beginning to get underway.

The two beginnings have modes of truth-disclosure appropriate to each. On the terms of the dissolution of the first beginning, the disclosure of truth takes the form of a demand (ein Herausfordern), an attack on things, and the validity of language, of articulating the disclosure, takes the form of agreement, a fitting of concepts to objective, public facts.⁴⁶ For the 'other' beginning, language is non-objectifying; it is a "Sich-sagen-lassen des Sich-zeigenden." The kind of thinking and saying, which such cryptic expression indicate, is illustrated in Heidegger's telling example of the rose:⁴⁷

Wenn wir z.B. im Garten sitzen und uns an den blühenden Rosen erfreuen, machen wir die Rose nicht zu einem Objekt, nicht einmal zu einem

Gegenstand, d.h. zu einem thematisch Vorgestelltem. Wenn wir gar im stillschweigenden Segen dem leuchtenden Rot der Rose hingegeben sind und dem Rotsein der Rose nachsinnen, denn ist dieses Rotsein weder ein Objekt, noch ein Ding, noch ein Gegenstand wie die blühende Rose. Diese steht im Garten, schwenkt vielleicht im Wind hin und her. Dagegen steht das Rotsein der Rose weder im Garten, noch kann es im Wind hin und her schwenken. Gleichwohl denke ich es und sage von ihm, indem ich es nenne. Es gibt demnach ein Denken und Segen, das in keiner Weise objektiviert noch vergegenständlicht.

The point of the example is this:

Denken ist vielmehr das Verhalten, das sich von dem, was sich jeweils zeigt und wie es sich zeigt, dasjenige geben lässt, was es von dem Erscheinenden zu sagen hat.⁴⁸

Seen in this light, thinking and language is, in the new beginning, not an activity or process other than, independent of and separable from being (conceived here participially as in "walking", "running"). And Being cannot be thought as another something apart from thinking, being and speaking. The "ontological difference" does not have these implications. On the contrary, "Die Sprache ist das Haus der Wahrheit des Seins. In ihrer Behausung wohnt der Mensch."⁴⁹

The other beginning is both a new beginning as a response to the culmination of its dissimulation in modern technology and also a condition for the occurrence of that dissimulation with the rise of objectifying metaphysics. It is earlier than the first beginning. It is the renewed unity of the ontological difference without negating the difference. (Thus, Heidegger's very Hegelian exposition of the unity of identity and difference in Identity and Difference.⁵⁰) Objectifying metaphysics had denied the

difference by collapsing Being into being. But this could occur only on the ground of their unity and difference. The latter is the possibility of the former, the former being the dissimulation, the forgetting of the latter. The new, other beginning is thus the retrieving of the ground of metaphysics, both historically and ontologically, a retrieve of the unity and difference of Being and being in which we already are, whether in falling away from it or in reappropriating it.

This outline of Heidegger's interpretation of the history of approaches to Being, which is also the historical career of Being, shows the comprehensive sweep of his tour de force through that history. He does it with great economy of ideas. Its simplicity is both seductive and suspicious, as is Hegel's equally comprehensive philosophy of the history of philosophy. We now take up some of the particulars of this theory in comparison with Hegel.

3. Destruction and Sublation of Metaphysics

Both Hegel and Heidegger provide large, comprehensive interpretations of the course which the history of Western philosophy took. Heidegger credits Hegel with having for the first time presented a philosophical history of philosophy. It has remained the only one, he says, and shall remain the only one "until philosophy is once again compelled to think historically of and from its own Grundfrage in an even more essentially original sense"⁵¹ then was the case

in Hegel. This latter task Heidegger has taken upon himself. The one phase which more than any other expresses the nature of the task is retrieving the ground of metaphysics. Heidegger has described this process on innumerable occasions. Probably the most detailed exposition of it is given in the Introduction to Metaphysics, but the clearest exposition of what he calls "metaphysics" and the retrieve of its ground is given in Nietzsche. In Being and Time it is called "the task of destroying the history of ontology," but it is the "traditional ontology" which is meant and is to be distinguished from the "fundamental ontology" which is said to begin with this work.⁵²

A metaphysical idea is one which applies to all that is. Thus Nietzsche's "eternal recurrence of the same" is a metaphysical idea, since in it being is thought as a whole.⁵³ The word "being" (das Seiende) denotes all that is.⁵⁴ In another sense, "metaphysics" is the title for the compass of the most basic and essential questions of philosophy. These can be reduced to one, and that is the question for the principle ($\alpha\pi\rho\chi\eta$) of being as a whole. The knowledge of the principle is then a knowledge of what being is, so far as it is being (was das Seiende ist, sofern es Seiendes ist). The question for the principle of being now becomes the question what is being? So, Aristotle says, "And indeed the question which was raised of old and is raised now and always, and is always the subject of doubt, viz. what being is,..."⁵⁵ (Und so ist

denn also das von altersher und auch jetzt und stündig fort Gefragte, aber auch zugleich das, wohin stündig die Wege aufhören und fehlen--Was ist das Seiende?⁵⁶⁾ When this question is taken as the fundamental and leading question (Grundfrage und Leitfrage), Western philosophy arrives at the end of its beginning.

Thenceforward, the fundamental task of philosophy became a seeking for an answer to this question. And the more philosophers sought for an answer to the question as Leitfrage, the more was the question as Grundfrage pushed into the background. In its own texture of meaning, the question was not further developed. As various answers were offered, there grew up a variety of schools of thought and positions in regard to the nature of being as a whole, for example, that of Plato, Christian theology, Leibniz, Kant, Hegel.⁵⁷ These various metaphysical positions (Stellungen) arise from a fundamental position which is the position of metaphysics itself (die metaphysische Grundstellung).⁵⁸ The latter remains for metaphysics "necessarily unclear," since it is the position of metaphysics in general as distinct from the array of metaphysical positions. It does not bring its own ground to light.

The Grundstellung of metaphysics is not, however, identical with what Heidegger goes on to call the "ground of metaphysics". The latter must be found on a profounder

level. The two are distinguished by different ways of regarding the question, "what is being?" On the one hand, the question is "managed" or "handled" (behandelt) and this means (heisst) to search for an answer to it. On the other hand, the question is "unfolded" (entfalten).⁵⁹

The use of the verb, "behandeln", recalls the term, "vorhandenhaben", in Being and Time, which is to be distinguished from Dasein's ownmost (eigentliche) involvements in the world. Moreover, the asking of the question of Being is there said to be the primordial character of Dasein's being, i.e., "that Being is an issue for it."⁶⁰ Vorhandenheit does not have this existential character, but signifies that way of dealing with things, in which things are regarded as externally related to us, as "external objects". Similarly in the Nietzsche passage, the question of metaphysics, when not further enfolded, remains for metaphysics simply a question to be disposed of, to be answered in various ways. The fault lies not so much in the formulation of the question, though that too, but in the direction in which we move from the question, whether we move towards answering it or, on the other side, towards a more "original asking". The more original asking involves a shift both in what is being asked about (Being rather than the whole of being) and in the place or position (Standort) of the one who asks (as an element in the whole of being or a disclosing of Being in the asking).⁶¹

Having arrived at the Grundstellung of metaphysics, Heidegger now goes on to unfold the question of metaphysics to its ground. His reasoning follows several steps which may be set forth in the following way.

The question of metaphysics, what is being, asks for the principle of being as a whole, in its wholeness. But this whole is a oneness (ein Eines, nicht nur alles oder Irgendeines⁶²). Now, if this One is the whole, there is nothing else. At the limit of the whole of being we confront nothingness. The field of being as a whole is limited by nothingness. But nothingness is obviously not another being or field of being. The field in question (das Fragefeld) is the whole of being and the aim of the question (das Frageziel) is the oneness signified by the whole. The aim is the oneness of the field, and this is called the Being of being.

Just as nothingness is confronted as the limit of the field, so we again confront it as the not-being (das Nichtseiendsein) of the aim, i.e., Being. This is not a negation of Being; it is a negation of being.⁶³ It is a negation of being, not in the sense that being should no longer be, but that Being is not being. Accordingly, "the nothingness of being follows the Being of being as night follows day."⁶⁴ For this reason, Heidegger will also use the notation ~~"being"~~ to stand for what he otherwise calls Being⁶⁵ and will insist on the difference

between Sein ist (which is incongruous) and es gibt Sein (sometimes translated "Being gives itself"⁶⁶). The verb geben has connotations which agree with Heidegger's intentions exactly: it means both "there is" (as in "Dasein") and "offering, revealing itself", as in Erschlossenheit (unconcealment) and Anwesen (presenting itself as it essentially is).

We are not at this point concerned to give a detailed exposition of Heidegger's "Being", nor are we as yet in a position to do so (Cf. Part III). We have followed Heidegger in his step by step exposition of the nature of metaphysical thinking, its consequences for the history of Western philosophy, and the unfolding of the metaphysical question to its ground. This ground is the ground of metaphysics, though it cannot be grasped in the terms of metaphysics itself. Heidegger's strategy here is a forward and backward movement: forward to the forgottenness of Being and backward to its retrieve. The retrieve is thus at once a destruction of metaphysics and a re-appropriation of its roots. What we thus retrieve is, in the first place, the original question as Grundfrage and, with its further unfolding, its implicit aim which leads us to a hidden caring for Being (Sorge um des Sein). This caring about Being is the ground from which metaphysics sprung and which throughout its history gave it life.

For Heidegger, a thread runs through the history of thought, philosophy as well as mythology, poetry, written history--thought as such. This is also true for Hegel. But far-reaching differences exist between them in the way in which we are called by each of them to regard it, what problem it poses for our present world and what is our contemporary task in relation to it. Each of them calls for a particular way in which this thread running through the history of thought is to be regarded. Each of them sees a problem posed for the present world and both see a task arising out of it for contemporary philosophy. The difference between them as to their respective philosophies of the history of philosophy⁶⁷ can no better be put than by comparing the notions "retrieve" and "sublation".

The retrieve, as Heidegger develops it, is very much like a Husserlian reduction. The theories of metaphysicians are reduced to the Grundstellung of metaphysics and its subsequent mummification. This in turn is reduced to certain root experiences of "caring for Being" and an original, inner intimacy of man and world. These root experiences have all the characteristics of immediate experience, the immediacy of which comes to be covered over (mediated) by objectifying categories, e.g., substance, causality, reality.⁶⁸ The re-appropriation of the original immediacy of human awareness of Being is thus the retrieve of the ground of metaphysics, the first beginning. This retrieve now constitutes the task of the new beginning.

Hegel's view of the same history sees in it a progressive and pervasive telos, despite all the variations of doctrine. The history of thought is studied from the point of view of what has been achieved towards realizing this telos. Such a view demands a standard, an idea of the terminus to the whole process, the terminus being the fulfilment of the telos. This fulfilment is the absolute philosophy itself, the complete system of absolute knowledge. This way of dealing with history is "speculative," "philosophical" history, rather than the story of successive products of human thought.⁶⁹ In the Philosophy of History, Hegel calls this telos Reason, the process of advancing rationality whose plot is the development of freedom.⁷⁰ It is the peculiarity of philosophical history, as distinguished from the narrative, conventional history, that the concept of Reason is brought to the study of history from philosophy. Philosophy has "demonstrated" that Reason is the "substance" and "power...underlying all natural and spiritual life."⁷¹ Accordingly, Reason appears not only as an organizing principle for the study of history, but as its very substance and meaning.⁷²

While only the end "is absolute without qualification," it develops through the process of arriving at it, which is the process of its own self-realization. Consequently, every stage in that development "has its own special right, since it is the embodiment of the Idea of freedom (or

Reason) in one of its proper specific forms."⁷³ Applied to the historical variety of philosophical doctrines, this account has the virtue of overcoming the transcendental dialectic of Kant. The scandal which Kant saw in the chaos of conflicting philosophical doctrines is now understood as a most expectable phenomenon. Each side of an antinomy has its right, albeit a one-sided one, since it is for its time and in its way contributory to the absolute philosophy. The latter requires that the antinomies be sublated, "metamorphosed by Mind," and in this way "the material worked upon is both enriched and preserved at the same time."⁷⁴

Der nunmehrige Standpunkt der Philosophie ist, dass die Idee in ihrer Notwendigkeit erkennt, die Seiten ihrer Direction, Natur und Geist, jedes als Herstellung der Totalität der Idee, und nicht nur als an sich identisch, sondern aus sich selbst diese eine Identität hervorbringend, und diese dadurch als notwendig erkannt werde.

Das letzte Ziel und Interesse der Philosophie ist, den Gedanken, den Begriff mit der Wirklichkeit zu versöhnen.⁷⁵

The absolute philosophy consists of this reconciliation. It was Kant's mistake to hold that "We must go outside the concept, in order to reach existence" ("Wir müssen aus dem Begriffe herausgehen, um zur Existenz zu gelangen.")⁷⁶ From this thesis Kant's antinomies arose and the doctrine of the transcendental dialectic in general. It is Hegel's constant concern to bring the two together. This unity is the content of absolute knowledge.⁷⁷

Seen in this light, the dialectic is progressive, both logically and historically, and allows for a kind of hermeneutic interpretation of philosophers of the past. In a particularly instructive example of his mode of interpretation, Hegel says of Jakob Boehme that the Notion had been grasped by him, but only in a murky or opaque (*trüben*) way. The Notion is still represented in sensual images, but it is there nevertheless: in the central idea of the Trinity immanent in everything, in the divine contrarium and absolute unity, in the doctrine of the birth and the two lives of God, etc.⁷⁸ If Heidegger's interpretation of traditional doctrines and writings go beyond (or beneath) the texts themselves, almost to the point of misrepresentation, the same or a similar procedure is adopted by Hegel. Rather than evaluating these sorts of approaches on the basis of what is explicitly said in the texts--Hegel and Heidegger could criticize their own interpretations from this point of view as well as anyone else--we need to look for the principles used in the interpretations, principles which, as Hegel clearly says, are brought to the material and are not derived from it.

The "formal law of dialectic" (Nicolai Hartmann) which is at work in Hegel's treatment of the history of philosophy is that of sublation (*Aufhebung*). This term is variously translated as "reconciliation," (Kevin Wall) "cancelling," "superseding," (Beillie) "overcoming,"

"preservation," (Findlay). All of these meanings are contained in it. Hegel refers to its twofold meaning and expresses delight in finding such a speculative and dialectical word already in currency.⁷⁹

'To sublate' has a twofold meaning in the language: on the one hand it means to preserve, to maintain, and equally it also means to cause to cease, to put an end to. Even 'to preserve' includes a negative element, namely, that something is removed from its immediacy and so from an existence which is open to external influences, in order to preserve it. Thus what is sublated is at the same time preserved; it has only lost its immediacy but is not on that account annihilated.

Something is sublated only in so far as it has entered into unity with its opposite; in this more particular signification as something reflected, it may fittingly be called a moment.

The sublation of seemingly opposite doctrines is thus an achievement, both for speculative thought and historical interpretation. The conflict of metaphysical standpoints is seen as an opposition of moments (each of which has its own right). The moments are preserved, but now as moments, thus leading beyond themselves towards the coming to fruition of the absolute philosophy itself.

It is a curious fact that those who interpret intellectual history from the point of view of a principle which is constitutive of it (logos, telos) often look to the beginnings for a pristine, unsoiled expression of that principle. Heidegger makes this into an inescapable condition for beginning anew. Hegel, likewise, finds in ancient metaphysics "a higher conception of thinking than is current today."

Thus this metaphysics believed that thinking (and its determinations) is not anything alien to the object, but rather is its essential nature, or that things and the thinking of them--our language too expresses their kinship--are explicitly in full agreement, thinking in its imminent determinations and the true nature of things forming one and the same content.⁸⁰

This insight, as we have emphasized, is the inner motive and the driving force of the whole of Hegel's philosophy. And this is not entirely different from Heidegger's. In both cases, the concept of Unity stands out prominently. It is a full and differentiated unity which is to be achieved in thought and in life in general. Hegel explicitly states this as his aim. The Absolute is the unity of thinking and being, a unity which evolves through history. But the movement is also described in terms of modes of Being: Ansich-Fürsich-, An-und-fürsichsein. The Ansich is immediacy, the Fürsich is reflection and mediation, and the An-und-Fürsich is the unity of the two. This logical and historical movement is a plenishing of Being from the immediate and intuitive to the mediated and conceptual. Heidegger, on the contrary, does not see the history of Western thought as an evolving of Truth (call it the Absolute Idea or the Awareness of Being), but as a dissimulation of it. Consequently, it becomes necessary to reduce the dissimulation to its own, authentic roots and thus to recover (retrieve) what has been lost, which is Being in its original plenitude. The original, the immediate, the intuitive is the true and the authentic

(das Eigentliche). Hegel's position is the exact opposite: the become, the mediated, the conceptual is the true.

This contrast comes out in Hegel's treatment of "Being" as immediate in both the Logic and the Phenomenology and in Heidegger's attempts to refute this doctrine. In various ways we have come to intimate that the nature of Being in its full plenitude is conceived in very similar ways by both Hegel and Heidegger (See Part III). On the other hand, they differ widely as to the way in which Being is apprehended immediately, that is in the 'beginning'.

4. Abstract Being in Hegel's Logic

Hegel's problem of making a 'logical' beginning is not a psychological problem as to the genesis of knowledge nor strictly an epistemological problem as to the first sources of knowledge in consciousness. The 'logical' beginning is a problem for 'pure' thought, the system of which is regarded as the web or texture of the mutually implicative categories of the Absolute Idea itself. The deduction of the categories is then called the "absolute Method", since it constitutes the self-thinking of the Absolute prior to its transition to nature and history.⁸¹ The question before us now is what that first category is and why it is the first category.

Hegel's answer is, of course, that it is Being. His argument is summarized in a crucial paragraph:⁸²

All that is present is simply the resolve, which can also be regarded as arbitrary, that we propose

to consider thought as such. Thus the beginning must be an absolute, or what is synonymous here, an abstract beginning; and so it may not pre-suppose anything, must not be mediated by anything nor have a ground; rather it is to be itself the ground of the entire science. Consequently, it must be purely and simply an immediacy, or rather merely immediacy itself. Just as it cannot possess any determination relatively to anything else, so too it cannot contain within itself any determination, any content; for any such would be a distinguishing and an interrelationship of distinct moments, and consequently a mediation. The beginning therefore is pure Being.

The argument of this paragraph follows a series of steps which are explicitly stated at the end of the Science of Logic.⁸³

(1) We resolve to consider pure thought as such, i.e., engage in the science of logic.

(2) The fact that we begin with a resolution does not introduce arbitrariness into the subject-matter. The resolution to engage in a science is a "free act,"⁸⁴ but the element of free choice in the decision to do so attaches to the one who proposes to commence the study ("the subject philosophizing") and not to the object of the study ("the science as science").⁸⁵

(3) Having resolved to consider thought as such, the first step is to consider what is contained in the meaning of 'beginning'.

(4) Its notion itself requires that a beginning have the characteristics of abstract universality, absolute simplicity (abstract relation only to self), presuppositionlessness, indeterminacy, contentlessness, relationlessness.

(5) These characteristics are summed up in the term "immediacy".

(6) An absolute-abstract immediacy neither requires nor permits a prior 'ground'. It 'grounds' (gründet) the movement it begins and is in turn 'grounded' (ist begründet) through the completed movement. Seen from the point of view of the total movement, this process of grounding and being grounded is a process of "becoming to itself" (Werden zu sich⁸⁶) in which beginning and end coincide.

(7) "The beginning is therefore pure Being." No further argument is given for this point in this passage and in other passages it is very sketchy indeed.

We have seen that Hegel's actual beginning contains potentialities by virtue of which something can come out of it. It is not actually as indeterminate as he makes out. We have also seen that this incongruity may be due to the fact that the standpoint of the absolute beginning is a pose and posture provisionally assumed, although the pose and the claims it makes for itself are demanded by the notion of a beginning. As an analogy, one might think of the start of a race in which the runners do not stand at the starting line when they begin running. The beginning of the race is not the starting line, but that point where the running begins. It is the beginning of the running since the runners had not already been running. But this point cannot be fixed except as a kind of fiction which,

however, is grounded in the reality of the race.⁸⁷ It is at the same time immediate and already underway.

On this ground, it is plausible that the beginning be 'pure'; but that it be Being requires further argument. If Being be the beginning, the first category, then it is to be conceived according to the characteristics of the logical beginning listed above. Such a conception of Being has a long and impressive history stemming from Parmenides.

Parmenides, who conceives the absolute as Being, says that 'Being alone is and Nothing is not.' Such was the true starting-point of philosophy, which is always knowledge by thought: and here for the first time we find pure thought seized and made an object to itself.⁸⁸

When Being is conceived pure, it meets the conditions laid down for the logical beginning. It is the first pure thought since it is the absolutely (though abstractly) universal thought: there can be no being other than and outside it. It is indeterminate since determination is a relation to an other, i.e., a limitation and negation.⁸⁹ But it is "absurd to speak of other contents of our consciousness (e.g. determinate beings) as somewhat, so to speak, outside and beside Being, or to say that there are other things, as well as Being."⁹⁰ Being is a simple positivity expressed in the statement "Being is." As such, it is not as yet infected with the negativity which would derive from relation to another, a relation which would "liquify" its positivity and set the dialectic in motion.⁹¹

Hegel's argument is very brief. It seems more like the simple assertion that this logical beginning, as it has been described, is Being. One might expect, therefore, that appeal is made here to certain assumptions which Hegel takes to be given in the stock of human knowledge carried over from the tradition of Western philosophy. This is quite clearly the case. At least four principles are implied in Hegel's discussion of abstract Being, sometimes explicitly stated and sometimes tacitly assumed. The situation is analogous to Kant's "metaphysical" (as distinguished from the transcendental) deduction of the categories. While Kant strongly emphasized that a deduction must proceed from principles and deplored Aristotle's "haphazard" approach,⁹² he nevertheless "finds" the "functions of thought in judgment" (the table of logical modes of judgment) in "the technical distinctions ordinarily recognized by logicians."⁹³ Though Hegel deplored this procedure, saying that "the Notion itself must show that it is itself the source of these determinations,"⁹⁴ he is in other ways no less guilty than Kant of violating this ideal.

First, a principle is taken from Parmenides: Being is one and continuous.⁹⁵ Its oneness is taken absolutely, for "it is necessary that being either is absolutely or is not." It is not in relation to anything other than itself, for "it is impossible that not-being is." Nor can it be internally differentiated, for "it is not compounded

of parts." This is the conception of Being which is the beginning of the Logic. But if this conception of Being forms the beginning, how can anything come of it? How can a further differentiation, determination, deduction proceed at all? How can Hegel avoid Parmenides' conclusions? It may perhaps be said that the problem of all ontology is to overcome this impasse. Hegel does it by assuming that the dialectic is the structure of reality and of thought. As in Plato's Parmenides, fixed concepts are loosened up and become liquified,⁹⁶ and "the hold of great chains" to which Parmenides had condemned Being is sundered.

A time-honored principle holds that it is impossible to simplify to infinity. Thus, Leibniz held that "there must be simple substances because there are composites" and Aristotle held that "the causes of things are neither an infinite series nor infinitely various in kind. Nor can there be an infinite process downwards, with a beginning in the upward direction..."⁹⁷ For Hegel, as against Leibniz, the absolutely simple cannot be a plurality, for plurality implies relation to other, distinction from other, even if, as with Leibniz, interaction between simple substances is ruled out. In the case of Being, the process of simplification is also a process of universalization. Indeterminate Being is thus not an individual or a plurality of individuals (monads), "but the original featurelessness which precedes all definite character."⁹⁸ It may be said,

with St. Thomas, that Being is the first universal apprehended in all things prior to all differentiation, but it is, for Hegel, not properly speaking anything known or apprehended, not at least in the Logic. This seems to be what Hegel has in mind in the Phenomenology, however. Abstract Being, in any case, is not further reducible in point of simplicity and universality.

The problem of making a beginning was so vexing a problem for the so-called post-Kantian idealists, that one would expect to find its sources in Kant himself. At least one principle involved in Hegel's problem of making a beginning is taken from Kant: the transcendental dialectic is not a matter of "transcendental illusion", but the structure of reality. Reality and thought about reality are triadic. The sublation of apparent contradictions is the key to philosophical thinking, as we have already noted. But there can be no infinity of triads backwards or forwards (by Aristotle's principle). At the beginning, the term is abstract Being (the thing in itself--Ansichsein) and at the end is the "Ideal of Pure Reason"--God. The thing in itself, when thought of as a mode of Being, i.e., Being in itself, is not an unknowable Jenseits, as Kant had thought, but is the most directly accessible; it is immediacy itself.

The Ideal of the "Ideal of Pure Reason" is the term of the upward triadic movement. The principle assumed here is an Aristotelian and a neo-Platonic one: Nous reflecting

upon itself sees in that act itself in all that is. The highest term is pure Thought thinking itself. Thus Hegel quotes Aristotle on the title page of the Phenomenology of Mind to the effect that "intellection is intellection of intellection." Everything else is participated being and emanation from Nous. According to Hegel's scheme, Being is the opposite pole from Nous. The Truth of Being is gained to the extent to which Nous is approximated. This is based on the principle that the higher explains the lower, the lower being an imitation or reflection of the higher. This is pure Platonism, but is therefore not less Hegelian. Indeed, this is very much what Hegel meant when he said "the Truth is the Whole."⁹⁹

Clearly, Hegel's 'absolute beginning' assumes certain commitments to principles taken from the tradition. These principles do not result from a deductive argument, but Hegel's conception of Being as the initial indeterminate positivity depends on them. One might affirm or reject them, but one must take a position in regard to them.

The next step in Hegel's deduction of categories is to give determination to Being through its relation to Nothing and sublation to Becoming, the limitation of Becoming by Quality and the transition to Being-for-self. These issues will be taken up in Part II: Being as Determinate.

5. Abstract Being in Hegel's Phenomenology

Hegel's treatment of immediate Being in the Phenomenology of Mind is instructive for present purposes because it appears there not as a concept, but as a given, "as it is presented before us."¹⁰⁰ Thus, Being is distinguished from Concept as a "mere apprehension (Auffassen) free from conceptual comprehension (Begreifen)." The distinction is formulated in different ways, e.g., as concept (Begriff) and object (Gegenstand), knowing (Wissen) and the true (Wahres), essence (Wesen) and being (Seiendes), being-for-another (Füreinandersein) and being-in-itself (Ansichsein), form (Form) and content (Inhalt), and in its first appearance, certainty (Gewissheit) and Being (Sein). In each case, the difference is that of the knowing subject and the object known or, to put it in more Hegelian terms, the content of consciousness and that independent being-in-itself which is assumed to exist outside (jenseits) of consciousness. Now, since the Phenomenology proposes to consider knowledge as it appears, knowledge itself is the phenomenon to be considered. The problem is not the epistemological one, how to show that concepts agree with external objects, but more properly speaking, the transcendental one. In the latter approach--and this is absolutely crucial for Hegel's phenomenology--the object is studied from the point of view of its occurrence in consciousness at various stages of its dialectical development.

The object is regarded as transcending the mode of knowing it, that is to say, following Kant, as being in itself. But this transcendence is regarded from within consciousness insofar as it is entertained by consciousness in various and successive ways. For the purposes of the Phenomenology, Hegel does not absolutely assume that there are things outside of consciousness nor that there are not, as if then to inquire as to the ways in which concepts correspond to them. He suggests, on the contrary, that this question be provisionally bracketed and that we direct attention rather to the ways in which the In-itself appears for different modes of construing its relation to its concept. Accordingly, the object appears in different guises according to the epistemic stance assumed, e.g., for sense-certainty, for perception, and for understanding. L

The solution to the traditional epistemological problem will come in time and it will come when the whole phenomenological process comes to an end, when appearing knowledge sublates itself to absolute knowledge. The aim of the Phenomenology is to achieve the reconciliation of subject and object, of self and otherness. Knowledge is now the self-knowledge of the absolute content (Being, Truth, object), because this content is none other than the absolute Subject knowing itself.¹⁰¹ "Only then is the content comprehended (begriffen) when ego in its otherness is still at home with itself."¹⁰²

While this final stage has not been reached, consciousness remains split into the internal diremption between concept and being, subject and object. Since object and subject appear in different guises within consciousness, their distinction constitutes a diremption of consciousness. This internal diremption is the mechanism which triggers the self-sublation of each standpoint and leads to the necessity of its ultimate overcoming in the "identity" of concept and being: "Des Ding ist Ich."¹⁰³

If Hegel's phenomenology is a tracing of the steps by which mind (consciousness in the broadest sense) seeks to overcome its inherent diremptions, the first step must be to isolate the most simple act and content of consciousness, and this is "immediate knowledge". Immediate knowledge in this context means the simple acceptance of what is given. The immediately given is identified as the sensuously given, and it is not surprising that Hegel should so identify it in view of Locke and Hume's doctrines regarding "simple ideas of sensation" and "sensory impressions". It is quite clearly to these doctrines that Hegel has reference here. Neither is it surprising that Hegel would attribute certainty to sensuous knowledge. The sensuously given is certain by the fact that it is immediately given, as indeed many modern phenomenologists have claimed.¹⁰⁴ The problem is--and this is Hegel's point--what it is that is immediately given in sense.

The sensuously given appears initially as the richest kind of knowledge, "for it has not as yet dropped anything from the object." The object is allowed to present itself directly; nothing is added or taken away. As distinguished from abstract concepts, sense certainty receives the object in its individuality and "concreteness". Nor is it limited in space and time, for at any time or place new riches may be added through sense. This is the pose which is initially taken. It is a pose in which the mode of knowledge is immediacy and the object of knowledge is claimed to present itself in its individuality and full concreteness. Hegel now proposes to show that the conjunction of this mode of knowledge with its putative object yields a contradiction. He offers two arguments. Both arguments make the same point: the singular is not self-explanatory; knowledge requires general concepts.

(1) On the basis of sense-certainty, what becomes of the self which knows? It is not included in the immediately received object of sense. If it is recognized at all, it is recognized que pure This, merely that it is apart from the object, a very meager knowledge indeed. When speaking of the I or self in this context and in the whole of the Phenomenology, Hegel has in mind the transcendental ego and not the empirical ego. On the initial assumption that sense-certainty provides a wealth of detailed knowledge, it might be argued that oneself and other selves are part

of this wealth and perceived as is anything else. But we would be missing Hegel's point. He is speaking of the subject which knows or senses, not the being as sensed or known. The latter is no less object than any object sensed. From the point of view of the transcendental self, sense-certainty presents us with the very dichotomy which the Phenomenology seeks to overcome: the dichotomy between the knower and the known. And even if we should admit that sense-certainty provides a wealth of knowledge, that wealth would attach only to the object, while the subject remains abstract, a "bare", "pure," Thisness, of which can be said only that it is, i.e., it is known as Being in the abstract.

(2) Likewise, if we reflect on the nature of the object "as sense-certainty gives it out to be," we find that there is a good deal more implied in it than can be allowed on the basis of sense-certainty alone. It is mediated by certain universals which the immediacy of sense-certainty cannot allow. Hegel mentions three of them, i.e., time (the Now), space (the Here), and the This. Other universals are, of course, also involved, namely those pertaining to the properties of things, but these are not introduced until the next chapter ("Perception") in which things are considered as having properties. Apart from these universals, the object of sense-certainty, like its tacit subject, becomes not what sense-certainty means it to be, but the exact opposite, a non-entity.

The same point may be made from another point of view. The content of sense-certainty cannot be uttered in the form of language. Whenever we try to do so, "we do not actually and absolutely say what in this sense-certainty we really mean." We might say "This" or "it is". The "This", however, is not a particular thing, but a universal: the thisness of any being; and the "it is" expresses only Being in general, since the "it" can have no content within sense-certainty. It is thus not possible at all even to express in words any sensuous data which in sense-certainty we mean.¹⁰⁵ "Language, however, as we see, is the more truthful."¹⁰⁶

The object of sense-certainty has shown itself to be not what it makes it out to be. The concept does not agree with its object. It has been shown to involve universals, but sense-certainty cannot admit of universals. In Hegel's terms, the Truth of sense-certainty must be found higher up in a mode of knowledge which will admit of universals. This means that pure Being must be mediated in order that knowledge of objects might become possible. The same conclusion has been reached in the Logic.

6. Heidegger's Phenomenological Refutation of Hegel

Heidegger's position as to our immediate knowledge of Being might best be understood from the point of view of two types of argument which he brings against Hegel and the metaphysical tradition in general. The first is the

phenomenological, taken primarily from Being and Time, and the second the etymological, taken primarily from the Introduction to Metaphysics. We can then ask to what extent these arguments are compelling and to what extent Hegel may be routed by them.

The problem turns on what it is that is immediately known or apprehended in regard to Being. For Hegel, as we have seen, it is Being as an abstract and vacuous universal. The beginning is made here because it is absolutely simple and therefore involves no prior composition and mediation. For Heidegger, it is the direct opposite.

Heidegger's general argument is that the common, everyday conception of Being "which prevails proximally and for the most part" (zunächst und zumeist) requires for its occurrence an original, existentiell understanding of Being. We use the word "existentiell," following Heidegger, to refer to a lived encounter as distinguished from theory about the encounter which the word "existentiel" designates. Thus, "the question of existence never gets straightened out except through existing itself. The understanding of oneself which leads along this way we call existentiell."¹⁰⁷ This existentiell understanding is an immediate one as Hoffmeister says: it is used "zur Kennzeichnung einer dem unmittelbaren Erleben entsprungenen wesenhaften Seinsbetrachtung."¹⁰⁸ The ontological 'truth' of the everyday conception (Vorhandenheit) is to be found in the "primordial, existentiell truth" of that original, immediate, lived

understanding of Being. Now, it is the task of phenomenology to reduce the former to the latter. According to Heidegger's exposition of it, phenomenology begins with the former and traces it to the latter and it is, on his account, well suited as a method of investigation to accomplish this task. The whole of Being and Time may be seen as a series of such phenomenological reductions.¹⁰⁹ A great number of them are carried out there, such as the reduction of spatial extension to existentiell spatiality; presence-at-hand to readiness-to-hand to Dasein's worldly involvements; factuality to facticity; the 'they' to being-with-others; technical knowledge to interpretation and understanding; categories to existentials; truth as agreement to truth as disclosure; clock-time to temporality. Throughout this wealth of detail, the point is to return human being in its 'everydayness' to its authentic Dasein. The movement is always from the objective to the existentiell, from detached observation to involvement by way of an existential analytic of Dasein's Being. The objective is regarded as a privation of the existentiell, the public is regarded as inauthentic, and the categorical-conceptual as the abstract. The existentiell is the 'ground' of these privative, abstract, inauthentic determinations in the sense that, while they are reducible to it, the existentiell is not further reducible. Heidegger's phenomenological argument (if one may speak of a phenomenological argument) against

Hegel in Being and Time takes the form precisely of such a reduction, in this case of time to temporality, as we shall presently see.

"The theme of our investigation," Heidegger says, is "the Being of beings, or the meaning of Being in general." Accordingly, "the task of ontology is to explain Being itself and to make the Being of beings stand out in full relief."¹¹⁰ This letting stand out in full relief is Heidegger's interpretation of Husserl's maxim, "To the things themselves."¹¹¹ The phenomenologist will then be on guard against "technical devices" and "free-floating constructions" (causal explanations, judgments in the Kantian sense of "binding something with something else,"¹¹² or speculative constructions). He will, on the contrary, be engaged in the description of that which stands out or that which shows itself as itself, i.e., the phenomenon. Following Heidegger's Greek, the word phainomenon "signifies that which shows itself from itself, the manifest." The phenomenon is therefore to be distinguished from "semblance" (that which "looks like something or other" but is not truly so) and from "appearance" (that which indicates something which does not show itself, that wherein something announces itself without showing itself, or the "showing-itself" and "announcing-itself"¹¹³). The phenomenon is to be found on a more primordial level. Semblance is a privation of it, since in it the phenomenon is made to seem what it

is not. And appearance, in its various senses, presupposes it.

If the phenomenon is that which phenomenology seeks, then "logos" will have the meaning of "letting something be seen from itself." Heidegger attributes this meaning of "logos" to Aristotle, claiming that other Aristotle interpreters have misunderstood him. This letting be seen is a direct seeing which may be covered up, but is itself "always true" and "can never be false." As a letting something be seen from itself, the logos discovers the phenomenon and therefore does not "pass it off as something which it is not." This is so by virtue of its character as a direct apprehension.

To have a science 'of' phenomena means to grasp its objects in such a way that everything about them which is up for discussion must be treated by exhibiting it directly and demonstrating it directly.¹¹⁴

Heidegger goes so far as to speak of this direct disclosure as "a kind of 'self-evidence' which we should like to bring closer to us."¹¹⁵ It is precisely this aspect of direct apprehension, with which Heidegger credits phenomenology, that must be brought out in relation to Hegel's dialectic of mediation. In the following statement, for example, Heidegger calls "secondary" what is essential in Hegel's method.

When something no longer takes the form of just letting something be seen, but is always harking back to something else to which it points, so that it lets something be seen as something, it thus acquires a synthesis structure, and with this it

takes over the possibility of covering up. The 'truth of judgments', however, is merely the opposite of this covering-up, a secondary phenomenon of truth, with more than one kind of foundation.¹¹⁶

Heidegger's point is, of course, that phenomenology seeks the irreducible, that which can have no further foundation, that which points to nothing prior to itself. This is an ideal of all versions of phenomenology. Even in Hegel, while there is "nothing in heaven or earth" which is not mediated, the phenomenological beginning is made with a presumed immediacy, i.e., that of sense-certainty. Such a direct knowledge cannot be a discursive, propositional, conceptual one. It cannot be a synthetic one in the sense of a "linking together of representations." It may be synthetic in another sense however, and that is in the sense of "letting something be seen in its togetherness with something." The emphasis is always on direct seeing, in distinction from an intellectual act of combination. Quentin Lauer, speaking of Scheler, makes the same point:¹¹⁷

True to the phenomenological method which he has adopted--and adapted--Scheler does not seek to prove that his intuitions are valid; rather, he describes them in such a way that he expects others as a result to see things the way he does. If others do not see things this way, his assurance is not thereby lessened; an essential intuition does not depend for its validity on the number of those who share it.

Similarly, Heidegger points to existentiell intuitions, arguing that the more 'objective' views, e.g., of being, moods, space, time, conscience, world, depend on and are abstractions from the more primordial, intuitive encounter

with these phenomena. His descriptions are very convincing indeed and convincing to such a degree that one might wonder if there is not something to this theory of direct intuition. In any case, a theory it is: Heidegger's account of phenomenology is not strictly that of a "methodological conception," but is shot through with epistemological commitments.

In so far as a definite phenomenological argument is possible, one such argument is given against Hegel toward the end of Being and Time. It seems that the argument there presented need not have been directed against Hegel, but rather to Leibniz and perhaps to Newton. It is directed to Hegel apparently because Hegel's philosophy represents a thoroughgoing logicizing of time, in which time derives from the negation of the negation which constitutes the restlessness of Spirit. As such, it is a concept "whose origin remains completely concealed." Spirit falls into time as a self-externalization, so that time is contrasted to Spirit "as something present at hand."¹¹⁹ Rather than deriving time from the negation of the negation, Heidegger argues that the negation of the negation is possible only on the basis of "primordial temporality".¹²⁰ In this way its existentiell origin might be disclosed.

The reduction of time to temporality is called the temporalizing of time. The temporalizing of time proceeds in either order through the following six steps leading from the existentiell temporality of Dasein, through objective or cosmic time, to the complete forgottenness of time.

1. The there (the da of Sein--Dasein) as temporal, i.e., existence as ecstatically stretched along (projection, possibility, being towards death, the ek-stases of temporality¹²¹).

2. Concernful reckoning with time, involvement in time.

3. Dating, measuring.

4. Public time; being within time as inclusion or insertion; World-time; absolute time (time as a relation of events has already been lost).

5. The ordinary conception of time; counting successive nows; clock-time; the now as present at hand.

6. The full concealment of temporality; fleeing in the face of finitude; "fugitive time".

While world-time represents time as an even and regular stream-like flow of successive nows, existentiell time temporalizes temporal intervals ecstatically, for example, in an anticipatory or foreboding way, so that there is no necessary continuity between datable and measurable intervals and existential ones. Further, while world-time represents the in in 'being in time' as containment and inclusion, existentiell temporality understands it in terms of involvements. For world-time, only the now is actual and for existentially temporalized time the factical now transcends itself and extends into the future. World-time is not necessarily finite: an indefinite series of nows

is conceivable and infinite temporal extension is at least logically possible. Existential temporality, on the other hand, is essentially finite. The conclusion is that world- or cosmic-time is a derivative conception, an inauthentic privation of the primordial temporality of Dasein.

For Hegel, time is generated, as Heidegger has said, in a negation of a negation. The "restlessness of the Absolute" requires and constitutes ontological time (Becoming), historical time (falling into time), and natural time (otherness as otherness). In each case, time is conceived as cosmic time and not as existentiell temporality. The existential reduction of time from #6 to #1 (above) has been deflected at #4 and #3. Had Hegel carried it down to #1, his general philosophical standpoint would have had to be fundamentally overhauled. Heidegger nevertheless praises Hegel for placing Spirit within time.

Heidegger's argument leads to the conclusion (or is meant to lead to it) that temporality is a way of Being for Dasein. In fact the second Division of Being and Time consists of an interpretation of all of the existentials, which had been brought out in the first Division, in terms of temporality. Temporality therefore becomes the primary mode of Being which Dasein 'has'. This is established by means of arguments such as this one we have just traced. As in this argument regarding time and temporality, it is "not just this entity or that, but rather the Being of

entities" which must be uncovered phenomenologically. The Being of beings is "what phenomenology is to 'let us see'." It is "what must be called a 'phenomenon' in a distinctive sense" since (1) it is what we know in advance in all encounter with things, but (2) "for the most part does not show itself at all: it is something that lies hidden," yet (3) constitutes the "meaning" and "ground" of what proximally does show itself (entities) and (4) is irreducible in the phenomenological sense: nothing stands 'behind it' which 'does not appear' and to which it might be reduced.¹²²

Heidegger's phenomenological procedure is very much like his historical hermeneutic. He speaks of phenomenology sometimes also as phenomenological hermeneutic.¹²³ To speak in spatial terms, he proceeds in both cases downward to a concealed ground, while Hegel proceeds upward to a whole into which everything is assimilated. Yet, this difference should not be pressed too far, for Hegel holds that the end is also in the beginning and Heidegger also moves progressively (at least in the order of exposition) from the privative to its existentiell ground. One might be tempted to say that this movement is essential to the subject-matter for Hegel (the Absolute undergoes this process) while for Heidegger it is merely a matter of exposition. Yet, one would be missing an important Heideggerian doctrine in doing so, namely that Being itself undergoes a fate

(Geschick) in metaphysics and technical thinking. The hiddenness and withdrawal of Being, for Heidegger, is not an absolute absence, but an obli-viating of its 'real' presence.

The difference between Hegel and Heidegger in this connection should be located elsewhere, namely in their respective views as to what is disclosed in immediacy. For Hegel, immediacy does not provide any apprehension of a content at all, while for Heidegger it is an apprehension of the fullest and most authentic content. When we turn now to Heidegger's etymological argument, we shall find this asserted again, and we shall also find again the doctrine, set out precisely against Hegel, that the further "declinations" and "mediations" of immediate Being constitute privations rather than enrichments of it.

7. Heidegger's Etymological Refutation of Hegel

We have observed in several connections that Heidegger constantly calls for a return to insights which have been lost. In his interpretation of history, he calls for a retrieving of the insight of the ancients, primarily Heraclitus and Parmenides.¹²⁴ In his interpretation and application of phenomenological method, he calls for a disclosure of the existentiell sources of technical and conventional ways of thinking and dealing with things. In both cases, the goal to be attained is a renewed awareness of what is originally meant by "is" and "Being". The same goal is now to be reached along another, though

very similar route. The argumentation is again addressed to Hegel's thesis "that 'Being' should be so empty a word."¹²⁵

It has been remarked by G.R. Vick and Rudolph Schmitt that Heidegger set out to formulate a new vocabulary for speaking about Being.¹²⁶ The vocabulary he gives us is so "abstruse" and such a "torment" (Vick), however, that one might wonder what advantage has been gained. The necessity of a new vocabulary derives from Heidegger's view of the traditional vocabulary (form-substance, subject-object, idea-reality) as a concealment and dissimulation. If this be true, then a distinct negative advantage is gained in rejecting the traditional vocabulary. One might argue further, that any new vocabulary will at first appear obscure by reason of its unfamiliarity. Its validity or usefulness will be judged according to its facility in uncovering what the traditional vocabulary has kept concealed. If, however, a new vocabulary is too obscure to be clearly understood, it would by this criterion be said to fail. For how can a language be said to uncover or express what has been hidden if it is not understood? Heidegger's increasingly cryptic and mythological ways of speaking tend to call forth this sort of a reaction, e.g., "The world worlds," "the thing things," "the fourfold: earth, sky, gods, mortals," etc.

This is fortunately not the situation in which Heidegger leaves us. For one thing, his new vocabulary, though obscure also in his native German, obviously suffers

in translation. Furthermore, he tells us at various points what point he is making when, for example, "certain words usually taken as substantive are given verbal iteration." The reason for such transformations is that, for Heidegger's new beginning, words like "essence," "thing," "world," and "to be," "being" are no longer abstract generalities which apply uniformly to their particular instances. This was part of the misplacing or dissimulation (*verstellen*) of their original meanings which still retained the temporality of the Zeitwort (verb). Thus, as against Hegel's Wesen ist was gewesen ist, Heidegger puts Wesen as noch wesendes Gewesene¹²⁷ or better, wieder und noch weiter Wesendes or das noch Wesen des Seienden. Heidegger has in fact gone to a lot of trouble to facilitate the task of understanding his thinking, not least by often and deliberately attempting to speak in the most simple terms. This is also true of the Introduction to Metaphysics, where he provides detailed grammatical and etymological clarifications of "Being".

The exposition of "Being" which is given in this work is also meant as an argument showing, on etymological and linguistic grounds, that underlying the variations of the infinitive "to be" (inflections, declensions, moods) there must be an original awareness of a fullness or density of Being from which particular uses of the verb decline or fall away.¹²⁸ Thus we have repeated again

the point of the historical retrieve and of the phenomenological disclosure. But in this case, the argument is etymological and is based chiefly on the Greek words enklisis, physis, and ousia.

Hegel had touched upon a characteristic of the infinitive form "to be", namely that it suffers from an indefiniteness and emptiness of detail. Although "it names something which underlies all the inflections of the verb...", it is the form that communicates the least of the verb's meaning."¹²⁹ Such in fact is the difficulty of all infinitives, but the infinitive "to be" seems to have the least imaginable or conceivable content of all. The difficulty is exacerbated if we transform the verb into a substantive by placing an article before it (as in "sein" and "des Sein"). The emptiness which already attaches to the infinitive is further stabilized in the verbal substantive. It is therefore no surprise that "Being" should be regarded as Hegel had regarded it. The inflections of the verb appear to be richer in content, adding to the infinitive form (and its equally vacuous substantive "Being") a wealth of concrete and differentiated relations and qualities. And this is precisely Hegel's point.

Heidegger is convinced, however, that the infinitive expresses more than the linguistic form might indicate. The linguistic form seems empty, but not the experience expressed or pointed to. His argument is perhaps not so

much a direct argument, but rather an attempt to elicit in us an awareness of the experience of what he takes to be Being. To this extent, his etymological, linguistic, grammatical, semantic considerations depend upon his phenomenology. The basic mistake of Hegel in his doctrine of immediate Being was his preoccupation with the form of the words and concepts, rather than the experienced content. The latter is, so to speak, jolted into our explicit awareness by linguistic pointers (such as the infinitive "to be" and its inflections, as well as unfamiliar uses of language) and by indirect arguments such as Heidegger's reference to ancient Greek.

At the same time, Heidegger claims that Being "dwells" in language: language is said to be its "Behausung". The difference between language as the home of Being and the emptiness of "customary" language about Being is very wide indeed.¹³⁰ There is an "essential" way of thinking and speaking which does not only re-reflect or re-present the experience of Being, but in which Being is made present. One of the faults of the metaphysical tradition is its preoccupation with the written word given to our visual perception and thus in a sense reified.¹³¹ The speaking of the new (and most ancient) beginning places greater value on hearing it spoken or even hearing it in silence, as one might regard touching as 'saying' a great deal. The senses are no longer regarded as different sources of

information, and knowledge is no longer a matter of gathering information,¹³² but as ways of being and dwelling. This is the kind of root experience to which Heidegger wishes to call his readers (and hearers!). This kind of experience seems to be very deeply rooted in Heidegger's own life, as his attachment to the Black Forest and its people would indicate.

The subsequent arguments which Heidegger now goes on to set forth in the Introduction to Metaphysics were called indirect, because they do not strictly prove any point, but are meant to point to this root experience of Being. He finds, typically, that the ancient Greeks already possessed a vocabulary which expressed an original insight into Being. An examination of this vocabulary will lead to quite different conclusions than did Hegel's mode of beginning. The argument begins with a consideration of the way Roman and Greek grammarians regarded the infinitive and its inflections. The Romans had distinguished between the modus infinitivus and the modus finitus, the latter being "a mode of limitation and determinateness of verbal signification."¹³³ The Greek word for modus, i.e., enklisis, is more revealing. It means "falling, tipping, inclining." This is also true of the word ptosis which refers to the case of a noun. These grammatical terms "characterize the first fundamentals of the Greek view of Being."¹³⁴ The "inclination to the side" which the word enklisis attributes to inflections, "implies a deviation

from standing upright and straight." This standing upright is what the infinitive "to be" designates and its declinations ("declination" is more revealing than "inflection") are limitations (peras) of it. They are ways of falling away from it. The infinitive must then have been recognized as having a fullness of meaning of which the declinations are declining forms. This relation of infinitive to its declining forms is precisely the relation of Being to being. Being is "the enduring;" "it is what makes the being into a being as differentiated from a nonbeing"¹³⁵ just as to be endures through the variations of linguistic and grammatical form. What to Hegel seemed "abstract and hence derived" now shows itself to be "inherently whole and fundamental."¹³⁶

The Greeks had several words by which they sought to name¹³⁷ Being as whole and fundamental. The first mentioned is eidos or idea. This meant "that which stands (upright," "the thing which 'sits'," but not the standing upright by which and by whose power it stands upright."¹³⁸ Herein consisted Plato's dissimulation of the meaning of Being. Secondly, the term ousia meant remaining in standing, enduring, not falling away. Thirdly, the term physis meant standing forth, emerging, arising. Finally, the term parousia combined the meanings of ousia and physis to mean standing presence (Anwesen). Rather than translating parousia as "substance," its meaning is much more that of an enduring homestead. It is this standing presence which for the Greeks "Being" meant.¹³⁹

These etymological considerations are supplemented by some further arguments to show that a unity underlies the forms of the verb "to be" in Indo-European sources and in common modern usage. There are three stems which, Heidegger says, "determine the entire range of the inflections of the verb 'sein'."¹⁴⁰ The first is the Sanskrit asus meaning life, the living, and to live and corresponds to the German ist. The second, also an Indo-European term, is bhu or bheu meaning "to come to stand and remain standing." From it developed the German bin and bist. The third is the Germanic word wes or wesen which means to dwell or sojourn. The German noun Wesen thus originally did not mean quiddity, but "enduring as presence," which retains the verbal and thus temporal connotation.

It need hardly be mentioned that Heidegger's translations and interpretations of Greek, Sanskrit and Germanic terms can be and have been disputed. Vick points out, however, that such objections, while perhaps legitimate, are "somewhat beside the point, in the sense that if his exegesis succeeds as a vehicle for bringing the reader to the desired apprehension of the standing-forth in and through which things are, the errors in Greek scholarship that he may have made will be of secondary importance."¹⁴¹ Gadamer offers a further defense of Heidegger, but it is a defense, curiously, which Heidegger himself rejects. Gadamer appeals to Meister Eckhart, Jakob Böhme, Leibniz,

and Frenz von Baader in order to say of the German language in general that it has always retained the meanings which Heidegger wishes to restore to the words "Sein," "Wesen," "Anwesen," and "Wahrheit." Despite the fact that they are nominalized verbs, "he who is really at home in the German language" will find "evoked" in these terms the movement which Heidegger calls "Anwesen".¹⁴² Although Gadamer appeals here to the mystics, he also has Hegel in mind. Both Hegel and Heidegger had, he says, an intimate feeling for the "speculative spirit of the German language."¹⁴³ It may have been an overstatement for Heidegger, even in the light of his notion of the retrieve, when he said that the great wealth of original meanings which the words "is," "to be," "being," and "Being" have had in the past is "extinct today" and only the abstract meaning has been preserved.¹⁴⁴

In any case, a "crucial question" arises with respect to the three stems of the verb "to be": Wherein do these three stems accord with each other? The interesting point, for Heidegger, is that these meanings have not just been lost, but have merged together under one verb. The implication is that an "inherently whole and fundamental" meaning of Being, implicitly and dimly understood, must have been present throughout this "age of Being." This conclusion is given in this particular context as a question, but the implication is clear. How we are to construe this basic understanding of Being is not here decided, but forms

the topic of the following chapter entitled "The Question of the Essence of Being". For Heidegger's present purpose, it is sufficient to have established that the Greek account of the existential infinitive and its declinations refers us to a fundamental and unitive apprehension of Being and that the meanings given in the three stems of the verb "to be" invoke "something more than indifferent particulars" i.e., different usages and inflections essentially independent of each other. This "something more" is the to be which endures through the differences of form and usage and into which the latter are concentrated. There must be a unitive meaning of Being by which it is possible to distinguish the different senses of it (really present, permanently there, taking place, coming from, being made of, standing for, belonging to, etc.¹⁴⁵) from nothing. And this we can do in advance of critical analysis. The Being of beings is directly and immediately apprehended. The task of philosophy is not to provide us with a "right" to know Being or to make a claim to such knowledge. It is its task to unveil Being. This is the rock-bottom of Heidegger's thinking. Through his laborious linguistic and etymological studies, it is always the fact (Tatsache) that we understand what it is to be ("the fact that we understand Being"¹⁴⁷) as a unity of its multiple forms and senses which is at issue.

8. Summary of Results

Up to this point we have primarily noted differences between Hegel and Heidegger. This is not especially

surprising, since for the most part Heidegger also proceeds in this way. When speaking of beginnings, whether historically, phenomenologically, or etymologically, he consistently opposes Hegel. When speaking of ends, however, whether the essence of Being or the features of Hegel's Absolute, he takes a much more agreeable and accommodating view.

In one respect, they agree in regarding much of past metaphysics as inadequate for dealing in "fixed" or "rigid" concepts and judgments. This meant for Hegel an exclusivistic application of the principle of contradiction (*Verstand*), which is to be overcome by a dialectical liquifaction of concepts which speculative reason (*Vernunft*) makes possible. For Heidegger, the "traditional" metaphysics has been imprisoned in a kind of thinking which deals with that which is, objects and facts. These conceptual fetters are to be sundered through an original thinking characterized by an openness to Being.

On the other hand, the value of the tradition is also affirmed by both. In each case, we find a certain historicism at work. Hegel had regarded the history of philosophy (and all history) not merely as a chronicle of conflicting doctrines, but as Spirit's own coming to self-knowledge. Similarly, Heidegger has spoken of the oblivion of Being not merely as the development of false or misguided notions, but as a fatefulness in the ways in which Being presences itself (*Geschicklichkeit*, *Seinsgeschehen*). So far, they are very closely related to each other.

For both, there is something which the tradition had not adequately seen. But what it has but dimly or implicitly seen is no less than its own ground and meaning (Grund, Sinn, telos, logos). We have seen how this interpretation is variously worked out. It is at this point that Hegel and Heidegger begin to differ. They vary widely as to the interpretation of the deficiencies of past metaphysics and as to the nature of the task now before us.

Heidegger's doctrine of the Retrieve of the ground of metaphysics holds that this ground has been concealed by objectifying categories and needs now to be regained by a return to origins. Hegel's doctrine of the sublation of theoretical oppositions in the absolute philosophy holds that past philosophies have grasped the truth (the unity of the whole as articulated in the absolute philosophy) partially and fragmentarily and to that extent have their right and legitimation. The process must now be brought to completion and fruition for our time and to the extent to which spiritual and cultural conditions permit. The difference of outlook between retrieve and sublation is thus quite deep-seated.

While the Phenomenology of Mind and Being and Time can very fruitfully be compared, there is really no work in Heidegger's corpus comparable to Hegel's Science of Logic. Heidegger has given reasons for this in his Introduction to Metaphysics.¹⁴⁸ It is not surprising, he says, that

logic should have assumed a dominant position, since it depends on the very dissimulations which deflected philosophers from the "authentic thinking that goes back to the roots," viz., the separation of thought from being, logos from physis, and the consequent identification of the Being of being as eidos and as the 'object' of episteme.¹⁴⁹ Though he praises Hegel (together with Leibniz and Kant) for attempting to overcome "the traditional logic," Hegel had defined logic as the science of pure thought and had therefore sought a logical beginning for it. Now, it is Heidegger's constantly held and often reiterated position that there can be no such thing as a purely logical beginning, for the logical presupposes the existentiell. Hegel, on the other hand, had not denied that our thinking carries with it a background of experience, tradition, habit and custom. In the beginning of the Logic he asks us simply to resolve to do logic. The logical beginning is thus logical in two senses, i.e., it is logical as the first pure concept and as the beginning for logic, where the latter requires the former. Yet, Hegel has made more ambitious claims, for example, that the conceptual process carried out in the Logic is an enactment of the process by which God thinks himself and thereby all reality. And here Heidegger might have a point. At least, a contrast emerges between him and Hegel. This contrast may be put in the following way.

There is no disagreement between them as to the demand that the quest for Absolute Knowledge (Hegel) and the meaning of Being (Heidegger) must have its beginning with an immediacy. Since Hegel regards this immediacy as barren of content, it becomes necessary for him to move forth from it and out of it and thence towards the actual, the real, the concrete. Since, on the contrary, Heidegger regards this immediacy as the intuitive and direct apprehension of Being itself in its profoundest depths, it becomes necessary for him always to refer back to it, to retrieve and reappropriate it. The mediation of immediacy is for Hegel an enrichment and for Heidegger a falling and a concealment.

This contrast accounts for the difference in structure between their respective phenomenologies. In Hegel's phenomenology we move from an assumed immediacy towards a progressive comprehension of a greater and greater wealth of detailed materials. In Heidegger's phenomenology we find a series of reductions to the immediate and existentiell. We have here two fundamentally different conceptions of phenomenology.

A more definite argument emerges from Heidegger's etymological and linguistic expositions of the verb to be. We must have a root understanding available to us as a necessary condition for the possibility of our being able to use different senses and inflections of the infinitive

"to be". If we grant this point, we would from Hegel's point of view then reply, "try to conceive of it and you will find that you are not conceiving anything definite at all." Heidegger's response would be to point out that we should not try to conceive it, certainly not as "something" and not as "definite" in the sense of a definable idea. He has nonetheless found certain fruitful metaphors in the Greek words physis and parousia, namely "standing forth," "standing upright," "remaining in standing," and "enduring presence". It may be true to say that imagination provides a greater range of possibilities and a greater freedom in the use of analogies and metaphors than does conception. This is quite clearly Heidegger's view, as can be seen from his treatment of Kant's doctrine of imagination.¹⁵⁰

We will be in a better position to ask questions of validity in relation to the ontologies of Hegel and Heidegger after a consideration of their full doctrines of Being in Part III. We are in this paper chiefly concerned with the way Being is thought by Hegel and Heidegger. The following chapter ("Being as Determinate") deals with what Heidegger has called "des Seiende" (being) and is thus of lesser importance for our purposes.

II. BEING AS DETERMINATE

1. Determinate Being as an Ontological Problem

The term "determinate being" is a translation of Hegel's "Dasein" in the Logic,¹ which is the title of the second chapter in the Doctrine of Being. The title of the first section, "Bestimmtheit," is also translated as "Determinateness", but this need not cause confusion, since it is the nature of Dasein that it be qualitatively determined. It is already clear from this use of terms that Hegel has something quite different in mind under Dasein than does Heidegger. It corresponds more closely to Heidegger's "das Seiende," for in both cases the meaning includes definiteness, qualitative distinction and quantitative plurality. What was found lacking in the category of pure Being is now given in the new category of determinate being.

We have distinguished between (1) the infinitive to be, (2) being as a present participle, (3) a being as a qualified, finite, limited entity distinguished from other entities, and (4) Being as the universal in all entities that are. In Hegel's terms, these distinctions might be rendered (1) existence, (2) the da in Dasein, (3) determinate being, and (4) pure Being. His dialectical

procedure follows this order in reverse. The beginning is made with pure Being. Determinate being forms the second tried under the general heading of Determinateness (both #2 and #3). Existence falls under the Doctrine of Essence.² For Hegel, therefore, the problem of determinate being concerns the role it plays in the logical dialectic, and in particular the role it plays in overcoming the self-negating character of pure Being.

In the Phenomenology, the issue is treated from a different point of view, as the titles "Phenomenology" and "Logic" would already indicate. Here it is treated in the form of the question, how can we reconcile the object, insofar as it is regarded as having independent existence (the thing having properties), with our concept of it? It turns out that the question is wrongly put (as Kant had wrongly put it), because this way of asking epistemological or transcendental questions leads either to the pulverization of the object or an inverted view of the world. The solution eventually becomes one which the Neo-Platonists long ago had held, viz., the existence of the object and the existence of mind flows from Nous or Spirit, and the unity between them is due to their mutual participation in Nous. This is, in fact, the basis on which Hegel can proceed as he does in the Logic. Determinate being is there not conceived as existing apart from logic, because logic is the thought of God, and the dialectical deduction of the categories is the elucidation of God's own self-reflection.

Determinate being as an ontological and phenomenological problem appears in Heidegger both in his early and in his later writings. In view of his relation to his phenomenological predecessors, this is not surprising. R.K. Revel quotes Colin Wilson as saying that "Phenomenology is the study of the way that consciousness perceives objects."³ Heidegger himself makes use of a distinction drawn from Meinong (and perhaps from Aristotle). Meinong had classified objects in three different categories:⁴

- (1) existent objects like tables, chairs, solid materials, etc.;
- (2) subsistent objects or ideal objects like the universals, as e.g., the mathematical entities, Platonic ideas, etc.;
- (3) nonsubsistent or impossible objects which neither subsist nor exist, as e.g., round square.

Similarly, Heidegger distinguishes between a narrower and a broader sense of "thing":⁵

The narrower or limited meaning of "thing" is that which can be touched, reached or seen, i.e., what is present-at-hand (das Vorhandene). In the wider meaning of the term, the "thing" is every affair or transaction, something that is in this or that condition, the things that happen in the world-- occurrences, events. Finally there is still another use of the word in the widest possible sense; this use was introduced in the philosophy of the eighteenth century and was long in preparation. With respect to this, Kant speaks of the "thing-in-itself" in order to distinguish it from the "thing-for-us", that is, as a "phenomenon."

These are clearly not mere verbal definitions of senses in which the word "thing" is and may be used. These distinctions involve and come out of serious epistemological

and ontological problems. Thus, Husserl, before he adopted Dilthey's conception of the Lebenswelt as a "lived" unity of the subjective and the objective, was faced with charges of subjective idealism and even solipsism, since he could not account for the "thing X" which had originally been suspended but had at the end to be reintroduced on pain of having to leave the "essence" of things within the immanence of consciousness.⁶ Kant's problems in this regard are famous enough. His successors saw immediately that the whole issue of the thing-in-itself needed to be cleaned up, and they did it by reducing all sources of knowledge to the ego. It was impossible for them to return either to a "bundle-plus-substance" theory (Locke) or a simple "bundle of impressions" theory (Hume).⁷ Hegel, however, found it possible to move through Kant back to the ancients, especially Anaxagoras, Aristotle, and Plotinus.

The issue here is not to give an exposition of Hume, Locke, Kant, or Husserl, but to point out that determinate being did present a serious problem for them. On the other hand, in view of Hegel and Heidegger's debt to the ancient Greeks, it will be useful to review in more detail the general model of the theory of being which the ancients used and which may be said to be one of the great legacies inherited from them. We can then ask to what extent this model or a different one is used by Hegel or by Heidegger and in what respects they differ. The theory may be set forth in the following way:

Things are observed as changing. Change is the fact to be explained. Changing things can be referred to prior changing things as their causes. But there can be no infinite regress. Consider, therefore, change itself apart from changing things. Change in general cannot be explained through another changing thing nor by change itself. The question now is, what are the presuppositions of change? The cause of change must be outside the process. The cause must be other than the effect.⁸ According to Anaxagoras, reason and love are ultimate principles. Accordingly, change is known and desired by its cause. For it cannot "be right to entrust so great a matter to spontaneity and chance."⁹ Change and the changing thing are therefore both intelligible (true) and good.

The cause cannot produce what it does not actually contain in itself. For example, potential heat does not make a thing hot. Therefore, the cause of change is true and good: it has intellect and will. Moreover, among the possible occurrences, particular changes and determinations take place. These must be willed and intelligible as they are (cf. also Leibniz's principle of sufficient reason). Therefore, that which is and its cause are both true and good. Consequently, all being, finite and infinite, is true and good.

In this way, Being becomes the subject of a proposition. All Being is true and good (All S is P_1 and P_2). But all Being is One: there is nothing outside it, differentiated

from it. "Nothingness" arises only in thought as a distinction from Being. It cannot be a metaphysical reality, because it cannot be said to be except as a contradiction. We thus have a third predicate of Being, i.e., that it is one.

While we can thus know that Being has the three predicates, verum, bonum, unum, we are not thereby enabled to understand Being in itself, i.e., as God knows it. To say that all that is, finite and infinite, is intelligible is not to say that it is rational. We can know that it is intelligible, by the above argument, but we cannot think it in its intelligibility. Thus, we are consigned to imaginative analogies using spatial and temporal relations.

The predicates of Being were found by a sort of induction from the observed fact of change. Everything depends on the next step. If Being has these three predicates, the definition of Being must be formulated in such a way that it can have these predicates. This is the traditional problem of the essence of Being. Among the ancient Greeks, the possibilities of a definition of Being and their consequences were clearly seen. Parmenides opted for an absolute conception of Being by which Being became one thing at the exclusion of all change and determination. If the oneness of Being is absolutized, it is hard to see how this result could be avoided. If this conclusion is to be avoided, another conception of Being must be available. The oneness of Being must be capable of being

understood in some way other than absolute, so that the world of changing things is not annulled.¹⁰

Aristotle's solution is that the movement from changing things to the cause of change and to Being as the subject of a proposition is a movement of thought only. This movement reflects the fact that human knowledge is not divine knowledge. We proceed in a round-about way to reach the conclusion that all being is one. What has been done rationally is to articulate and elicit what is contained in the changing thing. When Being becomes the logical subject of the proposition, All Being is true, good, and one, we carry out an act of abstraction. Since Being is not a being having properties, the proposition about all Being having predicates means in the last analysis that Being is Being or simply Being is. Consequently, the next question arises, "What is Being?" and this question is not answered by the predicates. If Being is not conceived as one absolutely, but as one in another sense, that other sense is a relational one. Being is, properly speaking, not a predicate (or at least a very peculiar one), but the unity of all predicates attributed to things, which grounds them all. Its predication of a thing (as when we say "x has being") has many meanings (e.g., when we say "there is straightness"), but an analogical unity obtains between them. Otherwise, Being becomes either one thing or irrational and unintelligible.¹¹

From this Aristotelian point of view, one might raise an objection against Hegel to the effect that he confused the rational and the really intelligible (the true). When Being is rationally treated as the logical subject, it will indeed seem rather poverty-stricken. But this indicates, for Aristotle, only the relative poverty of our conception in comparison with the richness of Being in itself. Consequently, it is Hegel's task to carry out a deduction of determinate being, by which there is added to Being a successive series of determinations. Aristotle, on the other hand, beginning as he does with the perception of things in all their variety, abstracting from it the concept of Being and returning to the world of changing things through the relational-analogical conception of Being, sees Being in itself as a fullness in which all that is is opened up for us.

The contrast must be carefully drawn, however. Hegel's movement is rational, though he claims the same movement also to be real. Nevertheless, the movement includes a return to nature as the next step following upon the Logic. It is, however, in his Doctrine of Being that a sharp contrast with Aristotle appears. It will be readily seen, moreover, that Heidegger has much in common with Aristotle, e.g., the rich, rather than the empty, notion of Being, the concern for the things themselves as announcing their Being, the emphasis on

imaginative analogies, the emphasis on the relative poverty of the purely rational, and the view of thought as nothing more than an eliciting of what is already there in direct apprehension of Being through beings. But let us see how this is actually carried out.

2. Determinate Being in Hegel's Logic

In the previous chapter we dealt with Being insofar as it is conceived in abstraction from all relations and determinations. As the beginning of the logical process of the dialectic, this conception of Being was seen to be self-negating but yet self-sublating. Otherwise, it could not give rise to any dialectic at all. Hegel saw very clearly that this was the result of Parmenides' notion of Being.¹² In some way, therefore, Being must be capable of receiving qualifications.

Hegel's argument is not merely that the necessity of such qualification implies ipso facto that it is qualified. Parmenides cannot simply be refuted by the assertion that determinate being exists. So, Hegel proceeds to give arguments. Ideally, the arguments are to be dialectical, and this means in one sense that what is contained in the original notion (in this case Being) is enfolded so as to achieve a result not immediately anticipated (in this case Becoming). In this sense, the result would follow with necessity. This may sound like an analytical argument, and in a certain sense it does

extract contents implicitly contained in the original notion, since the end is in the beginning, as Hegel says. On the other hand, the original notion is in the process also expanded by contrasts and syntheses.

It has often been remarked that Hegel's system is like an organism whose internal relations are such that each item, variable, or moment is qualified by every other and by the relations themselves. While the whole is greater than the sum of its parts, each part also contains the whole. The appropriate form of argument is therefore not a string of mathematical deductions. Hegel thought he had found in Kant and Fichte the form of reasoning and argument which is appropriate for an organic system, and that was the dialectic. This seems to be the original insight with which Hegel began. The dialectic seems to be taken as an inherited given. If Kant's transcendental dialectic is completed by means of the Nous of the Neo-Platonists or Fichte's Absolute Ego, the antinomies of speculative reason can be sublated, and speculative philosophy is again re-instated, but now on a new dialectical basis.

When we examine the particular triads and their dialectical arguments, we may be disappointed to find that they are often not compelling or even convincing. This has also often been said already, as for example by McTaggart, Stace, Wall, and Nicolai Hartmann. Can one

believe, then, that perhaps Hegel did not always take them seriously himself? The answer seems to be that Hegel took the overall dialectic very seriously and, for that reason, did not consistently take sufficient trouble with the particular details.

The first tried consists of the movement from Being through Nothing to Becoming. Being collapses into Nothing since both are entirely lacking determination. But if Being is Nothing, then Nothing is Being, since every equation is reversible. One might think it odd, on Eleatic grounds, to say of Nothing that it is or exists. Hegel argues that we are dealing with pure abstractions in the first instance, and that the contents thought (or rather the lack of contents) are in both cases the same. To say that Nothing is Being is not to say of Nothing that it exists, as if it were something. The latter would introduce limitation and relation, by which Nothing would be thought as a determinate something. But in the present instance, determination is "not yet posited" and the "transition in question is not yet a relation (Verhältnis).¹³ The Eleatic problems do not yet arise.¹⁴ The same can be said for "Being": it makes as little sense to say of Being that it exists or that it is something. And the statement "Being is", though it is not a contradiction, says no more than "Being is Being" or "Being in itself".

The latter might not be as vacuous as they may at first glance seem. The copule in "Being is Being" may

be understood as signifying a certain relation or reference (Beziehung). "Being is Being" asserts not mere, simple identity, but a contrast to Nothing, so that "Being is not Nothing" is equivalent with it in meaning. Of course, if A is A, then A is not non-A. This is simple enough and expresses no more than the identity of A with itself. From the point of view of formal logic, this would of course be correct. The fault of this formal reasoning is that it makes A (Being) into a determinate being or a class of beings and the complement of A into the class of all non-A's. Thus, Hegel will use the term "Nichts" as the opposite correlate of "Sein" and the term "Nichtsein" (non-being) as the opposite correlate of determinate being ("bestimmtes Sein").¹⁴ We can formulate the argument as follows:

If Being is Being, then Being is not Nothing. We are speculating that the is in the antecedent contains and therefore implies the consequent. Hegel asserts frequently that "we" always intend or mean a distinction between Being and Nothing. Secondly, if Being is not Nothing, then Nothing negates Being. This follows from the dialectical principle that difference implies negation. If Nothing negates Being, Nothing is opposed to Being. This follows from the principle that negation is opposition or "contradiction". The original argument about the identity of Being and Nothing is simply an example of the

principle of the identity of indiscernibles. We now have the coincidence of identity and opposition between Being and Nothing and this is an instance of the principle of the unity of opposites.

It would be interesting to experiment with a formalization of these arguments and their connections with each other. The possibility of doing so seems doubtful, because Hegel's argumentation is by no means a good example of the Cartesian ideal. Moreover, it seems also that it would be necessary to introduce types of logical relations which it would be difficult to render in existing logical notation. It also seems doubtful that Hegel himself would have been impressed by such attempts. Hegel insists that his thinking here is logical, not in the sense of deductive inferences, but in the sense that the ideas of Being and of Nothing are contemplated in imagination and thought,¹⁶ and no existential assertion is made in regard to them.

From the mutual identity and opposition of Being and Nothing, the category of Becoming arises. The passage of Nothing to Being is coming-to-be and the passage of Being to Nothing is ceasing-to-be, the two sub-categories of Becoming. Becoming, in turn, sublates itself into determinate being. The sequence of steps may be quickly stated before turning to the significance of the whole discussion.

Being and Nothing are not separate subsistences, but "vanish" into each other. This mutual vanishing into each other constitutes Becoming, a "resultant equilibrium of coming-to-be and ceasing-to-be."¹⁷ In the unity of Becoming, Being and Nothing are only vanishing factors. But Becoming depends on the distinctness of its moments. Therefore, with the vanishing of its moments, Becoming also vanishes. It is a self-destructive unity, for it rests on two opposite elements: the unity and identity of Being and Nothing and their distinctness and opposition. The dialectic which occurs within becoming, occurs between these elements.

Insofar as Becoming has achieved the unity of Being and Nothing, their distinctness is negated and their oneness remains. Thus, Becoming settles into a stability and rest (Ruhe). This is determinate being, or determinateness as such. No determinate being has as yet been posited. It is nonetheless concrete, in Hegel's sense of the term, because it is an achieved whole which resulted from a sublation. And it is a new immediacy, not yet involving a relation to another something (etwas).¹⁸

The relation (Beziehung) of determinate being to Being is not a relation (Verhältnis) to another, but the immediate unity of both. In the form of being (seiend), but as yet arrested in its immediacy, determinate being is a quality, not any quality but simply the category of

quality. Determinate being is the more universal term, however, since it can equally be determined as quantity and will be so determined at a later stage in the process. In the form of being (that it is) qualitatively determined being is reality. On Spinoza's principle, which is "infinitely important,"¹⁹ determination is negation, but "posited as affirmative," as a limit to itself. With the categories of reality, negation, and limitation, we have arrived at a point beyond determinate being as such, namely at the notion of a determinate something. In this idea the distinction between reality and negation is sublated: it is the first negation of negation.²⁰ But a something is not simply a "reflection" or relation to itself alone (reality), but is limited through its Other. It preserves itself through the negation, and it is therefore also a being-for-other. This is finitude.

The synthesis of the present tried (determinate being as such, finitude, infinity) is the true or authentic infinity, as distinguished from the bad or false infinite. This movement does not form an essential part of this discussion, however, and is more appropriately taken up in the next chapter.

Several especially noteworthy aspects of Hegel's theory of determinate being stand out. It will be readily seen, in the first place, that quality is a relational category. In the general architectonic of the system,

relation is a category of appearance and appearance is a category of essence. Despite this seeming relegation of relation to a sub-sub-category, it runs through every detail of the Logic.²¹ This is to be expected if the whole system is to be an organic one, as we have noted.

Quality is a kind of determinateness. As such it yields negation, which yields limit, which yields the other, which yields finitude, which yields the something. Following a convention instituted by George Berkeley, one might say that to be a finite something is to be in relation with one's Other. It is significant, indeed essential, that we qualify the Other with a reflexive and possessive pronoun. That the Other is one's Other is important for Hegel, because it makes the difference between mere difference and the negation involved in determinateness. The relation to the Other is thus a constitutive one. Were this not so, no dialectic could arise.

When in the later parts of the Logic, Hegel deals with the categories of quantity and existence, their relational character is again inescapable. Within the Cartesian tradition, these categories are least of all conceivable as having a relational character. The transition from Being to Essence is made through the identity and difference of quality and quantity. The category of existence is also a relational one, and this is so in

virtue of the category of ground. The existent is grounded, is its own ground, and grounds another. W.T. Stace, then, is quite right, when he says "Hegel uses the word existence to signify that a thing is part of the universe, i.e., is in correlation (relation) with all other existent things and forms part of the system or network of relations which we call the universe."²²

The category of quality has, besides its relational character, another significance. It precedes the notion of "something". Something is deduced from it. The significance of this order of deduction is that, for something to be da (seiend), it must be some-thing, some a which is qualitatively distinguished from a b which is not a. Again, in terms of Berkeley's convention, we might say, with Gilson, that "to be is to be something."²³ Gilson attributes this view to Plato, but it is true for any metaphysics which proposes to reduce being to quality. Hegel himself has said as much: "Existence is Quality."²⁴ The statement appears in the Phenomenology and would, according to the terms of the Logic, have to be revised so as to say "determinate being is quality." The latter is an obvious tautology, but it expresses nevertheless a certain ontological standpoint, the greatest and most far-reaching expression of which is Hegel's statement, "the truth of Being is Essence."

When we take Heidegger into view, these considerations will be seen to have important consequences. Hegel has

given an account of things (determinate beings, somethings) in such a way that their whatness constitutes their thatness. Their thatness is no more than an arrested immediacy, the thought of which will forthwith break the fetters of that immediacy; that stability of being is haunted by its own unrest which is its own essence. This is going to turn out a most interesting contrast with Heidegger's phenomenology of things. While the becoming of things is crucial for Heidegger, it is not at all the same as Hegel's logical notion of Becoming; and the essence of things (appropriately stated in the singular) has nothing to do with a category of quality for Heidegger, or with determinations of an Etwas (its quiddity), except in an ungenue way.

Since Heidegger's treatment of the structure of determinate being is phenomenological, we look first at Hegel's phenomenological exposition of it.

3. Determinate Being in Hegel's Phenomenology

Among the results coming out of the discussion of determinate being in Hegel's Logic, the following may be highlighted, especially since these will become crucial for a comparison with Heidegger.

(1) Hegel's procedure is logical: the thing having properties is a result of a process of reasoning. It is the result of a rational sublation. This does not mean that the existence of a thing is caused by the process of

reasoning, not at least at this point. Ultimately, God's thinking does constitute the cause of the being of things. But the reasoning carried out in the early stages of the Logic cannot be said to be such as, in some sense, bringing the thing into existence. The point of the deduction of the something is a justification in the sense in which Kant used the word "deduction". In Hegel it is both the justification of the category and the justification of the fact, which is never in doubt, that something should be at all. Thus, the whole system is often said to be a theodicy.²⁴

(2) The logical sequence, since it is logical, is concerned with abstract concepts, not with the observation of the particular thing. So, Stace will say:²⁵

This point, namely, that in the Logic we are throughout talking only about pure abstract thoughts, and not about sensuous objects, should be carefully kept in mind, not only as regards the transitions of being into nothing and something into other, but as regards all the transitions in the Logic. Failure to understand a deduction will frequently be removed by reflection upon this point.

Even the something is the idea of some-thing. Likewise, finitude is thought as idea, not as actual finite things. This is, of course, Schelling's point (above, p. 15).

It is hard to see why such a procedure should prima facie be illegitimate. At a later stage in the Logic and, perhaps, in the Philosophy of Nature, it may be right to say that on this point he runs into difficulties. But at this stage, I would think, the problem does not yet arise.

(3) Nicolai Hartmann has pointed out that in the Logic the idea of the something functions as a reestablished positivity (eine wiederhergestellte Positivität).²⁶ If the positive factuality of the actual world is not in doubt, as we have said, this positivity was not given in the first tried, but indeed negated. With the something, this positivity is re-introduced. On the other hand, in this case as in the whole of the Logic, we do not arrive at the natural thing. The latter requires a turn of the whole Logic, and thus of the Absolute, from the logical to the natural, from the Logic to the Philosophy of Nature.²⁷ Still, the idea of something contains this turn implicitly already. Problems arise when the turn to the natural is effected and, more significantly, when Hegel recognizes it as a necessary movement of the Absolute. How can the Absolute be said to be absolute if it requires such a turn in its own Being?²⁸ (Cf. Part III) This is a variation of a problem we have met with before in connection with the relationality of the Absolute. But again, these problems arise at a later stage.

(4) Stace has taken up a controversy begun by McTaggart as regards the question whether the category of Becoming involves time and change. McTaggart regrets the choice of the term "Becoming" as the name for this category, preferring the word "negation".²⁹ Negation is properly a logical category while Becoming expresses a concrete fact.

But no concrete fact is meant by Hegel. Stace replies that Hegel does intend to include "the conception of change".³⁰ Hegel's references to Heraclitus and his definition of Becoming itself (the sublation of coming-to-be and ceasing-to-be), he says, constitute "overwhelming evidence that Hegel conceived his category of Becoming as change." It seems that McTaggart had the better case, as our previous discussion would tend to indicate. McTaggart's most telling point is that Becoming functions as the identity of Being and Nothing insofar as it is established as a category. A category is always a point at which the dialectical movement is arrested into a stability and rest. This stability breaks into unrest, so that the category leads to further categories. In the case of Becoming, therefore, change is introduced not in the category, but if at all only in its break-up. Thus, McTaggart would be right in deploring the choice of the word "Becoming". On the other hand, when Becoming becomes a Werden-zu-sich, already in the dialectic of the One and the Other and ultimately in the self-externalization of the Absolute, it is not altogether so strange to think of becoming as a conceptual process.

(5) Finally, we have mentioned the crucial Hegelian view, according to which the something is a category of quality: to be is to be something.

These points are the critical ones for a comparison with Heidegger's ontology of things. Indeed, Heidegger's

notion of Presence-at-hand (Vorhandenheit) corresponds to this view, but this notion is held to be reducible to the more existential Readiness-to-hand (Zuhandenheit). Hegel, of course, does not leave the notion of determinate being at that. What corresponds, in the Phenomenology, to Heidegger's Vorhandenheit is the conception of the Thing having properties, and this also corresponds initially to the something in the Logic. In both works, this notion breaks up into a self-diremption. But this self-diremption does not lead, as in Heidegger, to a more existential conception, but to the spiritualization of things, things as having their being in the participation in Spirit. This contrast must be very carefully drawn, however.

The thing having properties in the Phenomenology is the result of the collapse of sense-certainty. It is a renewed stability in the apprehension of things after the certainty of sensuous knowledge has melted away. A new attitude is adopted in which the universal is accommodated, which, in sense-certainty, was seen to be involved, but could not be accounted for. The new attitude is Perception.

In perception, the thing is seen as having properties, thus being a member of a species and being distinguished from other things by kind. It will be readily seen, that such a conception of a thing will directly lead to the same diremptions which we have traced in the Logic. In

the first instance, we will think of the thing as a substance (in the Lockian sense, for this is what Hegel has in mind) and its qualities as co-existing peacefully together.

However, the qualities are distinguished from each other and thus involve mutual negation. Moreover, the substance is distinguished from its qualities. In good Leibnizian form, Hegel now calls the substance "force" and the sensory qualities (in good Lockian form) "appearance". The force is supposed to cause the appearance (vide Kant). In both of these relationships, i.e., between force and manifestation and between one quality and another, there is thought a unity (otherwise the thing would not be), but also a repelling. The unity of the thing is now a repelling and excluding unity. The thing no longer has what it was intended in perception to have, namely its self-identity.

The discussion of the unity and exclusion of the properties occurs under the title "Perception" and the discussion of the relationship of force and manifestation occurs under the title "Understanding". In the latter chapter, the dialectic of force and manifestation is brought to a point at which it is self-defeating and turns over into the consciousness of self. The self's knowledge of the object other than itself has failed. The self now looks to itself as the source of knowledge. Briefly, the reasoning follows the following sequence:

I posit the unity of the thing jenseits of it beyond my apprehension as a Kantian thing in itself,

because I could not find its unity in its qualitative manifestations. I must posit unity, for otherwise I would be left with the result of the dialectic of perception: the thing exploding into its mutually antagonistic elements. I cannot show the relational unity of the elements constituting the thing. So, often unconsciously, I posit the Jenseits as the essential unity of the thing. But the Jenseits is undetermined (as Kant had contradictorily held): "It is empty, for it is merely the nothingness of appearance, and positively the naked universal."³¹ I cannot know the Jenseits, not so much because it is jenseits, i.e., because I am limited, but because it is empty, i.e., there is nothing to know.

Furthermore, the system of forces (according to Newton) must be construed to be in the manifestations (phenomena), not entirely jenseits. This becomes the system of laws of nature. But in that case the Jenseits is Diesseits. The original solution by understanding of the problem of perception has reversed itself. The appearance is no longer thought as appearance, but as the substance, and the substance is no longer thought as the underlying "I know not what," but as the appearance. The inner has become outer and the outer has become inner.

The problem with which Hegel has here been concerned is to fit Notion to Being, and this is (in the case of "Consciousness") the same as the problem of reconciling the subject with the object. For consciousness, the

"Truth" and the "Reality" (gegenständliches Wesen) is the object as it is in itself. This conception of the object has led the difficulties and cannot be maintained. In itself the object is equivalent to nothing. But the conception of it has the result of sundering consciousness: the object thought in consciousness as in itself and the consciousness of it. This is the last turning point in the overcoming of the contradiction of consciousness and a stepping forth into the new realm of Spirit. Both sides of consciousness have been inverted: the manifestation has become the essence and the essence has become the manifestation. This is, in fact, a characteristic of dialectic itself: what was put out to be of one character turns out to be its opposite.³¹ When it is seen that what consciousness has regarded as the object (being in itself) is consciousness itself, and when the unity of the in itself (unity) and the for another (diversity) is seen as life, the transition is made from consciousness to self-consciousness.

The principles involved in the discussion of the thing in the Phenomenology are the same, clearly, as in the Logic. We need to keep carefully in mind, however, that both expositions are preliminary, coming out of an inadequate immediacy, proving to be inadequate themselves, and leading to further insights. Nonetheless, this is Hegel's interpretation of determinate being.

4. The Categories of Finite Being According to Heidegger

Hegel's discussion of Understanding in the Phenomenology constitutes among other things a refutation of Kant's doctrine of the thing-in-itself. The thing-in-itself appears there as essence, substance, being (in-itself), truth, the real, and force. These are distinguished from appearance, notion, semblance, manifestation, and expression. But this distinction assumes that much is known of the thing-in-itself and that, as force and law, it is located in the manifestation as its natural structure. In that case, the thing-in-itself is no longer jenseits and the manifestation no longer strictly phenomenal. The appearance becomes the real and the in-itself becomes the illusion. In this way, the distinction passes into contradiction, and the way is cleared for an interpretation of the world as having its source in Spirit.

Heidegger's objection to this argument is two-fold. Hegel, he says, together with German idealism in general, has misinterpreted Kant and does not take the condition of finitude sufficiently seriously.

What is the significance of the struggle initiated by German idealism against the "thing in itself" except a growing forgetfulness of what Kant had won, namely, the knowledge that the intrinsic possibility and necessity of metaphysics, i.e., its essence, are, at bottom, sustained and maintained by the original development and searching study of the problem of finitude?²

Kant himself had hedged on this question, however. Is the thing-in-itself to be regarded as having a kind of

being to which categories apply? Not certainly as schematized categories involving the forms of space and time. But as applied in a transcendent, unschematized way? Kant speaks of the thing-in-itself also as "noumenon" and "transcendental object",³³ thus as an idea of reason. To apply a category in a transcendent way is to refer it to a being transcending consciousness (vide Husserl). To apply it in a transcendental way is to apply it to an idea of reason (soul, world, God) transcending the legitimate 'i.e. (schematized) use of the understanding in the field of possible experience. Which does Kant mean? Clearly, he speaks in both senses. Yet, at the end of the Transcendental Analytic he says:³⁴

The concept of a noumenon is thus a merely limiting concept, the function of which is to curb the pretensions of sensibility; and it is therefore only of negative employment. At the same time it is no arbitrary invention; it is bound up with the limitation of sensibility, though it cannot affirm anything positive beyond the field of sensibility.

This is the interpretation Heidegger prefers. Kant's early successors, on the other hand, took Kant to hold the former view and consequently could point out the contradictions involved in it.

We have here recalled these Kantian difficulties, since Heidegger's interest in the ontology of things always turns around Kant. He regards Kant as having foreseen the beginnings of a new kind of ontology as a laying of the foundations of metaphysics. When Kant says that "the

proud name of Ontology...must give place to the more modest title of a mere Analytic of pure understanding,"³⁵ that Analytic foreshadows his own fundamental ontology.

For Kant, the schematism provides the connection of pure concepts with possible experience. Now, since the categories, as schematized, circumscribe the field of possible experience, "the conditions of the possibility of experience in general are likewise conditions for the possibility of the objects of experience."³⁶ Interpreted from the point of view of Heidegger's fundamental ontology, the field of possible experience becomes the pre-ontological whole of the connections of possible experience and of the things experiencesable--the World. Thus, "the World is not a thing, nor does it consist of things."³⁷ It is rather like a horizon from which, or in the light of which, things, our understanding of them, and our involvements with them are possible.

The most significant aspects of the schemata, for Heidegger, are their temporal character and the role played by imagination. If his conception of World is analogous to Kant's field of possible experience, then time is no longer an empty form to be filled in by sensory data, but a variegated relation of things, events, and our practical involvements with them. The same can be said of space. These are not "merely something thought, first posited in an act of thinking. They are rather

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relationships in which concerned circumspection as such already dwells."³⁸ This temporal involvement in the world is now to be taken as analogous to the temporality of the schemata.

The involvement is, first, a pre-ontological one, that is to say existentiell. Ontological, existential theory and conceptualization is subsequent to it. The latter depends on the former, but the former does not depend on the latter. "The ontological 'truth' of the existential analysis is developed on the ground of the primordial existentiell truth. However, the latter does not necessarily need the former."³⁹ Concepts are ways of sounding out what is contained in the existentiell.

The significant role which imagination plays in this relation of the existential to the existentiell is analogous to Kant's mediating position of the synthesis of imagination between the synopsis of the manifold in sensibility and the unity of the categories in apperception.⁴⁰ In Heidegger, however, imagination does not seem to occupy a place once removed from existentiell involvements in the world, so that concepts would be twice removed. The involvements involve imagination constitutively and essentially. By an act of abstraction -- and this, of course, from an existential standpoint -- we can distinguish these four "levels" in Heidegger's position:

1. The existentiell involvements (activities, dealings) in the World.

2. The pre-ontological understanding of these in imaginative ways.
3. The existential analytic of this understanding.
4. The metaphysical exposition of these in terms of the categories of Reality.

The first and the second are the same. These are the ways in which we "dwell" in the World. The third is Heidegger's existential-fundamental-ontological analytic of Dasein.

The fourth is the kind of metaphysics which Kant had attacked as transcendental illusion and is what Heidegger has been calling "metaphysics". The fourth depends upon the first, second, and third for its possibility and origination, but distorts them. The third, like the fourth is a conceptual procedure, depends on the first and the second, and does not in any way modify them.

The third can, however, faithfully sound out or express the first and second, if properly done. Yet, there is no way to decide if it has properly been done, but only a concerned listening and attending to what is in the first and second. The argument used again has the form of an existential reduction, in this case of the metaphysical view of things to the existential. The differences may be charted as follows:⁴¹

the metaphysical

substantiality
categories
space
time
objectivity
emphasis on sight
external relations
external objects
presence-at-hand

the existential

existentiality
existentials
spatiality
temporality
concern, attunement
emphasis on touching, hearing
internal relations
instruments, tools
readiness-to-hand

factuality	facticity
qualities, properties	possibilities, signs
things given to perception	projection towards, signification
aggregation of data	Worldhood

The list could greatly be expanded, but is sufficient for our purposes. Although Heidegger often speaks of the metaphysical as the way of thinking which not only dominated the history of Western thought, but as its proper characterization in general, the point in this connection is not only an historical one. As an historical characterization, it would, to say the least, raise questions. In the section of Being and Time with which we are here concerned ("Being-in-the-World" and "Worldhood"), he has primarily Descartes in mind. But the contrast between the metaphysical and the existential may be construed also as a contrast between ideal types of thinking. Neither are in fact ever purely held at the exclusion of the other. This is especially true of the metaphysical, according to Heidegger, since the existential is its ground, as we have seen above. And the existential tends constantly to fall into the metaphysical. As ideal types they represent different ways of regarding things and the determinations of their being both in thought and in practice.

In Being and Time the metaphysical is called a thinking in terms of the categories of Reality.

Thereby the Being of what is proximally ready-to-hand gets passed over, and entities are first conceived as a context of Things (res) which are present at hand. "Being" acquires

the meaning of "Reality". Substantiality becomes the basic characteristic of Being.⁴²

There is no exhaustive list of categories or of existentials,⁴³ and no attempt is made to set up a table of them. For Reality the primary category is substance, which Heidegger interprets as the traditional category through which reality is conceived as a context of things present-at-hand. This is also Kant's view of the matter.⁴⁴ As for the existentials, while they define the existentiell constitution (Verfassung) of finite being, this definition must remain fluid. Some of the existentials themselves point to this fluidity, e.g., projection, possibility, anticipatory resoluteness. Rather than defining a structure of cognition or thought, they express ecstases of Being or ways of standing out and being there. No table of existentials would then be possible, or even desirable.

A theory of determinate being in Hegel's sense would fall under the metaphysical standpoint. In this regard, Heidegger is much more agreeable with regard to Kant than he is with regard to Hegel. Initially it is easy enough to show that Hegel does not conform to Heidegger's metaphysical type, perhaps as much as does Descartes. Substance is not a category in Hegel's Logic in the way Heidegger intends it. The idea of substance occurs often in Hegel's criticism of Spinoza, where he consistently regards it as an inadequate idea. It signifies for him the vacuity of pure Being or the thing-in-

itself, having independent existence or subsistence without relation to another. In the famous speculative proposition, as Puntel calls it,⁴⁵ "Everything depends on grasping and expressing the ultimate truth (the Absolute) not as Substance but as Subject as well,"⁴⁶ the Spinozistic doctrine of God is rejected as well as the general definition of the category of substance from Descartes through Kant (independence and permanence).

It is, moreover, hard to see that Hegel's philosophy is a Thing-Ontology in Heidegger's sense.⁴⁷ Hegel's "something" is as fluid as any Seiendes is for Heidegger. So are its qualities, since qualities imply negation and relation to others. By no stretch of interpretation can Hegel's view of the world be said to be an aggregate or collection of discrete data. (Wittgenstein's first few propositions of the Tractatus, e.g. "The world is everything that is the case," "Any one can either be the case or not be the case, and everything else remains the same," are as far removed from Hegel as they are from Heidegger.) Heidegger's view of the world is as much an organic one as is that of Hegel.

Apart from Heidegger's ideal type of metaphysical thinking, one can find equally obvious differences. Gadamer has said that Heidegger regards Hegel's philosophy as the Zuspitzung der Seinsvergessenheit, the culmination of the oblivion of Being. For present purposes, this means a complete falling away from the existentiell

and understanding involvements with beings as they are. What takes its place is the logical deduction of the categories of being (as Reality).⁴⁸ Heidegger's fundamental and often repeated complaint is that Hegel had overestimated the scope and validity of logic. His revulsion against logic as an intellectual enterprise is so strong and heated that one might wonder as to its sources. Its philosophical source, as we have previously noted, is the "existential reduction". Especially in Hegel, logic is made into an independent and indeed absolute method for gaining access to metaphysical truth, when, on Heidegger's existential analysis, it turns out to be a dependent and reducible phenomenon. It is reducible to the kind of being which we, as logicians and human beings, have, viz. Dasein-Existentiality, but from which logic abstracts itself.⁴⁹ It seems odd, that Heidegger should often indiscriminately place Hegel's dialectical method under the general heading of logic, despite Hegel's repeated denials. But his reason for doing so seems clear enough. General or formal logic may be distinguished from dialectical, transcendental, or perhaps synthetic logic, but these have the common feature of being engaged purely in thought. The existence of the logician is missing in either case (vide Kierkegaard). This existence is ontological, or more precisely, it is that it is ontological,⁵⁰ a caring for one's own being and, with it, for Being itself. Only on this ground could logic exist.

A variation on this objection is Hegel's downgrading and devaluation of the role of imagination in cognition. The famous division of the Third Division of the Philosophy of Mind (as well as the Phenomenology and the Philosophy of Religion) into Art, Religion, and Philosophy has its basis in the higher rank assigned to conceptual thought over imagination. Religion entertains its content by way of figurative representations, though in the case of revealed religion, its content is as absolute as is that of philosophy. It is the task of philosophy to bring that content to the Concept. When dealing with symbols in the Logic, he states this point unmistakably:⁵¹

Philosophy needs no such help either from the world of sense or from the products of the imagination, or from subordinate spheres in its own peculiar province, for the determinations of such spheres are unfitted for higher spheres and for the whole.

Symbols are ways "in which pure determinations of the Notion or of philosophy are supposed to be represented." But they are "unfit" for this purpose. In this connection, he mentions force, substantiality (!), power, and causality as "only symbols for expressing, for example, vital or spiritual relationships, i.e., they are untrue determinations for such relationships."

It is an essential feature of the logical method (i.e. in Hegel), that existence and determinate being be the result of a deductive sublation. This is its basic fault. Once this methodological procedure is adopted,

quality and essence will expectably be given priority over the factual and existential in the sense that the latter is derived from the former. To proceed as if a derivation of existence and factual being took place at all is the first error. The second error follows directly upon it: it is a derivation from quality and essence. A third error follows from the second. To say of something that it has quality, or even to attribute definite qualities, is to say very little.⁵² To have a thing "get stamped as something" does not tell us anything about the Being of the thing, by which it can have qualities. In fact, the latter question gets "obliterated."⁵³

The differences between Hegel and Heidegger on determinate being may be seen more clearly from their different uses of the word "Dasein". The word which corresponds to "determinate being" in Heidegger is "das Seiende", which we have translated as "being" or "beings". In Hegel, the word "Dasein" is used for this purpose. "Dasein" is used by Heidegger to stand for human being primarily, though he allows that there may be other beings to which it could apply.⁵⁴ It is a compound of two words, da and sein. "Sein" refers both to Being (das Sein) and to the infinitive sein. When it refers to the infinitive, it means the being (Seiendsein) of a being (eines Seienden), e.g. of a human being. When it refers to Sein, it means something more: Being as transcendence. What is meant is

not a kind of being (Seinsart, Seinsmodus) appropriate to some being, but Being itself. In the term "Dasein", this latter Being is said to be there (da). The da has a great significance for Heidegger. It has a general and a more special significance. In general, it refers to the fact that all beings are (have being) so far as they are beings. This word "are" (is) has, in turn, many meanings, as Aristotle has taught us. But beyond these meanings, the being-there is the thereness or presence of Being which transcends all beings and kinds of being. (The question, how such Being is to be thought, will occupy us at a later point. For the present, we are concerned with the meanings of the da in Dasein.) The da has this further meaning, that in being (im Seienden) Being (Sein) presents itself and discloses itself. Thus Dasein is said to be the "clearing of Being."⁵⁵ It transcends itself to Being, for in being an ontological being, it seeks an articulation of Being and thus "brings Being to language."⁵⁶ But its difference from Being, since it is a being, constitutes at the same time its finitude. The da is both finitude and self-transcendence.

In this light, Heidegger's dissatisfaction with Hegel's view of Dasein can readily be understood. The da is Becoming arrested into stability, and this becomes the bare factuality of a something. Its thereness is due to its having quality, by which it is a some--thing. Its

finitude is due to its not being something else and thus to the limitation imposed by its own quality. Further, the Sein in Dasein is for Hegel, the bare, empty universal for which the da provides determination. So far then, Hegel's view of determinate being corresponds to Heidegger's metaphysical type, and to the notion of Vorhandenheit in particular.

This cannot be the final result, however. For it is equally true that determinate being, so conceived, nevertheless transcends itself. But its transcendence, for Heidegger, is wrongly conceived. Its ground (for the possibility that it can so be conceived) must be given beforehand existentially, so that its transcendence proceeds, so to speak, downwards rather than (logically, dialectically) upward. The same conclusion was reached above, when considering the contrast with respect to Being as immediately conceived. On the level we have now reached, this seems to be the basic contrast. Yet, it must be kept in mind, that Hegel has not as yet moved into self-consciousness, Reason, and Spirit. He has simply unpacked a particular parcel, namely determinate being, and has found that its contents include ~~elements which it cannot~~ contain within its enclosure: self, life (Phenomenology) and infinity (Logic)!

Similarly, Heidegger does not allow us to deal with determinate being apart from his very personal conception

of Dasein. The determinations of things are not qualities which they have for themselves. So far as we can speak of determinations, they are reduced to existentials. But existentials are relations in which things stand to Dasein (e.g. tools ready-to-hand) and ways in which Dasein comports itself to things. So, as in Hegel's Phenomenology, Heidegger now turns in Being and Time to a consideration of "Being-one's-self" and the "'who' of Dasein."

5. Jemeinigkeit and the "Who" of Dasein

Dasein is a transcendence to Being and a disclosure of Being. It is a way of being which is peculiarly suited to disclose Being. Thus, when for Dasein its own being is an issue for it, Being is in that act an issue for it. The two should not be separated, and perhaps cannot be. The peculiar being of Dasein is nevertheless considered separately in Being and Time, though not in the Letter on Humanism. In Being and Time, the peculiarities of the kind of being which Dasein has are considered for themselves and apart from the relation to Being. This is done for purposes of a preparatory analysis. We are assured again and again that the relation to Being is involved and that this is the chief aim of the work, but that it will be the subject matter of an anticipated, as yet unpublished further volume.

Turning to the distinguishing peculiarities of Dasein, we shall lift up three basic features which

non-Dasein entities do not share: mineness (Jemeinigkeit), falling (Verfall), and being-together-with (Beisein).

These seem to be among the primordial characters of Dasein as a way of being, although in the text Heidegger seems to give to care (Sorge) the most primordial rank. In regard to any of the existentials, it is difficult to say which presuppose which. In any event, Jemeinigkeit does have quite a high rank, since it is introduced in the beginning of the exposition and runs through all the rest. It is also of great importance in comparison with Hegel's understanding of self-consciousness. My being is in a significant sense mine, but in an essential relation with others. For Hegel this gives rise to a dialectic of Self and Other and in Heidegger it gives rise to the danger of one's identification with the other. With the loss of mineness, Dasein has forfeited itself and has fallen (verfallen) into the public "they" (das Man). Both Hegel and Heidegger find a solution in being-bei (Beisein), a mode of being in which the being-one's-self (Selbstsein) and being-with-others (Mitsein), being-for-self and being-for-other, are maintained in unity.

"Dasein" is a general ontological term. It does not initially refer to this or that being, but to a possible way of being. But even when taken as an ontological term, it contains ontic connotations, for it does not function as a class-concept under which particular

entities can be subsumed.⁵⁷ "Dasein" refers to a kind of being which some beings ontically are. Thus, "the essence of Dasein lies in its existence."⁵⁸ It might appear that what St. Thomas had said of God, Heidegger now says of men, i.e., his essence is his existence. The difference is great, however, and lies in the fact that existence, for Heidegger, is finite. To exist, he goes on to say, is to be one's possibility of being.⁵⁹ The identity of essence and existence, therefore, does not rule out potentiality, but affirms and accentuates it. The opposite doctrine, viz., that essence is separable from existence, has the denial of possibility as its consequence. For the essence is then given (by God or nature) and is not a project of realizing possibilities. Insofar as man has an essence, it is either created by him or is his existence (vide Sartre).

Having said this, the question of the individuation of Dasein arises. Who is Dasein ontically? The answer is derived from the very nature of Dasein, and this nature or definition of Dasein is such that its ontic and ontological sides cannot be separated.

That Being which is an issue for this entity in its very Being, is in each case mine. Thus Dasein is never to be taken ontologically as an instance or special case of some genus of entities as things that are present at hand. To entities such as these, their Being is a matter of indifference, or more precisely, they 'are' such that their being can be neither a matter of indifference to them, nor the opposite. Because Dasein has in each case

mineness (Jemeinigkeit), we must always use a personal pronoun when one addresses it: 'I am', 'you are'.⁶⁰

As transcendence expresses Dasein's disclosing relation to Being and finitude its own existentiality, so worldhood expresses its transcendence towards the personal and natural environment and Jemeinigkeit its ontic selfhood. The latter thus functions as the principle of individuation. This individuating function can be seen in all existentials, but most clearly in these four: authenticity, state-of-mind, possibility, and death.

Authenticity is defined by mineness, as the German word, "Eigentlichkeit," indicates. Eigentlichkeit has the closely related connotation of ownness, as also do the words, Eigentum (property), Eigenschaft (attribute), and the adjective, eigentlich. Mineness and ownness also signify being in a proper, genuine, and specific way. These terms do not, for Heidegger, imply ownership of a real piece of property to be disposed of in one way or another, or a trait I might have by way of an extra in addition to myself. I am the mineness of my existence, so far as I am authentically.

While inauthenticity is the denial of mineness, it is no less "grounded" in it. Both authenticity and inauthenticity "are grounded in the fact that any Dasein whatsoever is characterized by mineness."⁶¹ Mineness is essentially never lost, though authenticity can be lost.

Mineness may be forgotten, fled from, or forfeited when I turn myself over, so to speak, to others. But in that act I cannot recognize the other as authentic. I have at the same time lost the possibility of authentic relationships with others. This gives rise to the conception of the other as merely "they" in general.

Authenticity and inauthenticity are possibilities for Dasein to be. Now, if Dasein is not a something substantially present-at-hand, it is its possibility to be. One might conclude from this that authenticity and inauthenticity are on an equal footing as possibilities for being. Heidegger does deny that he is making any moral judgments in this connection and insists that he is only describing the phenomena.⁶² He also claims for the they the ontological status of an existential.⁶³ On the other hand, inauthentic being clearly does have a different status. The original character of Dasein as mineness contradicts inauthenticity, and this contradiction comes to haunt us through the call of conscience, which is, in fact, a call for a return to authenticity. Our existence becomes uncanny and we do not feel at home with ourselves in the world. And more than that, in falling into the they (inauthenticity), we will have forfeited our ownmost possibility to be, since our being-possible is no longer our own. This is not to find fault with Heidegger's procedure. It is supposed to be a phenomenological

procedure. Therefore, no moral considerations are permitted to enter. These considerations may count as phenomenological and ontological bases for a possible ethics, but on a phenomenological level the distinction between authentic and inauthentic is not meant to have a morally normative significance. The point is that these existentials involve Jemeinigkeit.

That existence is in each case (je) mine, appears finally and inescapably in the phenomenon of death. Death is regarded not as a physical event, but as "a way to be, which Dasein takes over as soon as it is."⁶⁴ This is called being-towards-death. Being-towards-death is the most individuating of all existentiell phenomena, since in it the mineness of my existence is completely inalienable. "No one can take the Other's dying away from him."⁶⁵ Each Dasein suffers its own, and only its own death. Thus, "when it (Dasein) stands before itself in this way, all its relations to any other Dasein have been undone."⁶⁶ In being-towards-death Dasein is freed from the illusions and absorptions in the "they" and has achieved a freedom to be itself which is a freedom towards death.⁶⁷

There is a certain recalcitrant and inescapable and given phenomenon which Kierkegaard, Schelling, and Augustine (and Plato in the Charmides) had seen and which Heidegger is now calling Jemeinigkeit. Two other terms are closely related: facticity and Befindlichkeit (oddly translated

"state-of-mind"). Perhaps it was this phenomenon which leads to religious doctrines of the immortality and simplicity of the soul and Cartesian doctrines as to the substantiality of the individual mind. This is the awareness that this existent which I call myself happens to be. Its seemingly accidental character ("the 'whence' and the 'whither' remain in darkness"⁶⁸) is part of the meaning of Heidegger's term, "facticity".

Whenever Dasein is, it is a fact; and the factuality of such a fact is what we shall call Dasein's "facticity".⁶⁹

Nevertheless, facticity is to be sharply distinguished from factuality.

Facticity is not the factuality of a factum brutum of something present-at-hand, but a characteristic of Dasein's Being--one which has been taken up into existence, even if proximally it has been thrust aside. The "that-it-is" of facticity never becomes something that we can come across by beholding it.⁷⁰

The term, Befindlichkeit, refers to the "there" in Dasein, but in this case to its peculiar there as Dasein and not as Sein. "Dasein is brought before its being as 'there'."⁷¹ This there includes both that one is and how one is. Thus, one might ask of someone, "Wie befinden Sie sich?" (How are you?). On the other hand, sich zu befinden may mean to "be-find" oneself in a certain place at a certain time under certain circumstances. Now, Heidegger places great weight on another meaning, and that is that Dasein "finds itself" thrown into existence. In its

thrown existence, Dasein "is disclosed to itself prior to all cognition and volition...."⁷² Thrownness signifies this priority of Befindlichkeit over any activities (cognitive or volitional) which a particular, ontic Dasein might engage in. Facticity signifies the givenness of the existence of a particular, ontic, jemeinigen Dasein(s) for self-reflection.

Behind this tortuous way of speaking there lies a great insight, I think. Heidegger chooses to employ the word, Jemeinigkeit, in order to distinguish his position from those of Descartes and Kant primarily. It is to say that the 'who' of Dasein, or what we ordinarily refer to with personal pronouns, is neither a substance nor a formal and abstract determination, e.g. Kant's "I think" (the unity of apperception).⁷³ In place of such views, Heidegger seems to be saying that the idea of the self is a secondary and derivative representation of an ontological characteristic of being-there, namely that existence is experienced as (je) mine. The self then becomes constituted by that reflection to itself. This seems to be contained in the concept of Befindlichkeit, although Heidegger does not say so. Care, he says, is a more primordial existential than is self.⁷⁴ This is so because Care is the comprehensive concept (Inbegriff) of all relationships of Dasein and World. Yet, the concept of Jemeinigkeit functions as the opposite pole (that of individuation).

Even though Jemeinigkeit serves as the principle of individuation, especially in connection with being towards death, "a bare subject without a world never 'is' proximally, nor is it ever given."⁷⁵ On the contrary, "the Other is encountered in his Dasein-with in the world."⁷⁶ From the side of the Dasein which is mine, the Other is disclosed as it (rather he) is in and with a mutual "concernful solicitude."⁷⁷ Therefore, there should not be any question as to the existence of the Other, as if an isolated subject had to prove his existence, and neither should there be any question as to the je-mine character of his existence, except insofar as the same question might arise with reference to my own existence. This notion of being-with (Mitsein) and being together in the same common world (Beisein)⁷⁸ is not far removed from Hegel's sublation of the dialectic of self and Other, to which we now turn.

6. The Dialectic of Self and Other According to Hegel

Hegel's discussion of consciousness of objects in the Phenomenology resulted in the conclusion that consciousness must now turn into itself. This result came out of the failure of each of three successive triads: (1) the This and the universal, sublated in (2) the unity of the object and the multiplicity of its properties, sublated in (3) the inner force and its outer manifestation. The third had resulted in the untenable position of the inverted world. Dialectically stated, the failure of these

trials, and thus the failure of consciousness in general, is due to the principle of the mutual negation of being-in-itself and being-for-another. The same opposition appeared in the Logic and led to the breakdown of the unity of the something.

In a sort of immediate way, it would seem plausible to look to the Self, now that the attempt to find the unity of experience in the object has failed. This is in fact the direction which post-Kantian idealism took and it had good foundations in Kant (the transcendental unity of apperception). For Hegel, however, this move is a systematic understanding which had reached the impasse of the inverted world.

Understanding has found itself in a diremption of unity and multiplicity. The unity that was sought was a unity of essence and appearance. The point, at which understanding has left us, is the mutual negation of essence and appearance, but in such a way that each collapses into the other. The essence, therefore, can no longer be found in being-in-itself, but must now be found in this movement itself, by which essence becomes appearance and appearance becomes essence. This is what is meant by true infinity.

Abstract or spurious infinity consists of the other of finitude. As a finite thing is limited by another finite thing, so finitude itself is limited by infinity

itself. Thus, a new dialectic arises, this time between finitude and infinity. But this sort of infinity turns out to be finite because it is limited by finitude: it becomes the mere idea of the limitation of finitude and, as itself, empty. Positive or true infinity, therefore, cannot be conceived as the other of finitude. It is rather the positive sublation of the opposition of finitude and false infinity.⁷⁹

True infinity is found in the reciprocal movement from finitude to false infinity and from false infinity to finitude. In this sense, true infinity is concrete. The finite world is structured by true infinity (the dialectical and constitutive reciprocation of essence and appearance), so that the true infinite is the truth of the finite.⁸⁰ The transition to self-consciousness now occurs when I see myself as having the same structure of true infinity.

I distinguish myself from myself; and therein I am immediately aware that this factor distinguished from me is not distinguished. I, the selfsame being, thrust myself away from myself; but this which is distinguished, which is set up as unlike me, is immediately on its being distinguished no distinction for me.⁸¹


In myself, that which is distinguished for me is, in being distinguished, not distinguished from me. Murray Greene regards the quoted passage as the "basic principle of transcendental philosophizing" and claims that Hegel's inverted world is the last step in the demonstration

of this principle.⁸² In Hegel's text, this sentence is followed by one in which the general principle is stated:⁸³

Consciousness of an other, of an object in general, is indeed itself necessarily self-consciousness, reflectedness into self, consciousness of self in its otherness.

I have now found myself as having the same structure which the world has, i.e., that of true infinity. I can thus recognize myself in the world. Nevertheless, the world is also recognized as my Other. So, again a new dialectic arises, this time between the Self and its Other. This is the dialectic of self-consciousness.

The dialectic with which we had been left in Understanding and which is now to be overcome in self-consciousness may schematically be represented in the following way:



True infinity is represented by the arrows. Since the self knows itself and the world in the same way, as true infinity, Hegel now turns to self-consciousness and, as it turns out, this will not be a solution either.

Self-consciousness has a peculiarity which mere consciousness does not have. In the case of consciousness, what counted for it as truth was something other than consciousness. The truth which was sought was the substantial being subsisting apart from consciousness. This

substantial being has now vanished, since it "proved to be a way in which it is for another."⁸⁴ In the case of self-consciousness, however, there appears for the first time the identity of knowledge and the known, consciousness and its object, or in Hegel's language, certainty and its truth. Self-consciousness is for itself its own object. In self-consciousness the distinction of being-in-itself and being-for-another is not made, because here that which is for me is I myself.

In this way, the first stage in the life of self-consciousness has been realized: the identity of subject and object. In the initial stage which has now been reached, this identity means that what is for self-consciousness is simply it itself. But this simple identity in turn also vanishes. The Other has vanished as a substantial element. But this vanishing of the Other has the consequence of reducing the Self to a "motionless tautology, Ego is Ego, I am I."⁸⁵ In order to have Self "in the form of being" it is necessary to posit the Other also "in the form of being." That is to say, in order that the Self should be, the Other also must be. In the Phenomenology itself, the consciousness of Self has appeared as a reflexion out of Otherness. "For self-consciousness, then, Otherness is a fact."⁸⁶ Nevertheless, this Otherness must be assimilated into the Self by virtue of the very structure of self-

consciousness (identity of subject and object). This ontological drive to assimilate the Other into oneself Hegel calls Desire.

Desire is a relation of Self to an Other. The object desired is affirmed to exist as a substantial element other than self-consciousness. But as soon as desire affirms this, it must forthwith deny it. The independence of the Other must be affirmed in order that there be an object of desire and through it a gratification of desire. On the other hand, the independence of the Other must be denied, since the gratification of desire consists of an appropriation, assimilation, and a making my own (Aneignung) of the Other. I must possess the Other. The Other must become I myself. Thus, I cannot escape the contradiction which is the structure of desire. This reciprocal and contradictory affirmation and denial of the Other is especially true of relationships with another self-consciousness, where the Other is seen as itself driven by desire, thus committed to my nihilation. These kinds of relationships are described at great lengths by Sartre,⁸⁷ but their basic structure had already been described by Hegel, notably in his description of the lord-bondsman relationship. In each case, self-consciousness cannot be itself in its bare, immediate form (Ego is Ego). The reflexion into Self is a reflexion out of the Other and a consciousness of Self

in the Other. The Self is this reflexion,⁸⁸ but constitutes it both as unity and diremption. The underlying and constitutive unity already brings before us the notion of Spirit, in which the reconciliation of Self and Other is to be realized. On the level of self-consciousness, the reconciliation is not yet possible. Indeed, self-consciousness ends in an unhappy consciousness, the alienated soul which knows itself as "divided and at variance within itself," but is helpless to attain the "rest of unity".⁸⁹ When self-consciousness is not transcended into Spirit, the struggle for inner unity is like "a struggle against an enemy, victory over whom really means being worsted, where to have attained one result is really to lose it in the opposite."⁹⁰

We know at this point already, however, what sort of unity is required. It is a state of being in which Self and Other remain differentiated but each can, in Hegel's words, "in seinem Anderssein als solchem bei sich sein."⁹¹

7. Summary of Results

Determinate being arises as a problem for philosophers primarily in response to Parmenides, whom both Hegel and Heidegger mention with admiration. Hegel began with a notion of Being which was very much like that of Parmenides, i.e., an undifferentiated, relationless, abstract-absolute universal. The problem for Hegel

then became how determinate being can arise in thought at all and how the concept can logically be justified. The answer is given in his deductions from Becoming to the finitude of the something in the Logic. In the Phenomenology, however, no justification was found for the conception of a determinate thing as such. On the contrary, a series of contradictions was found to vitiate that conception. This is not to deny that determinate things exist in the real world, but to affirm that they have their being in the unity of the Absolute and that our conception of them has its justification likewise in the unity of the Absolute.

Heidegger begins from a different point of view. He is concerned to bring to light the ways in which Being is disclosed in finite beings. Finite beings, especially those having Dasein as their mode of being, are so constituted as to reveal Being. The analysis of finite being therefore has two sides, the one concerned with its relation to Being and the other with the peculiarities of Dasein by which the relation becomes possible. The ontological constitution of finite things is to be brought close to us as it is, rather than as it is thought in logical, abstract concepts. Thus Heidegger begins his Letter on Humanism with an appeal to philosophers that they might pay greater attention to the nature of our practical relations and dealings (*Das Wesen des Handelns*).

This is the point of phenomenology, according to Heidegger, and the basis of his suspicion of logic in general.

There is then quite a great difference in method between Hegel and Heidegger. The difference is similar to methodological differences we have noted above in connection with Being in its immediacy. This difference is like the difference between looking at a caged tiger in the zoo and meeting one in the jungle. The former is analogous to a conceptual way of thinking and the latter to an existential one.

One result of Hegel's logico-conceptual procedure is his exclusion of change from Becoming, a result which from Heidegger's viewpoint could only strike us as an odd curiosity. Another result of this methodological difference is the role assigned to imagination. For Hegel, imagination has value only insofar as in it is figuratively represented what is known in the Concept. For Heidegger, imagination has a much greater value than does conceptual thinking. It is the key to the understanding of Being and being.

More specifically, a crucial difference exists in the meanings ascribed to Dasein. Heidegger sees Hegel's use of the term as a prime instance of the category of presence-at-hand, which therefore conceals the more original experience of worldhood. We have noted however, that Hegel's notion of Dasein does not quite fit

Heidegger's notion of presence-at-hand. For one thing, Hegel's "Dasein" is not the concept of an inert, corporeal substance, but leads, as a result of its internal dialectic, to true and good infinity.

One might appeal to this same issue as a point of agreement between them. For neither one is a thing conceived as being-in-itself, unrelated and independent of anything else. This is the result of the breakdown of the Jenseits in Hegel's Phenomenology and of the transition from the finitude of the something to true infinity in the Logic (as well as the more general transition from Being to Essence). In Heidegger, the same result comes out of the reduction of presence-at-hand to readiness-to-hand and, more generally, of substance and extension to the worldhood of the world. It seems perfectly true to say that both would agree in regarding the "little flower in the crennied well" as containing the whole universe in itself.

Nevertheless, when we regard Dasein as the da-sein of a something apart from the further dialectical development which proceeds from it, it has clearly not the same meaning as the word does in Heidegger. The da is then meant as being-there in a univocal sense, simply as being there before us as a given positivity. Moreover, the being-there of something is derived from its qualitative determination, so that its there-ness lies in the fact that

it is some-thing. For Heidegger, on the contrary, the da has a wealth of further existential meanings: involvement, facticity, worldhood, *Befindlichkeit*, disclosure, etc.

When we turn to questions of personal identity, the same sort of ambiguous situation exists. In some respects they seem to agree and in other respects they do not. In Hegel, the Self is itself by distinction from its Other as well as by a reflexion from and through the Other, while for Heidegger personal self-identity is due to the experience of Jemeinigkeit. In both cases, to be oneself is not to be a thinking substance whose relation to outer things must be established apart from its self-identity, but is constituted in and with contexts of relationships. And in both cases, the unity of oneself with oneself is attained in the unity of being-bei. Despite these similarities, two basic differences exist. First, Heidegger does not regard the otherness of the Other as constitutive of being oneself. The unity of being-bei is originally given and estrangement from the Other arises as a falling away from this unity. The unity is, in fact, the ground which makes the falling possible. For Hegel this unity of Self and Other is an achievement following upon a great effort to overcome constantly recurring diremptions.

Yet, the least one can say is that this relationship does not appear to be clearly delineated in Heidegger.

To what extent, for example, would Heidegger be willing to say that Jemeinigkeit is a reflexion out of the "they"? It would seem that it should be so construed. But in the exposition, it occurs at the beginning and all further existential determinations include it. Furthermore, Heidegger's existential reductions invariably result in an assimilation of things into the intentionality and structure of Dasein. Thus, reality is reduced to existentiality. Heidegger does this in the interest of affirming the inner unity of the world, but this inner unity then depends on this assimilation (reduction?) of things (matter, extension) to the personal Jemeinigkeit of Dasein. Is this not a kind of idealism?

In any case, Heidegger's assimilation of things into Dasein by means of existential reductions is not like Hegel's notion of desire, since the latter involves antagonisms between Self and Other. But is it so different from Hegel's quest for a reconciliation (Versöhnung) of Self and Other in which their mutual otherness is overcome? Hegel's concepts and his dialectical development of them seem to provide a more adequate way of dealing with these issues of reflexion into self, relation to others, and their reconciliation. It is certainly a more systematic one. Still, Heidegger and Hegel are speaking of the same phenomenon.

Finally, we again see some ways in which Heidegger can blame Hegel for a certain obliviousness to Being.

Heidegger primarily refers to Hegel's logicism as an instance of it. Further the reduction of Dasein to qualitative determination is held to be a denial of existentiality, and it is the latter which marks Dasein as a disclosing kind of being. Thus the disclosure of Being will be missed. The reduction should, on Heidegger's view, be carried out in the opposite way, that is from quality to Dasein. This would have the advantage of answering Heidegger's question, what kinds of beings must we be in order to be able to think of things according to categories of quality, or for that matter any categories at all? In Hegel's Logic the categories are justified in the deduction of them. So far Heidegger has a point. We return, then, again to the question of method: Which is the more valid, true, or fruitful, existential reduction or dialectical deduction? An attempt to evaluate the methodologies, their application, and some details of content can be made once the ends envisioned by Hegel and Heidegger have been set forth.

III. BEING AS ABSOLUTE

There are some passages in Hegel's works, but very few, in which Hegel speaks of the Absolute as Being, and there are many passages in which he denies that such an identification should be made.¹ Similarly, there seem to be no passages in Heidegger's works in which Being is spoken of as absolute, except in a lengthy discussion of Hegel's concept of the Absolute, and then only by way of a comparison.² By what justification can we then speak of Being as absolute?

In regard to Hegel, there is a certain plausibility in speaking of Being as absolute and of the Absolute as Being. We have noted two senses in which the word "absolute" is used by Hegel: the abstract and the concrete. As an abstraction, Being is an immediate and simple relation to self, a "selfsameness", as Werner Marx puts it.³ The problem arises, however, when we wish to speak of the Absolute as Being. Hegel does speak of "fulfilled Being" on occasion and the term "being-in-and-for-itself" is a crucial one in his general philosophy. Heidegger makes a great deal of these expressions, wishing to show that Hegel did have in mind a larger conception of Being than he is for the most part willing to admit.⁴ And Gerhard Huber has

no compunctions at all in speaking of "des absolute Sein" in Hegel and equating it with Kant's Ideal of pure Reason.⁵

When we turn to Heidegger, the word "Being" becomes the foundational one. The problem is thus reversed. We are now faced with the problem: how can, on Heidegger's terms, Being be said to be absolute? These problems arise for us simply because we are attempting a comparison between Hegel and Heidegger, in the present instance, between their respective highest or foundational terms. We have also suggested that it is at this point that Hegel and Heidegger are closest to each other (as also Gadamer had suggested). This hypothesis would consequently commit us to an attempt at relating Heidegger's "Being" and Hegel's "Absolute". Heidegger has himself carried out such an inquiry in Hegel's Concept of Experience.

The problem has a great precedent in antiquity, where an absolute conception of Being was proposed by Parmenides and a relational one by Aristotle. The issue concerned the definition of Being, whether as genus or as analogy and proportionality. Now, it seems that Hegel's conception of Being, in the beginning of the Logic, is that of Parmenides, as we have seen. But, on the other hand, his notion of the Absolute is not thought in this way. For Heidegger, it seems that

his hesitation to use the term "absolute" derives from the fact that he regards it as a category of the metaphysics of the oblivion of Being. Another source of this hesitation may be his conception of Being itself, which is not thought as a genus. Therefore, the concept of the Absolute in Hegel appears to be closer to Heidegger's understanding of Being than is his category of Being as immediate. We need to inquire first, what is meant by "absolute" and the "Absolute" in general and by Hegel in particular. We will then consider Heidegger's interpretation and criticism of Hegel's ontology of the Absolute and his own substantive understanding of Being, so far as this can be made out.

1. The Concept "Absolute"

The adjective, "absolute," comes from the Latin (*absolutus*, adj., *absolute*, adv.) and there it has a positive and a negative meaning: (1) perfect and complete, and (2) unfettered and unconditional. In much philosophical and ordinary discourse its meaning also includes unlimited, independent, not requiring any further determination, relationless. For example, in economics one once spoke of gold as having an absolute value, as opposed to a market value. "Absolute" is in this way distinguished from "relative", dependent on changing conditions and in relation to them. In metaphysics, at least in the Cartesian tradition, the

word meant independent existence, being in and through itself (as in the case of substance), or the impossibility of its nonexistence (as in the case of God). Thus, the Absolute would be the unconditioned, the unlimited, the self-existent, the perfect, etc.

Kent has pointed out that the word is indispensable for speculative philosophy, but that it has "suffered from long-standing misuse."⁶ It now has, he says, at least these two meanings: (1) "that something is true of a thing considered in itself, and therefore of its inward nature," and (2) "that something is valid in all respects, without limitation, e.g. absolute despotism, ...in every relation possible..." Kent himself prefers the latter:⁷

It is, then, in this wider sense that I shall use the word 'absolute', opposing it to what is valid only comparatively, that is, in some particular respect. For while the latter is restricted by conditions, the former is valid without restriction.

What is absolute is then true (Kent says "valid" and "possible") under any circumstances, in every relationship in which it might stand. It can thus stand in relation to another, but will be true and valid in any relation. Descartes had previously opted for the first definition given by Kent and had defined "absolute" in distinction from "relative":⁸

I call that absolute which contains within itself the pure and simple essence of which we are in quest. Thus the term will be applicable to

whatever is considered as being independent, ...and the absolute I call the simplest and the easiest of all, so that we can make use of it in the solution of questions.

All things can be said to be either absolute or relative... "Relative" means to stand in relation, and "absolute" means to be unrelated. For Descartes, the absolutely "pure and simple essence" is wholly what it is in itself and is not modified by any relation. No relation can make a difference to what it is in itself.

According to Hoffmeister, Nicholas Cusanus was the first to use the substantive, "the Absolute" (absolutum), as a name of God. It is highly interesting to note that Cusanus conceives the Absolute, as does Hegel, as a coincidentis oppositorum, combining a kind of pantheism with the transcendent unity of God. So, Henry Bett says:

The fact is that Nicholas was obsessed by that thought of the Absolute which has been the pre-occupation of all idealistic philosophy since Kant.¹⁰

The Absolute Ego in Fichte is likewise not an empty universal or contentless being, but is called a Tathandlung:

Idealism, as we have said above, explains the determinations of consciousness from the activity of the Intelligence, which, in its view, is only active and absolute, not passive; since it is postulated as the first and highest, preceded by nothing, which might explain its passivity. From the view of Idealism, the Intelligence is a Doing, and absolutely nothing else; it is even wrong to call it an Active, since this expression points to something existing, in which the activity is inherent.¹¹

The word "Tathandlung" is distinguished in meaning from a Tatsache by the fact that it is pure activity without

ground. It is its own ground and the ground of the finite, empirical ego and its opposite, the finite non-ego. In this sense, it is absolute.

The early Schelling began from a similar standpoint: the distinction and opposition between subject and object, spirit and nature. This opposition, he thought, pointed to the necessity of the Absolute. But it fell to him to reassert the absolute simplicity and self-identity of the Absolute. For the Absolute, the subjective and the objective do not exist.¹² It is Absolute Identity.¹³ In a later work (1809), however, he seems to revise his position in response to Hegel's criticism in the Phenomenology of Mind.¹⁴ Hegel's famous passage was directed to Schelling as well as to Spinoza:¹⁵

To pit this single assertion, that "in the Absolute all is one", against the organized whole of determinate and complete knowledge, or of knowledge which at least aims at and demands complete development--to give out its Absolute as the night in which, as we say, all cows are black--that is the very naivete of emptiness of knowledge.

In response, Schelling protested that he had never held such a view.¹⁶ He now insists, "In the divine understanding there is a system; God, himself, however, is not a system but a life."¹⁷

Whatever degree of consistency Schelling might have maintained between ca. 1795 and 1809, Hegel was quite consistent on this point:

True reality (the Absolute) is this process of reinstating self-identity, of reflecting into

its own self in end from its other, and is not an original and primal unity as such, not an immediate unity as such. It is the process of its own becoming, the circle which presupposes its end as its purpose, and has its end for its beginning; it becomes concrete and actual only¹⁸ by being carried out, and by the end it involves.

It is a question still to be considered, if this view can be maintained. The passage seems to hold that the Absolute involves relation, since it becomes other than itself and undergoes the process of reinstating itself. This is its own becoming. This is said with the proviso that the Other of the Absolute is self-generated by it in its self-externalization, and is thus not "absolutely" an Other, but ultimately itself. Puntel has pointed out that Hegel does not give us an account of how this is possible, especially in regard to the process in which the logical, absolute Idea externalizes itself in nature.¹⁹ Prof. Well argues in a similar vein. Referring to Bradley's relationless Absolute, he says:²⁰

The argument (of Bradley) is clear and categorical. Relation is opposition. There is no opposition in the Absolute. The Absolute contains no relations.

Hegel, furthermore, "does not show us how to get around Bradley."²¹ In some way, process, and thereby relation, must be thought in the nature of the Absolute, if Hegel's view is to be maintained. The problem is not one merely of the use of the term "Absolute". The citations given above from Cusanus, Fichte, Schelling, as well as Hegel illustrate the fact that the term has

been used in various ways. We are faced with a difficulty within Hegel's system. On the other hand, according to Hegel's argument, a denial of real process in the Absolute (and in its Notion) falls "back into that inert, abstract simplicity" of Schelling and fails to grasp the Absolute as Subject as well as substance.²²

Heidegger has no such problems, since he is not concerned with the concept of the Absolute. Interestingly, however, he welcomes the elements of becoming and process which Hegel puts into the nature of the Absolute. This is the point of contact which Heidegger sees between Hegel's concept of absolute experience, as he interprets it, and his own understanding of Being.

2. Absolute Being in Hegel's Logic

Although we are not responsible within the limits of this paper to give an account of Hegel's total system, Hegel's philosophy ends with the result that the method and substance of the total system is the Absolute itself. The Absolute is present in all the moments leading up to it, and this process is the self-movement of the Absolute, its life and Being. In view of the fact, therefore, that we have up to this point dealt with particular issues in Hegel's Doctrine of Being, it will be useful to sketch an overview of the system as a whole. W.T. Stace has given a very detailed chart of Hegel's system at the end of his The Philosophy of Hegel, a very

useful one but far too complex a one to be duplicated here.

The following will suffice:

Absolute Method--Dialectic

	Position	Sublation	Negation	
	Notion	Absolute Mind Philosophy Religion Art	Organic	
<u>Logic</u> the Idea in itself	Essence	Objective Mind Sittlichkeit Morality Abstract Right	Physical	<u>Nature</u> the Idea outside itself
	Being	Subjective Mind Psychology Phenomenology Anthropology	Mechanical	
	<u>Spirit</u> the Idea in and for itself			

This chart follows the divisions of the Encyclopedia, which went through three editions and followed both the Phenomenology (1807) and the Science of Logic (1813) by many years. The only notable change which occurs here is the relatively minor position assigned to phenomenology. The earlier Phenomenology of Mind had covered a much greater field. Otherwise, the Encyclopedia changed the order of deductions of categories as it had appeared in the earlier Logic, as McTaggart clearly shows.²³ The movement is still from Being through Essence and Notion to the Absolute Idea, but especially in the

first two divisions of *Essence* the detailed arrangement is revised. It may well be perfectly expectable that Hegel should make revisions in the course of five to fifteen years (1813 to 1818, first ed. of *Enc.*, 1830 third ed.).

If, however, the course of the logical dialectic from Being to the Idea is the thought of God, it cannot be that in its details. There may then be a discrepancy between Hegel's conception of his method and his application of it, and the scholastic distinction between the real and the rational will take on a greater force than Hegel had allowed.²⁴ But these are introductory questions intended to gain us access into the present problematic. The point of this chapter is that Hegel's Absolute can be thought as Being in a wider sense, and that, therefore, Heidegger is so far right. Heidegger's interpretation is, in some particulars, questionable, and his general conception of Being is not that of Hegel, unless one is willing to agree to his hermeneutic procedure. Nevertheless, on Hegel's own terms, the Absolute can be said to be Being in a wider sense, a sense which Hegel himself admits of.

A. The Absolute Idea in Hegel's Logic

The process of dialectic requires an absolute beginning and an absolute end. The absolute beginning was seen to occur with the idea of pure Being as such. The end is now found in the "Absolute Idea". The

necessity of the absolute and derives from the fact that dialectical opposition must be sublated, and if Hegel's derivations are correct, they sublate themselves in an ever higher unity. The Absolute Idea is thus the highest unity. This highest unity is not only necessitated by the process leading up to it, but the character of that process also determines the character of the Idea. Hitherto we have seen each element pass into another, thus being constituted by negation. The Absolute Idea, as the ultimate unity, is the absolute negation of the negation. It is the final negation of the negation since it has itself as its object and is its own object. The opposition of the subjective and the objective is overcome by the self-reflexion in which the Idea thinks itself. Hegel recognizes his debt to Aristotle at this point.²⁵

An absolute self-reflexion it is the Idea in itself (Objectivity) and for itself (Subjectivity). From the point of view of the system of Logic, however, its content is that system of terms and their logical relations. It is its own content, which is the Logic itself. As absolute self-reflexion, its form is the Notion, which contemplates this content as its own self. An analogy might be given from the Logic as a book in which the Idea is given exposition. The content of the book is the Logic, but the book does not itself think that content. The book does not reflect upon itself. It exists thus in

the form of being, lacking subjectivity. The Absolute Idea contains both and is both, the content and its thinking itself as that content. Form and content now coincide. In this sense the Idea can be said to be absolute.

Further, from the point of view of the Logic, it is the logical Idea. From the point of view of nature and history, it is the Idea in itself, for as logical Idea, it is as yet separate from nature and history. Yet, in this Idea in itself there is given consciousness, thought, and subjectivity (and even will). This has caused a great deal of difficulty for commentators.²⁶ Many of these difficulties may be resolved and misunderstandings removed if we keep in mind that consciousness, thought, will, and subjectivity are not in the Absolute Idea as they were found categorially in the earlier stages of the Logic. They are in the Idea together with and in unity with the object of thought, self-consciousness, objectivity, and, as regards the will, in unity with cognition proper. The peculiar character of the Absolute Idea, which none of its moments have in common with it (considered by themselves), is that consciousness and thought is reflection into self. Consciousness and thought are relations, to be sure, but in this case the relatees are not distinct from each other. Relation to self has, in the Idea, thus negated the negativity which

haunted relations in the course of the logical development of it. The Absolute Idea can be said to contain relation, but only because it is the whole end, on that account, all relations are ultimately self-relations. Its internal relationality therefore does not rule out its absoluteness. One would be correct in saying that for Hegel the Idea is absolute in the sense of achieved dialectical, concrete unity, identity, and totality.²⁷

The Idea, as unity of the Subjective and Objective Idea, is the Notion of the Idea,--a notion whose object (Gegenstand) is the Idea as such, and for which the objective (Objekt) is Idea,--an Object which embraces all characteristics in its unity. This unity is consequently the absolute and all truth, the Idea which thinks itself, --and here at least as a thinking or logical Idea.²⁸

In this paragraph, we find everything stated that Hegel wishes to say about the Notion of the Absolute Idea. This Notion arises as has any other category in the Logic. It arises from an opposition contained in the idea of cognition, viz. between the True and the Good, or the theoretical and the volitional. Each of these sub-categories of cognition contains its own contradiction. The one leads into the other by virtue of these their own internal contradictions. The Absolute Idea brings them into unity.²⁹

Cognition has as its object the True. Initially, cognition regards the true as the external object given to cognition as a datum. The world is taken to exist

apart from the cognition of it. Cognition is thus finite, since it depends on the limitation of an Other, its object. The subject cognizing is seen on this model as a passive receiver of data. The next few steps in the argument depend heavily on Kant. The subject receives the data through certain forms. These forms are empty universals so long as they are not filled in by given data. This filling in of the universals occurs either by subsumption, which is analytic, or by demonstration, which is synthetic. In the latter case, a certain necessity is implied. But necessity does not attach to the datum, but to the subject cognizing. With the idea of necessity, we have the idea of an active subject constituting the world for itself in its own image. But this is volition.

Volition has as its object the Good. It intends that the world should conform to the Good, but realizes that it does not. The will is finite, since the world does not conform to its intentions. The latter is still an alien being. The will does not conform to being as being does not conform to the will. But it wills that its subjective intention of the Good be made objectively actual. The knowledge of the Good as objectively actual, however, is again the attitude of cognition. The True and the Good must then in some way coincide. This coincidence is achieved in the Absolute Idea. Recalling some ancient metaphysical doctrine, we have

arrived now at the point where we can say that all being is true and good, since all that which is has its truth (intelligibility) and its goodness in its participation (sublation) in the Absolute. Hegel's own statement, "the real is the rational and the rational is real,"²⁹ also now takes on a certain legitimacy.

B. The Absolute Idea as the Meaning of Being

In the chart of Hegel's total system above, Being occupies a relatively insignificant place. This is as Hegel intended it to be. It occupies that particular space in so far as it is defined as unreflected immediacy. Reflexion comes to explicit expression in Essence, though it is clearly involved already in determinate being. We can call this conception of Being its definition in the narrow sense. In suggesting a wider sense of the term, we rely on Hegel's own various applications of it, and on Gilson's suggestion that existence and essence be included in its meaning.³⁰ "Being" is so complex a term that not even Hegel could limit its meaning to the narrow sense. The word appears in various senses throughout the Logic and is qualified by various prepositions according to the context in which it appears. One might therefore suppose that a generic meaning underlies these various occurrences of it. This seems in fact to be the case.

A clue as to this generic notion may be had by recalling a characteristic of the Hegelian dialectic itself. Its beginning must be absolute as must be its end. But they are absolute in different senses. Likewise, both are absolute in contrast to the relativity of the moments in the process. Yet, both are like each moment in the process in being an arrested immediacy. This is true even of the Absolute Idea, which, in itself, is its own self-reflexion, but subsequently moves by a "free act" into nature.

The beginning (Being) is absolute in so far as it is pure self-identity, not yet related to Nothing. The end is absolute in so far as it has no Other except itself and is not yet externalized. Each moment in the process is immediate in so far as it is an arrested immediacy, not yet turned into its Other. When Hegel says of anything that it is "in the form of being", he means this not yet. Being in this sense means mediation arrested at the point of a sublation. This is the recurrence of immediacy. In this sense, Being at any point conforms to its original conception, Being as immediate. It would be simple enough to trace in each case how being occurs in this way in the Logic, but would tend to be tedious here.

Arrested immediacy is one sense in which Hegel conceives of Being, or better being, since in each case

such being turns into its Other, which is its not-being. There is another, more important sense, however, in which Being is conceived by Hegel. If the process of progressive mediation receives its intelligibility and legitimation from the Absolute Idea, the Being of the Absolute will be the measure of the being of any of its moments. The nature of this Being is clearly spelled out:³¹

Accordingly the true meaning of mode (of the Absolute) is that it is the Absolute's own reflective movement, a determining; but a determining which would make it not an Other but only that which it already is, the transparent externality which is the manifestation of itself, a movement out of itself, but such that this being-outwards is equally inwardness itself and therefore equally a positing that is not merely positedness but absolute Being.

If we need any justification for speaking of absolute Being, we need not look much further. This passage occurs in Chapter I of the last part of the Doctrine of Essence and is entitled "The Absolute". The notion of Being which Hegel here invokes is that of self-reflection. Echoes of both Aristotle and neo-Platonism are clearly evident. While neo-Platonism had unequivocally placed Being outside the One, since Being involves plurality, Hegel, together with Aristotle, is not willing to do so. On the basis of the text of the Logic, one might, in a hard-nosed way, find fault with Hegel for employing the concept of Being in these various ways. It would have been desirable if Hegel had made these senses of "Being" systematically explicit, rather than stating them in a

sort of an incidental way. Heidegger, however, has a different view. His own hermeneutic allows him to suppose that philosophers of the past (except for the pre-Socratics and Aristotle) are bound to confuse different senses of "Being", since they had been capable of entertaining the concept only in a dissimulated way.

Again, it would not be difficult to find instances in the Logic in which this notion of Being is invoked. One might refer particularly to the doctrine of infinity as the sublation of determinate being as such and finitude, the doctrine of essence as the truth of Being, the absolute relation as the sublation of contingency and necessity, and other instances.

It will be readily noticed that these two senses of Being coincide in the Absolute Idea. Arrested immediacy and self-reflexion coincide in the Absolute Idea because (1) there is no inadequacy to be found in the Idea of the Absolute which would lead beyond itself, and (2) it is the supreme instance of self-reflexion, indeed it is the Inbegriff of self-reflection. It is thus the total movement in itself, arrested in its final term.

These two complementary meanings of "Being" may be found in two statements, both of which occur in Hegel's discussion of the Absolute Idea:

The universal is immediately itself this immediate, since as abstract it also is merely the abstract relation-to-self, which is Being.³²

The Absolute Idea alone is Being, imperishable life, self-knowing truth, and is all truth."

Being is first said to consist in abstract relation-to-self, which is an immediacy. But the fact that Being, even in its immediacy, is a relation-to-self, harmonizes it with the Absolute Idea. Secondly, the Absolute Idea is said to be Being, Life, Self-Knowing, and Truth. These are not to be taken as different qualities of the Absolute, since in that case the previous dialectic of properties attaching to an underlying substrate would recur. Each fully comprehends the Absolute, and each is itself absolute (thus the Upper case is used). The Absolute is absolute Being in so far as Being now is in its Truth. In the light of Hegel's conception of truth throughout the course of the Logic, i.e. the higher stage is the truth of the lower, the Absolute is absolute Truth, the Truth of each moment and of the whole process. In Heidegger's language, we might say that the Truth of Being and the meaning of Being is the Absolute Idea.

3. Absolute Being in Hegel's Phenomenology

There is no doubt that Hegel's texts make hard reading. Bruno Puntel has suggested that the chief source of this difficulty is not so much a matter of style as it is the subject matter itself. The same terms are often used with different meanings and often these are the crucial ones. It would be a mistake, however, to

account for this variety in the uses of terms as an inconsistency which could be avoided by being a little more careful. What appears as a number of different meanings ascribed to the same word is often due to the dialectical character of the subject matter. Terms like immediacy, subjectivity, objectivity, truth, being, notion, spirit, absolute, and the welter of prepositions and possessive pronouns change in meaning as the Sache itself changes in process of dialectical mediations. It would also be quite off the mark to treat these changes as equivocations, since it is equally true that a certain unity of meaning remains, so that the process does not lose its continuity.

When we distinguish various meanings of the same word, therefore, the contexts should be specified in which it occurs. Accordingly, we have all along endeavored to specify the contexts in which the concepts "Being" and "Absolute" occur. When we now return to the Phenomenology in order to determine the meanings of these concepts, the same situation arises again.

We have already found two meanings of "Being" in the Phenomenology. First, in regard to the cognitive attitude of sense-certainty, which formed the initial and naive attitude of consciousness, the matter or object of sense-certainty turned out to be exhausted in the meager content expressed in the quasi-judgment "it is." Yet, sense-certainty is not in a position to explain what it

is that is said to be. The is, therefore, signifies only pure Being without content.

In the structure of the general attitude of consciousness, object and subject were separated. The subject took the object as the truth of its notions, ideas, or representations. Cognition sought a knowledge of external objects. This external reality was there called Being (sometimes Sein and sometimes Seiendes) and distinguished from notion. In each case, the object sought was determinate being. In the beginning, i.e., with sense-certainty, the impasse that was reached consisted in the fact that the object turned out on analysis to be pure Being. And again at the end, i.e., with understanding, the object became either the pure being-in-itself alone or the manifestation alone, since the one turned into the other. The difference could not be maintained.

These two meanings of "Being" roughly correspond to immediate Being and determinate being in the Logic. There is a third meaning in the Phenomenology as well and it is a very elusive one, but roughly corresponds to the notion of absolute Being. Absolute Being is complicated in the Phenomenology by the fact that this work covers a much greater field than does the Logic. The latter could not include Spirit since the Logic is concerned only with the logical Ideas. Now Spirit becomes the highest expression

of the Absolute, "the grandest conception of all."³⁵ In relation to Spirit, the logical Idea has the form of a renewed immediacy, the Idea in itself (see the chart above). In relation to the content of the Logic, it is the Idea in end for itself. From the point of view of the total system, Logic functions as the first position, turns into its Other which is Nature, and the two are sublated in Absolute Spirit.

These transitions involve very difficult problems. In the Encyclopaedia, the system is set up in such a way that the transition from Logic to Nature must be a dialectical one and must have, in this sense, a certain necessity. At the end of the Science of Logic this does not appear to be the case. The transition is said to be a "resolve" and a "free release" of itself. Hegel even denies that it is to be regarded as a transition.³⁶ If the turn to Nature is to be a dialectical one, the Idea must go outside itself in such a way that what it has become in Logic is the first immediacy in the realm of Nature. Thus,

The Idea, namely, in positing itself as absolute unity of the pure Notion and its reality and thus contracting itself into the immediacy of Being, is the totality of this form--nature.³⁷

The terms have shifted. Unity, absoluteness, Being, totality, Notion no longer mean what they did a moment ago. The Absolute Idea had just appeared triumphantly as the concrete unity of subjectivity and objectivity, fulfilled

Being, the Notion which has itself as object, but is now again reduced to "the immediacy of Being."

Solutions have been proposed, e.g. by Stace. Puntel sees this as an insoluble problem within Hegel's system. For present purposes the problem can be left standing. It is mentioned here in order to draw attention to the difference which is introduced with the concept of Spirit.

Whatever the position of the logical Idea might be in relation to Nature and Spirit, it formally contains the characteristics of Absolute Spirit. "The essential being of Spirit is its act, and its act is to be aware of itself."³⁸ Further,

This last embodiment of Spirit--Spirit which at once gives it complete and true content the form of self, and thereby realizes its own notion--this is Absolute Knowledge. It is Spirit knowing itself in the shape of Spirit, it is knowledge which comprehends through notions. Truth is here not merely in itself absolutely identical with certainty; it has also the shape, the character of certainty of self; or in its existence--i.e. for Spirit knowing it--it is the form of knowledge of itself.³⁹

The Absolute appears in the Phenomenology in the form of Absolute Knowledge (Wissen). Two reasons may be given for this: (1) Phenomenology is the science which considers phenomena as they appear in consciousness (in the widest sense). Thus, Absolute Knowledge is a state of consciousness, but in which it sees itself in unity with its object. (2) For the same reason, consciousness transcends its subjectivity in Absolute Knowledge. It

has already done so earlier with the notion of Reason. Absolute Knowledge is no longer my individual consciousness and self-consciousness; it is now Spirit which includes all consciousness and self-consciousness.

As in the Logic, so also in the Phenomenology we find Hegel speaking of the Absolute as Being, or absolute Being. But in each case, the introduction of the word "Being" in this connection is done in a surreptitious way, as if he had a bad conscience about it. The expression, "absolute Essence" (absolute Wesenheit),⁴⁰ is much more frequently used, and Beillie blithely proceeds to translate it as "being" or "essential being". There is at least one passage in which Hegel identifies "absolute Wesenheit" with "Sein schlechthin."⁴¹ There is also a sense in which Hegel speaks of Absolute Spirit in its Dasein.⁴² The Dasein of Spirit is Spirit in time and history, and is not at all the same conception as was Dasein (determinate being) in the Logic. It is a conception which the Logic could not comprehend within its own scope. For an understanding of it, we need to turn to the Preface of the Phenomenology, and in particular the sentence which states the heart of the system and the basic principle of speculative philosophy, as Hegel conceives it.⁴³

In my view--a view which the developed exposition of the system itself can alone justify--everything depends on grasping and expressing the ultimate truth not as Substance but as Subject as well.⁴⁴

The "ultimate truth" is interchangeable with "the Absolute". This sentence expresses the nature of the Absolute.⁴⁵

The sentence is a compound of two sentences: the Absolute is Substance, and the Absolute is Subject. In both a grammatical subject is given a predicate, but in such a way that the predicate is identified with the subject. But this identification is speculative, rather than abstract (as in understanding) or dialectical (as in Logic). Let us take an example. When we say, "God is Being,"⁴⁶ the copula might be taken as an expansion of the subject of the sentence. When the sentence is put forth, the subject is taken to have a certain fixed meaning. We presume that "God" has a meaning for us, but that a further content is attributed to God. In this sense, the subject is thought to have an implicit content already given prior to the predication of Being. When, on the other hand, the copula signifies unqualified identity, subject and predicate are interchangeable and the predicate gives the content and meaning ("the essential nature"⁴⁷) of the subject. In that case, why not speak alone of Being? Nothing is added by the word 'God'. Neither of these approaches will do. As a logical predicate, Being is regarded as something added to the nature of God, but this is a contradiction since God does not have Being (this would finitize God) but is Being, as the sentence says and as theological

tradition has maintained. If Being is formally identified with God, however, nothing is being said beyond the bare tautology.

For Hegel, there is a profounder sense to this statement. It is in one sense analytic, since an identification does occur, but in another sense synthetic, since the process of identification is more complex.⁴⁸ In a dialectical identification, the subject geht suf into the predicate, and the predicate geht in turn suf into the subject. In this Aufgehen a mediation occurs, and it occurs in the peculiar way that the subject becomes the mediation which the copula signifies. The subject is at once the agent of mediation and that which suffers mediation. It is the thing mediated, thus becoming the predicate (its other) and in this act assumes the predicate into itself. The otherness of the predicate was initially put forth in the act of making the statement, but so was the identification. The otherness of the predicate is not denied by the logical identification. We are not dealing in universals and their abstract, formal relations, but with a movement of Selbstbestimmung and Selbstvermittlung, which occurs in the act (rather than in the formal statement) of assigning a predicate to a subject.

We are now almost at the point of introducing the speculative Subject. We have already noted on several occasions above where this sort of a process occurs.

We have also noted on several occasions that difficulties arise in the attempt to formalize this theory of predication and dialectical logic in general. One difficulty arises from the fact that such formalization would belie Hegel's own intentions. This is not a theory of formal predication, but it is more like a concrete logic of the act of predication. Curiously, those who demand precision in the terms of formal logic, are thereby demanding that we set forth Hegel's theory in pre-Hegelian terms.⁴⁹

The justification of the system and of the methods it employs is found in the actual working out of the system, as Hegel constantly insists. Surely he has a good point in this. This point would also mitigate Heidegger's objection against Hegel's "logicism". No doubt, it would be very beneficial for Hegel-scholarship if someone were to trace the logical principles at work in the various deductions Hegel carries out, and to set them forth systematically and more precisely than Hegel has done even in the logic of the Notion.⁵⁰

In any event, a dialectical predication involves a mediation of the separate identities of subject and predicate. By mediation, the terms lose their separate identities and are consumed (aufgegangen) into each other. This process is mutual. But it is by the mutuality of the reciprocal mediation that the terms gain self-determination.

The speculative method goes beyond this dialectic and sees in that dialectical process "something reflected into self, a Subject."⁵¹ Subject is now no longer the grammatical or logical subject. This is expressed in the speculative sentence, "The Absolute is both Substance and Subject." Substance represents the immediacy of the Absolute, an immediacy which results from its simple turning into itself.⁵² It is thus "in the form of being." If Subject is conceived as Substance, and if the predication of Subject to the Absolute were conceived in the same way as the predication of Substance, no movement to Spirit would be generated and the Absolute would remain in its Ansichsein. But this is precisely what the speculative sentence is to avoid.

The word "subject" occurs in the Phenomenology with at least four different meanings: (1) as subjectum, that which underlies, as in Perception and Understanding; (2) the subject which has itself as its object, as in Self-Consciousness; (3) the subject which represents its Other to itself, as e.g. the bondsman who represents the lord to himself as his Other, or the unhappy consciousness which represents God as an Other to be placated, or the beautiful soul which sees itself as being in accord with the morally Right, but will not actualize its self-righteousness in the human world of culture and society. In each case a relationship occurs in which unity and

distinction are in conflict. (4) Finally, the subject which sees all contents, experience, and determination as related to itself, the Ich-Subjekt of Kant, but with the difference that this Ich-Subjekt is Selbst-Subjekt as Selbstvermitteltheit. It thus becomes Spirit.

The most important point for the nature of Spirit is not only the relation of what it is in itself to what it is actually, but the relation of what it knows itself to be to what it actually is; because Spirit is essentially consciousness, this self-knowing is a fundamental determination of its actuality.⁵³

It is in this last sense that Hegel employs the word "Subject" in the so-called speculative sentence above.⁵⁴ This notion of Subject is assumed already in his analysis of predication. As distinct from the logical subject, it is an actual movement enacted in the act of mediation. At this point, the mediation is no longer only a logical one, a formal one, or an act of thought in general, as in the Logic. Again, this transition appears not to be a matter strictly of demonstration, but more like an act of imagination, and for that not less valid. The proposition has become a metaphysical enactment.

The proposition, "the Absolute is Subject," must itself be sublated, so that it will become a real process. The grammatical and logical form of it is deceiving, because the subject is regarded as a term in the relation of identity. In truth, the logical subject collapses and becomes the mediation itself. It is, as such, the

act of mediation enacted by myself, who enunciates the proposition. I, who enact the act and enunciate the proposition, am by that act a participant in the process of mediating the Absolute's Substance and Subjectivity, the latter being the act of mediation on a metaphysical scale. The proposition thus transcends itself, Hegel says, as soon as it is stated.⁵⁵ It transcends the form of proposition and transcends itself towards the actual, ontological process.

These are strange things to say about a combination of words constituting a sentence. Of all commentators, only Bruno Puntel has hinted at this quasi-magical character of the speculative proposition.⁵⁶ Hegel, however, says clearly that the proposition transcends its linguistic and logical form. Puntel's exposition of Hegel is conditioned throughout by his anticipation of Heidegger's thought, although he seems to begin with a Thomist outlook. Heidegger often speaks of language in a quasi-magical way, and Puntel's exposition of Hegel seems to have this feature in view. Without belaboring the issue, one might also cite Gadamer as having a similar view of language.⁵⁷

The conjunction of Substance and Subject is Being mediated, and this is the conclusion of the Phenomenology.

Being is entirely mediated; it is a substantial content, that is likewise directly in possession of the ego, has the character of self, is Notion. With the attainment of this the Phenomenology of Mind concludes.⁵⁸

The conjunction of Substance and Subject constitutes Spirit.

That the truth is only realized in the form of system, that Substance is essentially Subject, is expressed in the idea which represents the Absolute as Spirit--the grandest conception of all, and one which is due to modern times and its religion. Spirit alone is Reality. It is the inner Being of the world, that which essentially is, and is per se; it assumes objective, determinate form, and enters into relations with itself--it is externality (otherness), and exists for self; yet, in this determination, and in its otherness, it is still one with itself--it is self-contained and self-complete, in itself and for itself at once.⁵⁹

Much of the obscurity of this passage is due to the translation.⁶⁰ Substance and Subject are connected in a dialectical way in the Absolute as Spirit, the one indicating the in-itself and the other the for-itself. On the other hand, Spirit and Subject are so closely identified that Subject may also stand for Spirit. Being and Spirit, likewise, are in one sense connected dialectically, when Being is regarded as immediacy, the "instinctive" or unreflected relation-to-self, and Spirit is regarded as the consciously reflected relation-to-self. In another sense, Being is identified with Spirit, as when it is said that Spirit is absolute Being. In this sense, Being, in its absolute Truth, is a name for the unity of Sichselbstsetzen, Sichselbstwerden, and Mitsichselbstsein. This is the Being of Spirit, Thus,

Die lebendige Substanz ist ferner das Sein, welches in Wahrheit Subjekt, oder was desselber heisst, welches in Wahrheit wirklich ist, nur insofern sie die Bewegung des Sichselbstsetzens, oder die Vermittlung des Sichendenswerdens mit sich selbst ist. Sie ist als Subjekt....⁶¹

4. Heidegger's Interpretation of Hegel's Absolute

Heidegger's interpretation of Hegel's Absolute is given in his essay, "Hegel's Concept of Experience," which first came out as one of a collection of essays published under the title, Holzwege.⁶² In this essay Heidegger does not intend to reproduce Hegel's thought, but expressly makes an attempt to interpret it in the sense of a Daseinshermeneutik. This piece of interpretation is a good example of Heidegger's method of Hinterdenken, as Gadamer has called it.

In accordance with Heidegger's own view of the matter, he will seek to find intimations of Being. He will translate Hegel's statements (and, along the way, also those of Aristotle) into his own ontological language. Often one is hard put to see any agreement. If Heidegger had not given the Hegelian text along with his commentary, and if he had not documented his references to Aristotle, one would have very little to go on for the purpose of finding the original texts.

"Philosophy contemplates what is present, in its presence."⁶³ This is Heidegger's rendition of Aristotle's "There is a science which investigates being as being,"⁶⁴ and of Hegel's "the actual knowledge of what truly is" ("das wirkliche Erkennen dessen, was in Wahrheit ist"⁶⁵). What is present "already prevails" in philosophy "from itself" and prevails already before philosophy contemplates

it. What is thus present is the Absolute as Spirit. "Real knowledge of beings as being now means the absolute knowledge of the Absolute in its absoluteness."⁶⁶

So far Hegel has not penetrated to the meaning of Being, but deals with beings as beings. But nevertheless, the Absolute prevails and is present prior to theory about it. The next step is to "select, among the various modes of mental representation, precisely that mode which alone is suited to absolute knowledge." We see here an implicit reference to Heidegger's Dasein as the disclosure of Being. This mode of mental representation "is established in the land of self-consciousness." Self-consciousness thus functions in Hegel as does Dasein in Heidegger, though Hegel did not fully penetrate self-consciousness so as to determine its Being as Dasein.

The method by which we gain absolute knowledge cannot be a "means," an "instrument," or a "medium." Relative to the Absolute, any means is finite and therefore inadequate. We "must examine the adequacy of knowledge with respect to the Absolute by measuring knowledge against the Absolute." We "must already know the Absolute."⁶⁷ Consequently, as Hegel says, "the Absolute is 'in and for itself already close to us of its own accord.'" Accordingly, "The first step which knowledge of the Absolute must take is to accept and receive the Absolute in its absoluteness, that is, in being-with-us.

This being-present-to-us, this parousia, this Advent, is part and parcel of the Absolute in and for itself."⁶⁸ From the side of our absolute knowledge of the Absolute, we are to return to what Heidegger has previously called our "pre-ontological understanding." From the side of the Absolute as absolute, its closeness to us is part of its nature (or, as Heidegger would prefer, *ist* Being). "This pointer merely refers us back specifically to that relation with the Absolute in which we are already."⁶⁹

The question now arises, what it is that is present to us. We have said that it is the Absolute, but from the point of view of its presence it is as Subject. "That this is so is due, not to the thinker's point of view, but to the Being of beings."⁷⁰ Thus, the Being of the Absolute as Subject is the Being of being-present. It is "the Being of the beings that are as subjects" as well.⁷¹ The two coincide: "Unconditional self-awareness, being the subjectness of the subject, is the absoluteness of the Absolute." Philosophy "wills" the knowledge of the absoluteness of the Absolute, since it wills absolute knowledge, and this is possible on the ground that the absoluteness of the Absolute is present to us, i.e., is Subject.

Philosophy itself contains a double aspect. On the one hand, philosophy wills knowledge of the Absolute. It also "speaks...the will of the Absolute whose very nature it is to will to be with us."⁷² In it "there is the

perousie of the Absolute."⁷³ In order to clarify the meaning of the words "the Absolute," "knowledge," "truth," "objective," and "subjective," philosophy "must have entered from its very start into the perousie of the Absolute-- it must be with its absoluteness."⁷⁴

What Heidegger seems clearly to be driving at is a notion of Being as Anwesen or presence. The first move is to point to a paradox of philosophy. It seeks the Absolute but can only do so by already knowing it. Its already knowing it is due to its being like the Absolute, i.e. we who philosophize are subjects. Our knowing it and participating in it already pre-ontologically is the presence of the Absolute. And this presence is of the nature of the Absolute, of the nature of absoluteness. The task of philosophy now becomes an expression of that presence, indeed the Absolute's self-expression. If we replace the word "Absolute" with the word "Being," we have the outlines of Heidegger's ontology before us.

The Phenomenology of Mind proposes to "undertake a description of knowledge as it appears, a presentation of knowledge as a phenomenon."⁷⁵ Such an attempt, if it is to lead to absolute knowledge, involves "the struggle of the Absolute itself, wresting and bringing itself forth into the absoluteness of self-comprehension...."⁷⁶ When Hegel speaks of the "toil of the Concept," he is not only opposing romantics and the like, who seeks to

gain knowledge of the Absolute directly and immediately. Nor is he speaking of the intellectual toil of the philosopher. It is the "toil and effort of the Absolute."⁷⁷ In this way, the phenomenon, in this case of knowledge, loses its character of mere appearance. "The appearance is authentic presence itself: the parousia of the Absolute. In its will to be with us, the Absolute is being present."⁷⁸ Thus, "Phenomenology of Mind means: the parousia of the Absolute at work."⁷⁹

Up to this point, Heidegger has given Hegel the benefit of the doubt. Now an objection is developed, though it is very carefully stated so as to "set (Hegel's) thinking free into its own nature."⁸⁰

The reality of this consciousness, the subjectness of the subject, is the appearance itself. But like the Being of all beings in all metaphysics, the Being of this being, which is appearance, enters into representation only insofar as beings present themselves as beings (on to on). But now the on is the ens qua ens perceptu. It is present in the presentation through the cogitationes that are as conscientia.⁸¹

Again,

The essentia of the ens in its esse is the presence. But presence has being in the mode of presentation. However, since the ens, the subiectum, has meantime become the res cogitans, the presentation in itself is at the same time representing--it is a representation.⁸²

Hegel uses the word "Being" in a narrower sense, Heidegger says, but implicitly also invokes a larger sense.

Hegel always understands "Being" in the narrower sense of "mere being," because that which truly is is the ens actu, the real, whose actualitas

or reality consists in the knowledge of self-knowing certainty. Only this certainty can in truth--and this now always means by virtue of the certainty of absolute knowledge--make the claim that it 'is' all reality. Being thus here crops up again, to be sure, just when it was supposed to have vanished. But the absolute knowledge of science takes no notice thereof.⁸³

We have found this to be the case from an analysis of the Hegelian texts themselves. "Given Hegel's use of the word "Being", he was strictly speaking no longer entitled to designate what for him is the true reality of the real--Spirit--with a term still containing the word 'being.' And yet he does so everywhere, since the essence of Spirit remains 'being'self-conscious."⁸⁴ For this reason Heidegger feels justified in applying the word "Being" also to the absoluteness of the Absolute, as he had interpreted this expression.

Since he had defined "Being" as presence or parousia, he finds an echo of it in Hegel's sub-title to the Phenomenology: "the Science of the Experience of Consciousness." He wishes now to interpret the notion of experience as the Being of beings. "Experience now is the word of Being, since Being is apprehended by way of beings qua beings." In Hegel's emphasis on experience, "he is above all else concerned with the aspect of presence." Heidegger is referring to experience as self-reflection, or inversion as he calls it. In our own case, i.e. that of finite subjects, and in the subject-being of the Absolute, a certain inversion of consciousness occurs by

which consciousness examines itself. For the Absolute this act of self-relection constitutes it as Subject and Spirit and brings it to presence. But this presencing of itself is its very Being. Presence is the Absolute as Subject. "Accordingly, our thought grasps experience in its full nature--as the beingness of beings in the sense of the absolute subject."⁸⁵

When located in the Absolute, and when seen as the Absolute's self-concretization, "experience" is the Being of beings."⁸⁶ This appeal to Hegel's concept of experience is apparently meant to rescue Hegel's philosophy from its "subjectism" by reinstating what Heidegger takes to be the ancient Greek concept of experience.⁸⁷ In the expression, "being qua being," the "as" is implied in the word "experience." "In virtue of the qua, beings are thought of in their beingness. Experience is now no longer the term for a kind of knowledge." The result of this interpretation of Hegel's Phenomenology of Mind is summarized as follows:

The phenomenology of Spirit is the perousia of the Absolute. The perousia is the Being of beings. There is for men no introduction to the Being of beings, because man's nature, his life led in the escort of Being, is itself that escort. Insofar as the "being with us" of the Absolute prevails, we are already in the perousia.⁸⁸

5. Heidegger's Quest for the Meaning of Being

The main outlines of Heidegger's ontology are evident from the expositions already given, especially

from his interpretation of Hegel. We have found that, in every context, Heidegger refers us to a non-conceptual understanding of Being, which is, at the same time, the presence of Being for us and in itself. We will here be concerned with his onto-logy, that is, with what Heidegger explicitly says about Being. It turns out, as a matter of fact, that he does not say much in this regard, and what he does say is obscure to the point almost of nonsense. Expressions like "Being," "being," "the Being of beings," "beings as beings," "the truth of Being" appear constantly in his writings. One would expect, therefore, that much will be found there as to the meaning of "Being". But this is not the case.

For the most part, Heidegger speaks of our apprehension of Being--as beings whose Being is that of Dasein or of escort or shepherd of Being--but stops short of giving a definition of Being. A definition of Being is supposed by him and many others to be impossible, "and rightly so," he says, "if definitio fit per genus proximum et differentiam specificam."⁸⁹ In another sense one might speak of definition, and Heidegger speaks often enough of the "essence" of Being. Of course, "essence" is not understood as essentia, which he regards as a "category" of "metaphysics". But, as we have seen in connection with Aristotle, one might speak of a definition of "Being" by way of giving it transcendental predicates,

which have been derived by a kind of induction. The definition of "Being" then consists of such an account of it that it can both have these predicates and that they will apply to all beings.

Heidegger goes to great lengths in describing the existentials of Dasein and the linguisticity (Sprechlichkeit) of man. These qualify him to be the agent of the presencing of Being. This presencing is Being. Accordingly, ontology is caught in a circle: ~~Dasein~~ seeks the meaning of Being, but it must seek it in its own being, which is the disclosure of Being, which is the Advent of Being, and Being is that Advent. These are obscure statements, but not as obscure as many others. We do not intend here to follow the example of e.g. Langen, who confuses the re-statement (in English!) of Heidegger's obscurities with exposition and profundity. One is constantly tempted to do so, not only because Heidegger's language is often murky and thus difficult to translate into clear English (or German), but because of his admonition not to fall back into the traditional metaphysical categories. One might wonder if he is not stacking the card-deck in such a way that, if we played the game, we would be unable to escape the quicksand he has prepared for us. "The question remains whether and in what manner... we play along and abandon ourselves to the game."⁹⁰ We are asked to abandon ourselves to the game, but Heidegger

claims that he did not invent the game: "Being...plays the game which Fate deals us..."⁹¹ But let us see if an ontology can be made out.

The upshot of Heidegger's discussion of Hegel's concept of experience was that Being should be conceived as presence, and this notion has two aspects: (1) the process or act of presencing, and (2) ourselves (Dasein) as escort of Being. The two cannot be separated. Heidegger understands Hegel as saying something very similar by means of the concepts of Subject and Spirit. One is tempted to interpret these two aspects in terms of the metaphysic of emanation and participation or in Hegel's dialectical principles. Either one seems to be less cumbersome than Heidegger's own mode of expressing what seems to be much the same doctrine. The difference, according to Heidegger himself, is not so much a difference between systems or doctrines, but a difference in expressing in language what everyone implicitly and intuitively knows, i.e. the presence of Being.

From this point of view, it is possible to understand what Heidegger means by distinguishing between "es gibt Sein" and "Sein ist."⁹² "Es gibt Sein" implies a giving on the side of Being, Being's presencing of itself, and it implies, for our part, a waiting for the Advent of Being.⁹³ This is the point of the book Gelesenheit, which is probably the most obscure of Heidegger's writings.

Scholar: Then wonder can open what is locked?

Scientist: By way of waiting...

Teacher: ...if this is released...

Scholar: ...and human nature remains appropriated to that...

Teacher: ...from whence we are called.

Waiting is the opposite of demanding (fordern), but it is also an attending to beings and the cultivation of the attitude of attunement with the world. Being is thus allowed to come to presence; beings are let-be in order that Being may be unveiled. This ~~double~~ aspect constantly occurs, and Heidegger sees no difficulty in speaking of the one in terms of the other. We are allowed to receive and we allow to be received. Ontological language has no other function than to express this conjunction of giving and receiving. Our ontological and pre-ontological expressing of Being does not need to make use of words or vocal speech. In its fundamental level of insight, it is a "soundless saying."⁹⁴ In this unity of giving and receiving, Being "essences" (west), worlds (weltet), and disposes itself (weltet). But this essencing, worlding, and walten is Being in its truth (unconcealedness). Being, therefore is not to be conceived as something which is first and subsequently gives itself: its is-ness is its giving-ness.

Accordingly, Being cannot be described directly as we might describe a thing, a matter of fact, or a state of affairs. But we know Being directly in the sense that no concepts mediate that knowledge. Being is known through beings, to be sure, and this is implied in the definition

of Being as presencing. We are angewiesen auf das Seiende, but our being-with (bei) dem Seinden is at the same time our being-with Sein. Our being-with beings is such that Being is allowed to shine through them. This is not yet an ontology, however, but indicates, if Heidegger is right, the ground from which an ontology might spring. Ontology is secondary (nechtr#glich) to the experience of Being in beings.

When we ask, now, for the meaning of Being, we might have two things in mind: (1) a call for openness to Being on this intuitive level, or (2) a theory about Being. In Being and Time, the call of conscience back to openness to Being is not simply a request that we do so, but is a constitutive element in Dasein. Also in the same work, Heidegger promises to provide an articulation of the meaning of Being in the form of an ontology. Heidegger's post-1929 writings can be seen as an attempt to move in the direction of such an ontology. But as a matter of fact, these later writings remain for the most part on the first level. Perhaps a theory of Being cannot be given on Heidegger's terms, but he does give us several suggestions of possible modes of approach.

The question asks for the meaning of Being. "Meaning" is not understood as signification and certainly not as denotation. We are concerned with the meaning of Being, not with the meaning of "Being". If the truth of Being

is its disclosure of unconcealment, its meaning will be found through or from certain perspectives or horizons. Of these the following most fundamental ones may be mentioned.

(1) Dasein-analysis. This is given primarily in Being and Time and is reaffirmed again and again, notably in the Letter on Humanism. The result of the Dasein-analysis is this:⁹⁵

Der Mensch ist und ist Mensch, insofern er der Ek-sistierende ist. Er steht in die Offenheit des Seins hinaus, als ~~welche das Sein selber ist,~~ das als der Wurf sich das Wesen des Menschen in 'die Sorge' erworfen hat. Dergestalt geworfen steht der Mensch 'in' der Offenheit des Seins.

(2) Hermeneutics of past writings. This occurs whenever Heidegger considers writers of the past. His general attitude towards tradition can also be called a hermeneutical one, insofar as he wants to see through it to the ground from which it sprang. We have reviewed in some detail how Heidegger applies this method to Hegel. But it is in poetry that Being comes to expression most decisively. "It is the poets who, through the 'essential word,' initially 'open' being in its Being."⁹⁶

(3) Analysis of language and discourse. This also occurs throughout Heidegger's writings, but one book exists which is wholly devoted to this topic, Unterwegs zur Sprache.⁹⁷ For the most part, language "verweigert uns noch ihr Wesen." Language under the dominion of modern philosophy (the metaphysics of subjectivity) is still regarded as an instrument of domination over being. In

its essence, however, language is the abode of the truth of Being.⁹⁸

(4) Closely related with language and hermeneutics is reflection on the essence of thinking. The notion of "essential thinking" comes relatively late in Heidegger's writing, as in What is Called Thinking and Discourse on Thinking (Gelessenheit).⁹⁹ This mode of thinking is to be distinguished from systematic thinking¹⁰⁰ and mathematical calculation. It is what has been called a disposition to receive the Advent of Being. "Des Denken... lässt sich vom Sein in den Anspruch nehmen, um die Wahrheit des Seins zu sagen."¹⁰¹

(5) Reflection on the thingliness of things. This question of the thingliness of a thing arises from the original distinction between Being and being. Being is approached from the point of view of the nature of being. This is not a resuscitation of the Thing-Ontology, but just the opposite. In his essay "The Thing", Heidegger claims that the thingliness of the thing has actually never been thought.¹⁰² But he characteristically adds the qualification, "in its nearness" or in its "thinging." In this context, the meaning of Being is approached from the point of view of the Being of beings.

(6) Reflection on historicity and temporality. In Being and Time, historicity and temporality were found to be of the nature of Dasein and, as such, were proposed

as the horizon from which Being might be understood. So far as Dasein is its disclosure of Being, the temporality and historicity of Dasein, when thought in Being itself, becomes the Geschicklichkeit of Being. This "Geschick des Seins" is also expressed in Being's "es gibt." The transition from the historico-temporality of Dasein to the Geschick of Being (sometimes translated "fate" or "fatefulness") is carried out in the Letter on Humanism and elsewhere. "Dieses 'es gibt' waltet als das Geschick des Seins." "Das Geschehen der Geschichte west als das Geschick der Wahrheit des Seins."¹⁰³ Being is essentially historical because it is of its essence to give itself for the Andenken des Denkers. The thinker who thinks Being now takes the place which Dasein had occupied in Being and Time. But the thinker is still conceived as an ek-sisting being as was Dasein. Heidegger's use of the word "Andenken" is significant. A corresponding noun means devotion (Andacht), a reverent attending to a matter. In regard to Being's fatefully giving itself, this is the proper attitude. And through the conjunction of Andenken and the giving of Being, the whole of nature, the totality of the world, takes on an aspect of holiness and a tone of value (rather than of values pinned onto objects, so to speak). Again we see the double aspect of the presence of Being we have noted above. The history of Being is both a history to which thinking and the thinker (that is to say essential thinking in the sense

given) belong (gehören) and also a history brought about (ereignet) by this thinking.

(7) Reflection on the nature of truth. This is probably the most fundamental consideration of all. Heidegger's conception of truth underlies all of these perspectives or "horizons." The relation between the conception of truth expounded in Being and Time and the use he makes of it later (Vom Wesen der Wahrheit, Brief über den Humanismus) is very much like the relation between Dasein's temporality and the historicity of Being. In Being and Time, Heidegger has carried out an existential reduction of truth as adequation to truth as aletheia. Truth in this sense was interpreted as the existential, "being-in-the-truth." When we speak of the Truth of Being, truth as aletheia is applied to Being itself.

The argument of Being and Time may be briefly summarized.¹⁰⁴ Truth and Being have been associated in antiquity, especially by Parmenides and Aristotle. What connection does truth have with Dasein's understanding of Being? In order to answer this question three steps are taken. We begin with the traditional conception of truth and attempt to lay bare its ontological foundation. From this the primordial phenomenon of truth becomes visible and how the traditional notion of truth derives from it. Thirdly, it will be shown what kind of Being belongs to truth and why we must presuppose that 'there is' truth.

The traditional conception of truth asserted that judgment or assertion is the locus of truth; only judgments can be either true or false. The essence of truth lies in the agreement of judgment and object. One notices again a rather cavalier attitude towards the history of thought. Heidegger attributes this notion of truth to Aristotle and St. Thomas, but does not seem to trouble himself with another conception of truth to be found also in these sources, i.e. as the intelligibility of things. And in general it seems very difficult to speak of the traditional conception of truth in any case.

Agreement is a very general and empty sort of a term. It is a relation, but what kind of a relation? It can mean equality, convergence, similarity. Thus, we ought not only describe and presuppose the totality of relations implied in agreement or adequation, but to look for its ontological foundations.

In every assertion there is involved a certain being-towards something. Assertion is more than a proposition. It is a way of being towards the thing which is. This being-towards is a relation of uncovering, a "being-uncovering." This is the original meaning of the Greek aletheia. The thing being uncovered is the entity which one has in mind in one's assertion, as that very same thing in its self-sameness. To say that an assertion is true is to say that it uncovers the entity

as it is in itself. Being-truth (truth) is therefore a being-uncovering. This is only possible on the basis of being-in-the-world which is the ontological basis for the possibility of the occurrence of truth.

The next step consists of describing the primordial phenomenon of truth as uncovering. Being-truth is a way of Being for Dasein, i.e., it is an existential. Uncovering is a mode of being-in-the-world. The uncoveredness of entities within the world is grounded in the world's disclosedness, which is at the same time the there which Dasein is. With Dasein's disclosedness, the most primordial phenomenon of truth is attained. To say that Dasein is 'in the truth' is to say that the disclosedness of its ownmost Being belongs to its existential constitution.

Heidegger now proceeds to show how the notion of agreement arose as a modification of disclosedness and as derivative from it. The idea that truth is agreement arises when Dasein is absorbed into the 'they'. Truth as uncovering an entity is replaced with absorption in something said. The relation between intellect and thing becomes present-at-hand. Both intellect and thing are regarded as present-at-hand. But on the contrary, Truth is an existential, because, in the sense of being-in-the-truth, it belongs to the basic constitution of Dasein. Unless truth is grounded in Dasein's disclosedness, the traditional conception could not even arise. Thus, the traditional conception is derivative and privative.

"Because the kind of Being that is essential to truth is of the character of Dasein, all truth is relative to Dasein's Being."¹⁰⁵ This does not mean that truth is subjective in the sense that it is subject to the subject's discretion or limited to the self-experience of the subject in isolation. The validity of truth as uncovering is founded in the fact that truth is, "in its ontological meaning, itself a Being-towards real entities, and a Being that uncovers."¹⁰⁶

The question, "why must we presuppose that there is truth," is now seen to be a pseudo-question. We are not faced with the problem of proving the claim that we know truth about being. We presuppose truth because we are already in the truth as our way of Being. Truth has already been presupposed so far as we exist. Truth already is presupposed insofar as Dasein exists at all.

Nonetheless, there is a difference between an attempt to prove that truth about being can be had (Cartesianism) and, on the other hand, an attempt to lay the foundations for the fact, already recognized, that such truth can be had and is constantly achieved in our being-in-the-world (neo-Kantianism). In neither Hegel nor Heidegger is the problem set up in the Cartesian way. In both cases, the Kantian transcendental heritage is maintained: the question to be asked is how not whether.

For Heidegger the solution has two prongs: the possibility and validity of truth is traced to Dasein's disclosedness, and truth is inherent in Being as such. The connection between these two theses is very difficult to make out and is, in fact, another source of the distinction between Heidegger I and Heidegger II, as Richardson and Versenyi see it. The following considerations may be set forth as essential to an understanding of this connection between Dasein's being-in-the-truth and the Truth of Being.

Heidegger has said that the disclosedness of Dasein makes possible the unconcealment of its own existentiell nature as well as the unconcealment of the entities towards which it comports itself. The latter is unconcealment in the mode of assertion. But "assertion is not the primary 'locus' of truth."¹⁰⁷ Truth, in the most primordial sense, is the existential, i.e., Dasein's character of disclosedness.

This is as far as one might have expected Heidegger to go in Being and Time, since this is as far as he seems to have thought it necessary to go in the case of the other existential reductions. But in the case of truth he goes farther, and this is a good indication of the importance he attributes to the question of truth. It is at this point that the crucial transition occurs from Dasein's being-in-the-truth to the Truth of Being. In these last few paragraphs of the exposition of truth,

Heidegger treads on soft ground and he seems to be aware of it. To the reduction of truth to the existential, he immediately adds disclaimers.

The Being of truth is primordially connected with Dasein. And only because Dasein is as constituted by disclosedness (that is, by understanding) can anything like Being be understood; only so is it possible to understand Being.

Being--not entities-- 'is there' (gibt es) only insofar as truth is. And truth is only insofar as Dasein is. Being and truth 'are' equally primordial.¹⁰⁸

Now the disclaimers:

The answer to the question of the meaning of Being has got to be given.¹⁰⁹

(We have yet to) analyze primordially what belongs to the concept of a science of Being as such, and to its possibilities and its variations.¹¹⁰

The transition from the truth of Dasein to the Truth of Being remains problematic. Their coincidence is merely asserted. In the Introduction to Metaphysics a further exposition is given, but this time from the side of Being rather than Dasein. "Truth is inherent in the essence of Being," he says.¹¹¹ This is Mannheim's translation of Heidegger's "Die Wahrheit gehört zum Wesen des Seins." The original German sentence indicates more clearly what Heidegger had in mind. The word "gehört" (belongs) is always used to mean identification, certainly when followed by the word "essence". Heidegger does not seem to vary from this usage anywhere. Thus, we might say, "Truth is the essence of Being." On the

other hand, it is essential to Heidegger's thought that "is" be interpreted in a dynamic sense of coming-to-be. Consequently, he will often hesitate to use this verb and instead employs verbs like "to belong to," "to be there," or the expression "es gibt". The latter have connotations which would allow of phenomena like falling from the essence. The possibility of falling from it in no way diminishes the essential identification, however.

The word "essence" is a translation of Wesen, and has already caused some difficulty for us in other contexts. For much traditional metaphysics, essence includes in its meaning potentiality and assumes a further act of existence. When Heidegger rejects the scholastic essentia, he most definitely has the difference in mind between essence and existence. That difference does not occur with regard to Dasein. Possibility is Dasein's mode of existence. Moreover, when speaking of Being (Sein), that difference does not occur either. The negation of the difference between existence and essence and of Being and essence is contained in the concept of Anwesen: *Das Wesen des Seins ist das Anwesen, die Erschlossenheit des Seins. Das Anwesen des Seins ist das Wesen des Seins, im Wesen anwesend zu sein. Das Sein west als Anwesen.* These sentences are identical in meaning. The genitives should not be taken as a having, as possessive, but as an identity. Thus, the words "Anwesen" and "Sein" in the expression,

"Anwesen des Seins," mean the same thing. Furthermore, "Wesen" is also used as a verb, "wesen" as in "des Sein west," and therefore refers to the coming-to-presence of Sein, which is Anwesen and which is Sein.

The dynamic, historical character of Being, which is expressed in the notion of Anwesen, and its connection with the Truth of Being may now be summarized as follows.

From the point of view of being (Seiendes), to be is to come to light (zum Vorschein kommen), to appear on the scene (erscheinend auftreten), to take one's place (sich hin-stellen), to produce or set up (etwas her-stellen). In contrast, not-being (Nichtsein) means to withdraw from appearing, from presence (aus der Erscheinung, aus der Anwesenheit abtreten). But this not-being, so-called in relation to being, is Nothingness (das Nichts) in relation to Being. Thus again, the Meaning of Being is Anwesen. And Truth as unconcealment (aletheia) is precisely this coming-to-presence, viz., being-unconcealing (entdeckendsein, Erschlossenheit). The Truth of Being, the Truth of Dasein, the Meaning of Being, and the Being of beings thus come together.

6. SUMMARY OF RESULTS

The problem which has engaged us in the present chapter concerns the final or highest terms in the ontologies of Hegel and Heidegger, and their comparability with each other. For Hegel the highest term is Absolute

Spirit and for Heidegger it is Being. There are good reasons for undertaking this comparison. Heidegger has himself suggested it and to some extent has also carried it out, as we have seen. Moreover, it is thematically more plausible to compare Heidegger's "Being" with Hegel's "Absolute Spirit", than to compare the former with Hegel's category of immediate Being. The latter comparison was attempted in the first chapter, and there it led to difficulties and discontinuities. Just as Heidegger has said that an understanding of Being has been the aim of all of his thinking,¹¹² so Hegel sought in all his work to grasp the Idea of the Absolute as Spirit.¹¹³

The attempt is complicated by several very complex problems. From the history of ontology, we have inherited two notions of Being which seem to exclude each other: the absolute notion (Parmenides) and the relational (Aristotle). Plato, himself, gave dramatic expression to the complexity of these notions -- and therewith of the ontological problematic itself -- in the first section of the Parmenides, when he has the young Socrates initially accepting Parmenides' absolute conception of Being and confessing that he sees no way out of the difficulties following from it for the theory of Ideas. It seems quite evident that both Hegel and Heidegger sought to synthesize the absolute and the relational notions of Being, thinking that the one could not clearly be said

to be true or false at the exclusion of the other. Hegel sought to do this by reinterpreting the notion "Absolute" and Heidegger by introducing a new conception of Being, namely the existential-factual (in relation to the da of Sein) and that of presence (in relation to the Sein of the da).

We have accordingly first taken up various interpretations of "absoluteness from past ontology, indeed from writers from whom Hegel drew. We found in this connection that there is by no means a great degree of agreement to be found among them. Hegel therefore had a wealth of material to draw from -- and out of his own tradition -- in order to formulate the nature of absoluteness in a non-Parmenidean way. This step had to be taken if the Absolute were to be conceived as subject, that is as a reflection into self through a self-positing other, as becoming.

Very intriguing and prohibitively complex problems arise at this point. It is clear from the above discussions of Hegel's Absolute that he conceives it in a non-Parmenidean way. From the point of view of Parmenides, one would have to say that Hegel's Absolute is not absolute, for it allows of becoming and movement. In what sense can it then be absolute? Not in the sense of substance. (Hegel conceives of substance in the Cartesian-Leibnizian-Spinozistic sense as that which requires nothing

but itself in order to exist.) For substance is an immediacy, a being-in-itself. Further, even on Hegel's terms there cannot be anything other than the Absolute, for relation to something substantially other constitutes a limitation. So far Parmenides and Spinoza are right. But how then avoid Parmenides' conclusions?

Hegel has answers to these questions, as we have seen. His first and often repeated answer is that there is only one 'thing' which is absolute in Parmenides' sense and that is Being, just as Parmenides had said. Absolute in this sense means immediate and therefore vacuous. Therefore, he says, we should not "make such a fuss about it" and move on beyond it. But -- Parmenides again -- how can we move beyond it, if the movement is to be a necessary and dialectical one? From nothing nothing comes. Hegel holds, however, that Being is nothing real. It is an intellectual entity and it is one under which nothing is thought. Yet, he says, Being is pregnant with its own transcendence. But in that case not even Being is absolute in the Parmenidean sense. Our conclusion must be: Hegel cannot be right in his doctrine of Being as immediate. This doctrine is either a mistake or else he did not intend it to be taken as true.

One other point is clear however: Hegel did not intend his doctrine of Being to be taken in isolation. In isolation it is certainly a mistake. It is also

clear that the first section of the Logic does not exhaust Hegel's doctrine of Being. A very likely interpretation, for which we have, I think, found considerable documentation, may be stated as follows.

The first section of the Logic is intended to give an exposition of the meaning of being-in-itself (Ansichsein). This has also been called "arrested immediacy," "positedness," "to be in the form of being." This moment recurs at every dialectical stage of the Logic. It is a being-not-yet-mediated, and this moment is clearly an intellectual abstraction, as Hegel meant it to be. There is no moment in reality which has this character. Better said: there is no time or place, no determinate stage in any real process of becoming which has this character. The very statement of such a view constitutes a contradiction, since no determinate moment or thing or event can "have the form of immediate being." Yet again, an inescapable difficulty arises. Can Hegel admit of any purely intellectual entities into the dialectic? Dialectic, we are told, is real, concrete logic. It is said to be at once the movement of reality and (therefore) the correct movement of thought. "The rational is the real and the real is the rational," as Hegel expressed it in the Philosophy of Right.

Problems of the meaning of absoluteness have led us to ask some questions as to the absoluteness of

Hegel's Absolute. These questions have led us to distinguish two different senses of "absolute", the Parmenidean and another, i.e. the dialectical. The former is applied to the immediacy of Being and the latter to the Absolute. It turned out that even in the case of immediate Being, the application of Parmenides' absolute Being leads to difficulties internal to Hegel's doctrine. These difficulties involve the whole dialectic as such. For as Parmenides had said and Hegel had repeated: Being and Thought are One. But Hegel's conclusions could not be farther removed from those of Parmenides. It seems that Hegel's dialectic can be saved only by denying one of its chief principles, that the real and the rational coincide.

That the above criticisms are unfair to Hegel becomes evident when we recall that the real and the rational coincide only from the standpoint of the Absolute, in a certain way by hindsight. Along the way the rational constantly separates and distinguishes what in reality, in the life of the Absolute is a unity. We thus return to the original problem, how the concept "absolute" may be applied to what Hegel calls "the Absolute".

We have found conceptions of the Absolute in the Logic and in the Phenomenology. In the former, absoluteness and relatedness are harmonized in the conception of the

whole in which all relations are ultimately self-relations. Relation to self has, in the Absolute, overcome the negativity which relations involved at every individual (and thus abstract) step in the course of the dialectical process. The Absolute is absolute in the sense that the otherness of the Other has been sublated. This notion of absoluteness supposes that the Absolute is absolute only to the extent that it has completely realized itself and is thus again without movement, again an immediacy. But Hegel's Absolute never reaches that stage. Thus again, Hegel's Absolute is not absolute. Are we now faced with the same problem over again, except this time on the opposite side of the scale?

At the end of the Logic, the Absolute Idea is indeed said to have achieved unity. It is said to have achieved unity to the extent that it becomes again an immediacy. The point is that it is a concrete unity in relation to the foregoing movement which led up to it and it is a renewed immediacy in relation to what follows upon it, i.e. Nature. The Absolute Idea is the logical Idea and can therefore be said to be both. It must now move beyond itself, negate its logical character, and externalize itself into Nature. The problem, how can this be possible? is the same as that which confronted us before. How can an immediacy become its other? The movement in these two cases is clearly not a necessary one. But if not, the

legitimacy of the dialectic is put in question. In that case, the Christian doctrine of free creation takes on a greater plausibility.

That this criticism is not quite fair to Hegel is again evident when we remember that the Logic is not Hegel's total system. It is indeed said to be the logic of God's self-consciousness and the like. That does not however have the consequence that nothing more can be said of the Absolute. The transition from Idea in itself (Logic) and Idea outside itself (Nature) is a problem only when considered from the point of view of the Idea in itself. But viewed from the point of view of Absolute Spirit, the interconnections are seen, on Hegel's view, as necessary. It all depends on the position from which one proposes to deal with these questions, from which side of a transition one proposes to judge it. Similarly, Hegel's famous image of the Owl of Minerva in the Philosophy of Right is to say that, in the interpretation of history, the philosopher can only interpret and understand the course of events after they have already taken their course.

One can judge the necessity of a dialectical development only from the point of view of its conclusion. In the last instance, one can judge the necessity of the world and its movement only from God's point of view. So far e.g. Kierkegaard is right: God can see the systematic character of things. For Hegel, however, this

does not imply that we cannot see it. There is in principle no logical connection between the statement that God understands something and the statement that we cannot understand it. Other considerations would need to be added in order to justify putting a "therefore" between these two statements, e.g. that our thinking is historically conditioned (to which Hegel would agree) and God's is not (to which Hegel would not agree).

That Hegel had the notion of Absolute Spirit in mind throughout the Logic and certainly at its end is evident from the fact that (1) he spends very little space and effort in trying to define the Absolute Idea there and (2) the definition of Spirit and Subject as reflection of self, becoming oneself through the other and the like not only recurs repeatedly but is a foundation of his dialectic in general. The notion of Spirit is expressed implicitly in the Logic, although it does not have its proper place in that part of the system.

With the introduction of Spirit, the word "absolute" explicitly takes on a meaning which allows of movement and relatedness. With Schelling, the problem as to the nature of the Absolute had become that of a dilemma: either conceive the Absolute as pure identity, in which case it is equivalent to nothingness, or conceive it dialectically, in which case its absoluteness becomes doubtful. Hegel wishes to affirm the dialectical character

of Spirit, but with it also its absoluteness. When reality is explained as a dialectical process of Spirit (thus, dialectical idealism), Spirit is both the result of the process and the process itself, both the become and the becoming reconciliation of the in-itself and the other-than-itself. The absoluteness of Spirit is to be found in this conjunction of a present and achieved unity and a unity in the making. This is a way of stating the two-fold character of Absolute Spirit, viz. that it be in itself (substance) and for itself (subject). This is also the way in which Hegel seeks to overcome the debacle of Schelling. Spirit is the final term of the process, it becomes itself through that process and is itself that process. This whole complicated texture of meaning which is Spirit, is contained in Guzzoni's happy formulation, Werden-zu-sich. The self-identity (sich) is maintained as an essential aspect or moment in the process of becoming (werden) to itself. Some important conclusions may be drawn from this notion regarding the nature of the self, whether one is speaking of Spirit or finite human self-consciousness and we shall draw them presently as part of the general conclusions coming out of this paper.

This notion of the concurrent, co-eternal, essential, inseparable self-sameness and becoming of Absolute Spirit is the central one in Heidegger's Hegel-interpretation as well. It is in fact this point from which Heidegger

proceeds in order to uncover the underlying ontological intention of Hegel's philosophy. The world, and essential thought about the world, is the perousia of Being, according to Heidegger, but to that must be added that Being transcends the world (since it transcends being) and yet is that perousia. This is the point of contact at which the highest terms of Heidegger and Hegel come together. That both Hegel and Heidegger insist on this double aspect of Being and Absolute Spirit is a most remarkable fact. And it is also a most curious fact that it has not been brought out in the secondary literature. This may be due, however, to the fact that so little has as yet been done by way of a systematic comparison between them. It is also in terms of this double aspect that both Hegel and Heidegger make their claims to having effected a break-through in philosophical thinking. And in both cases it is primarily the attempt to give expression to this insight which led them into their laborious terminologies. In the case of Hegel, the basic scheme is that of being-in-itself, for-itself, other-than-itself, and reconciliation. In the case of Heidegger, the basic conceptual scheme is that of being, Being, concealment, and perousia. These schemata almost cover each other. Further, and again most remarkably, Heidegger holds that the Truth of being is Being and the Truth of Being is its perousia in being. Very similarly, Hegel holds that

the Truth of the finite is the concrete infinite, in the last instance Absolute Spirit, and the Truth of the infinite is the reconcilisation of the finite into, with, through itself. Even the prepositions, so important to metaphysicians, are much the same.

While the prepositions coincide not only verbally, but also in the significations attributed to them, the same cannot, however, be said about the verbs. And this fact shows up some basic differences between the two thinkers. If we consider the verb "to negate" or its corresponding substantive "negation", we find that it occurs in Heidegger, if at all, only in a very limited sense and not at all with the broad, sweeping meaning it has for Hegel. In Hegel it is, of course, a crucial concept for dialectical thought. In Heidegger it does not have the positive, creative function it has in Hegel. For Hegel the negation of the negation is the true position.¹¹⁶ One might construe a role for negation in the philosophy of Heidegger in terms of the fallenness of Dasein and the corresponding hiddenness of Being. But in this context negation has only a negative role. The negation does not generate its own negation as in Hegel. This matter may be put by saying that, though Heidegger's basic scheme (being, Being, concealment, perousie) looks dialectical in comparison with Hegel's basic scheme, it is fundamentally not. The moment of negation is lacking.

It would be terribly tempting to build it into the Heideggerian scheme, since the foundations for it are already given in the scheme. One would then say that Being comes to its perousia, i.e. to itself, through and in terms of the hiddenness, estrangement of it. Strictly from the point of view of ontology, this is a tempting possibility, and it may be interesting to ask if Heidegger himself might not now be willing to admit of it. Beyond the strictly philosophical considerations, this possibility has theological implications, which drive us down into the groundwork of Christian doctrine, as we shall see.

IV. CONCLUSIONS

1. Continuities and Discontinuities

We have reached the point where those conclusions, which have been reached as to continuities and discontinuities in the ontologies of Hegel and Heidegger, may be set down. The general topic of the paper is, as the title says, "the concept of Being in Hegel and Heidegger". Since the topic itself might raise eye-brows among contemporary philosophers and theologians, it was desirable to begin with a justification of its very possibility. Two questions presented themselves at the outset: (1) How may Hegel and Heidegger be compared at all? (2) Is "Being" a visible concept at all? In answer to these questions, a number of suggestions were made by way of introduction and a wide range of secondary literature was brought into view. Moving on to the Hegelian and Heideggerian materials, we found that Hegel begins with the concept of Being in the Logic, the Phenomenology, and the Encyclopedia. The problem of making a beginning in ontology thus presented itself, a problem to which Heidegger also addressed himself. For both of them, the beginning is Being and, for both of them, Being is in the beginning conceived as immediate. On the other hand, they could not be farther removed from each other as to the content

they assign to immediate Being. For Heidegger it is an original plenitude directly apprehended. For Hegel it is an empty thought. By way of Heidegger, the problem became an historical one, leading back to the pre-Socratics, as indeed it did in Hegel, i.e. to Parmenides. Their respective attitudes towards the history of ontology was found to be intimately connected with the logical problem of Being as beginning. Their differences with respect to the latter were repeated in the former. The original insight of the pre-Socratics (so Heidegger) was regarded as the primordial insight into the fullness of Being, an insight which has since been forgotten. Thus, a return to that insight was called for. For Hegel, on the other hand, the course of history was regarded as a progressive development just as was the logical dialectic. Happily Heidegger has addressed himself to the view represented by Hegel and has set forth arguments in refutation of it, i.e. the phenomenological and the etymological. Heidegger's arguments, as well as those of Hegel, were found to depend on presuppositions which tend to reduce their force. Therefore, when we wish to take a position as to this question of the content of Being as immediately thought (Hegel) or apprehended (Heidegger), we must make a decision as to these presuppositions. The arguments simply are not compelling, though a decision is, I suggest, unavoidable for reflective thinking.

Having raised the question of the original or immediate conception of Being, the problem arises how determinate being can issue from it. This is the traditional problem of "saving the appearances," (as in Platonism), the categories of substantial being (as in Aristotelianism), the deduction of finite, determinate "somethings" (as in Hegelianism), or the ontological constitution of things present-at-hand (as in Heidegger). It was found again in this connection that the differences between Hegel and Heidegger outweigh the similarities. First, Heidegger regards Hegel's concept of Dasein as a prime instance of presence-at-hand and therewith of the forgottenness of Being. Heidegger is here clearly right. But this is as Hegel intended it. Under Dasein, in Hegel's use of the term, a thing is regarded as a positivity, but a positivity which it cannot remain. With its sublation to positive infinity, it enters into internal relations with other things and finds its truth in the whole. Nevertheless, this Hegelian logical movement is for Heidegger spurious. For Heidegger, the internal relations of things are seen by a direct intuition. Thus, the negativity of the present-at-hand is, for Heidegger, not one which bears fruit, as a negativity does in Hegel. It must be destroyed. The same argumentation occurs in connection with Heidegger's concept of Dasein, the Hegelian correlary of which is self-consciousness. On one level, Hegel and Heidegger

seem to agree: the self is itself only with (Heidegger) or through (Hegel) the other. The self is not a monad. On the other hand, being-with carries with it the danger of falling into the "they" (Heidegger) or remaining other-than-itself (Hegel). In both cases, the self has not become itself. That negation is, for Heidegger, a temptation to be avoided, an inauthenticity to be shunned, while it is for Hegel a necessary movement in the self-realization of oneself. The difference as to the function of negativity lies at the foundation of their differences in ontological methodologies. If inauthenticity is an absolute negativity, without positive function, ontology will have to proceed by way of a Heideggerian reduction. If negation has a positive function, ontological thinking will proceed by progressive sublations. Despite these differences, both Hegel and Heidegger are in this connection speaking of the same phenomenon: a person's being not himself. How should we account for this phenomenon? Both recognize the phenomenon. Both call for a return of the self to itself. The difference lies in their interpretation of it. To put the same point somewhat figuratively, one might say that in Hegel the death of the spirit is a condition for its resurrection, the Golgotha of the soul a condition for its redemption.

The same movement occurs in Being (Heidegger) and in Absolute Spirit (Hegel), i.e., in their interpretations of their final terms. And the same considerations are

again applied. In Heidegger's conception of Being, so far as it can be made out, Being is at once a transcendence and a parousia. The parousia is not a secondary event following after transcendent Being. It is that Being. In Hegel's conception of Spirit, it is at once the in-itself (transcendence) and the for-itself (immanence). The two aspects together constitute the Being of Absolute Spirit. And again, the negation involved in immanence (becoming other than itself) is a necessary moment for Hegel in Spirit's coming to itself. This is not the case in Heidegger. The parousia saves the world from its objectivity, from its alienated character, and brings it back to its inner being-ness, although its objectivity is not a necessary moment in that return to itself. Who has the better case? By what criteria can this question be decided? How are these criteria in turn to be evaluated? Hegel's view stands or falls on the validity of the dialectic. If the dialectic is assumed as philosophical method and as real process, Hegel's view of negation is, of course, inescapable. If phenomenology is assumed as a reduction to primordial insight and indeed an epiphany of Being, Heidegger's view of negativity is inescapable. Are the two approaches mutually exclusive?

The fact that we are able to ask these questions in this form is already a considerable step forward in the understanding of Hegel and Heidegger and of the

ontological problematic in general. Moreover, we are not faced with a simple either-or. It is not a choice between either Hegel or Heidegger altogether. The continuities we have found between them are impressive enough to avoid such a dichotomy. The general philosophical problem of making a decision between opposing views arises here only in regard to their differences, in this case that of the role of negation. C.I. Lewis once said that philosophical argument rests on persuasion rather than proof. This does not mean, however, that we are here left with wilful choice. Some considerations may be proposed for and against the one view of the other. To some of these we now turn.

2. The Interpretation of Hegel

It seems almost a scandal in the philosophy of Hegel that the concept of Being is first given such short shrift and is subsequently introduced surreptitiously again. Heidegger finds in this a "Zuspitzung der Seinsvergessenheit", while Prof. Klaus Hartmann finds Hegel's depreciation of Being perfectly legitimate on the ground that Hegel is not and should not be engaged in ontology. In any case, it would be a mistake in the interpretation of Hegel to regard his own exposition of the doctrine of Being as his final doctrine of Being. On the basis of his own texts, one must draw the conclusion that he has several doctrines of Being, though only one

of them is given an extended treatment. For the rest, one has to rely on incidental statements along the way. This procedure may be explained by the fact that he lived and thought in the historical context of the post-Kentians, who, with Kent himself, sought to replace ontology (which meant Wolff's ontology to them) with the so-called transcendental philosophy. For the latter it was the task of philosophy to deduce the categories of human knowledge. Consequently we find Hegel laboriously trying to complete a deduction of categories, an enterprise which Heidegger regards as an ill advised logicism and a forgetting of Being.

The second main source of Hegel's thought is neo-Platonism. There again we find a depreciation of Being in favor of the concept of unity. The undifferentiated concept of unity in neo-Platonism is now tempered by the dialectic and a "concrete," becoming unity takes its place.

In these ways we can understand Hegel's hesitations with the concept of Being. Yet, this sort of an interpretation of Hegel is clearly one-sided. His own repeated, though apparently incidental statements about "fulfilled being" and the like are striking and conspicuous enough to call for closer attention. Heidegger has attempted to pay attention to them and, in fact, took on the task of giving an ontological interpretation of Kent himself, who was the source of subsequent anti-ontological predelections.

From Heidegger's attempts a rich literature of ontological Kant and Hegel interpretation flowed and this revisionary movement seems still to be in full force.

It is of crucial importance, however, to be clear about this: the interpretations of Heidegger and his followers are hermeneutic ones and for such interpretation the textual and historical materials are of secondary importance. Thus, when we seek to go beyond Hegel's doctrine of Being in order to find his underlying ontology, we are doing some violence to the texts. The texts remain a measure, but the ontological questions we ask of them determine the weight given to the passages in the texts, depending on the extent to which these passages answer the questions. That such a procedure has been used in this paper is clear. It was therefore essential to begin with a lengthy introduction in which the questions were asked and the criteria of relevancy set forth. It is not an arbitrary procedure however. In this way it is possible to bring out aspects of a man's thinking which might not otherwise have been brought out and of which he might not have been fully aware.

3. The Interpretation of Heidegger

Beginning with great bravado and self-confidence, Heidegger proposed in Being and Time to sound out the nature of Being. But the promise was not fulfilled. Speaking of the later works of Heidegger J.M. Robinson says:

But it was less clear exactly what he really meant with this term 'being'. The following publications and lectures, which came one behind the other, each more extraordinary than the preceding, did not give any directly illuminating information, but increased the odd helplessness in which the scholarly world found itself with regard to Heidegger.

In Being and Time Heidegger had not found the indefinability of Being an obstacle to an exposition of its "meaning".

Why was he not able to carry out the project? The answer is not to be found in his biography, as if e.g. his interests had changed, he did not find the time and the like. By his own admission, he was always concerned with the same problem. But his subsequent writings seem to exhibit a growing feeling of conceptual powerlessness in the face of this problem, as if he were constantly coming head-on against a wall of aporiae. Three considerations are relevant here:

(1) Heidegger proceeds in every post-Being and Time work in a provisional way, as if he still had a coming magnum opus in mind. Being and Time is now often considered his magnum opus and the subsequent writings either as appendages or, on the contrary, as repudiations of it. The more convincing view, which accords also with Heidegger's own self-evaluation, is that the subsequent writings constitute various probes in the direction set by Being and Time, none of which are conclusive or exhaustive, but each of which is meant to throw light on an aspect of Being: Dasein-analysis, hermeneutics of

past writings, analysis of language, the essence of thinking, reflection on the thingliness of things, on historicity, on truth. In each case, the purpose to be attained is to achieve a certain attitude of openness to the advent of Being in ourselves.

(2) Consequently, the attempt to give a conceptual exposition of Being has been given up and has given way to an attentive waiting for its epiphany, advent, parousia. The proper receptive attitude is to be gained by a concerned dwelling with things in the world. The apprehension of Being remains therefore always on the way and in the making (unterwegs).

(3) Substantively, something can nevertheless be made out as to Heidegger's conception of Being. The basic concept is presence (Anwesen, parousia). This concept contains within it, one could say, all of the complex and obscure terms and phrases: Sein des Seienden, Wahrheit des Seins, Sinn von Sein, Verstehen, Geschicklichkeit, Erschlossenheit, Eigentlichkeit, Gelesenheit, Dasein, Wiederholung, Zeitlichkeit, Sorge, etc. If one can comprehend all of these into one concept, one will have gone very far towards understanding Being.

Heidegger's terms lend themselves very often to a translation into Hegelian terms. Sometimes, and inevitably, he uses terms which Hegel had already used. A conspicuous example is the preposition "bei". "Being-with" is a

translation of "Mitsein", and it includes in its meaning "bei-sein", which has incorrectly been translated "being-alongside". "Bei-sich-selbst-sein" is a crucial Hegelian term without which no dialectic could occur. Indeed, the Phenomenology concludes with this its highest concept, which is nothing less than absolute knowledge.

It is therefore tempting to render Heidegger in Hegelian terms. That this has in several instances been done in this paper is clear. But if this is even a possibility, one might wonder what becomes of Heidegger's claim that he has overcome, dismantled, indeed destroyed the history of ontology, of which Hegel was to have been the culmination. One might in fact reverse the procedure and interpret Heidegger hermeneutically in terms of Hegel. This might lead to disastrous consequences for Heidegger's interpretation of the history of philosophy. But why not reverse the order of interpretation? It lies close enough at hand, and it would really be a matter of following Heidegger's own procedure, though without the historical-philosophical trappings of the theory of destruction, dissimulation, and retrieve.

The temptation to render Heidegger in Hegelian terms, and its real possibility, also throws doubt on Heidegger's call for a new ontological language. If the notions of Heidegger can to a great extent be expressed in Hegelian terms, then one might wonder why all the fuss (to use

Hegel's expression) should be made about a new language to express what is supposed not to be expressible in traditional language. Moreover, Heidegger's language is obscure to such an extent that he could conceivably write down any combination of familiar and newly invented words and pass it off as profound insight. Scholars would not doubt agonize over it for years. One might suspect that the dialogue, Gelesenheit, could have been made public in this way, perhaps by someone other than Heidegger. At least there are some limits of intelligibility and structural rules to the language of Hegel.

3. The Self as the Paradigm of Being

Arthur Schopenhauer once said that in metaphysical thinking one should begin with what is most familiar. And what is most familiar to a person is his own self. Schopenhauer intended to put forth a proposal which, he thought, metaphysicians would do well to follow, but he was in fact giving a description of the way in which idealist philosophers had proceeded all along. The Ich-philosophy of Fichte is a prime example. For Kant, the "I think," which is to accompany all experience and bring unity of apperception to it, set the stage for the subsequent idealist constructions. We find now that both Hegel and Heidegger are deeply embedded in this tradition.

It is a remarkable fact, that both idealism and existentialism seek to answer philosophical questions in terms of the mode of Being the self is.¹ In Heidegger, especially in Being and Time, the worldhood of the world and Being itself are to be seen from the viewpoint of the mode of Being which is signified by Dasein. Dasein-analysis is offered as the key to the understanding of Being. It is perhaps on this ground that Heidegger is often classed with the "existentialists". Yet, Dasein is not Being. It is a mode of Being which some beings have. Heidegger's question is always: what sort of beings must we be in order to be able to ask the question of Being? The answer is that it is Dasein, and Dasein is constituted by the asking of the question of Being. And this concern for Being, which constitutes our own mode of Being, makes us the "shepherds" of Being. The relation between Dasein and Being can be seen either from the side of Dasein or from the side of Being. On the side of Dasein, we can know, according to Heidegger, that we, as beings having Dasein as our mode of Being, "house" and "dwell in" Being. Seen from the side of Being, Dasein is its advent, its coming to presence. There is no break between, say, Heidegger I and II in this regard. One might say that in Heidegger I, Being was seen from the side of Dasein and in Heidegger II, Dasein was seen from the side of Being. But if this is the "turn" from Heidegger I to Heidegger II then it was anticipated in Being and Time.

Heidegger does not, of course, see the self as a "subject" distinct from an "object". Thus, the word, "self," may be inappropriate in this connection. It is clear, however, that his "existential reductions," as we have called them, refer all experience and "reality" back to the Being of Dasein, to the mode of Being which that being has, who experiences and thinks. We have raised the question, if this is not a kind of idealism. It is not an idealism, if idealism means the reduction of objective reality to subjective experience. But if this is what idealism means, then neither is Hegel an idealist.

It becomes even clearer that the self is a certain paradigm of Being, when we consider his basic scheme: Being, being, concealment or absence, parousia. The same movement occurs also in Dasein: concerned involvement in the world, shepherd of Being, estrangement in the "they," reappropriation of one's Dasein in Care, through conscience, as freedom towards death. In Hegel the paradigm is even more clearly evident. His scheme of Absolute Spirit (in-itself, for-itself, other-than-itself, reconciliation) is exactly duplicated in the case of human consciousness. The self seeks to be independent (in-itself) but cannot do so. It seeks to find itself in the other, but is thereby alienated from itself. The reconciliation takes place when the self sees itself and the other as participants in the life of Spirit in-and-for-itself.

Unlike Heidegger, Hegel has worked out a metaphysical system in which this paradigmatic relation becomes intelligible. While Heidegger holds that man is characterized by *Dasein*, Hegel holds that man is characterized by his spirituality (Geistigkeit). Man is subjective spirit, society is objective spirit, and the unity of both (which transcends both) is Absolute Spirit. As subjective spirit, man seeks to transcend his subjectivity by objectivating himself by his own creations, e.g. the products of his work. Man exhibits his spiritual nature by forming materials according to his plan, his intention, his ideas. The object is then no longer an alien object, ~~it~~ is (an objectivation of) himself. And it is in this way that man becomes aware that he is conscious, that he is a spiritual being.

The similarity between Hegel's account of work and Heidegger's account of the worker in his work-shop is striking. Hegel goes on, however, to build a speculative system out of this actually very mundane observation of man's coming to consciousness. As in the case of the man, who has not yet come to a consciousness of his own humanity, i.e. of his spirituality, through his creative activity, so also God, before the creation of a finite world, lacks a corresponding consciousness of his own divinity. For this reason, God must objectivate himself in creation. Out of the divine dynamic resulting from this process,

man can develop as a being who spiritualizes himself through his creativity, exactly in the same way as God has become conscious of himself through his creation. Man can thus see God as through a mirror, through himself. Hegel draws the conclusion, that the work of the philosopher is the authentic and essential creative work for man, since it is through philosophy that one can understand these relationships. Only in philosophy does a man consciously carry out the spiritualizing of himself and thus, not only see the imago dei, but carry it out.

4. Theological Implications

As part of the initial justification of the project here carried out, we have referred to its importance for theology. We there pointed to the essential role which the concept of Being must play in the attempt to conceive of God. It was said, further, that it would be a mistake to rule out a priori any philosophical attempt to conceive of God, no matter to what degree one wishes to emphasize God's transcendence or the finitude of the human intellect. In this connection, the concept of Being is a welcome aid. A confrontation with Being is for us inevitable (Heidegger) and a certain pre-understanding of it is given to us by nature in any case (both Heidegger and Hegel, though the latter does not always want to call it "Being"), a certain awareness of the imago dei independent of special revelation.

The account of Being in Heidegger and the account of Spirit in Hegel involve certain clusters of ideas having a direct bearing on the concerns of theology. The most directly relevant of these are the unitary and trinitarian nature of God, transcendence and immanence, creation, incarnation, general revelation, and the concept of the soul.

(1) The trinitarian character of God (and of all Being) is, according to Hegel, a dialectical unity of transcendence (Ansichsein) and immanence (Aussersichsein). This unity is an achievement, a successful sublation of both terms, which always remains in the process of becoming. Transcendence alone is empty; immanence alone is an estrangement; the coming to unity of both is the life of God himself as Spirit.²

The concept of perousis in Heidegger also unites the transcendence of Being (over beings) and the immanence of Being (in beings). Being as transcendence alone and apart from the coming to presence in beings would be another ~~another~~ being among others, and this is absurd. Likewise, the beings considered apart from Being would be reduced to the inauthenticity of objects present-at-hand. As in Hegel, so also in Heidegger are transcendence and immanence necessary moments of each other.

Parallel doctrines in Tillich³ and Whitehead⁴ immediately come to mind. This dialectical notion of God may be proposed as a welcome corrective to doctrines

of the unqualified transcendence of God and, what follows from it, the capriciousness of God in creation and incarnation. But problems arise immediately also for this notion.

(2) On this understanding of Being, divine creation becomes a necessary movement of God in his own coming to be himself. Admittedly, Hegel seems to have run into difficulties at this point, as we have seen in connection with Bruno Puntel's Hegel-commentary. The idea of God's freedom remains a problem for this doctrine of creation.

(3) The same scheme may be applied to the doctrine of the incarnation. And the same difficulty arises: Is the incarnation a free act of God or a necessary constituent in his own Being? This same question arises whether we employ the Hegelian dialectic or the Heideggerian parousia in the interpretation of the incarnation. In both cases the freedom of God is compromised and finitude is placed within the Being of God as a necessary aspect. It is, however, not far removed from traditional doctrines to the effect that God's freedom consists in acting according to his own nature. On the other hand, it seems equally impossible to let transcendence stand alone and thereby to reaffirm the "dead God of theism". Though the latter would allow of God's unconditioned freedom, it would be an unsatisfactory freedom indeed: a freedom against which a free man would need to rebel, if only to maintain his own freedom (Hegel, Nietzsche, Sartre,

Camus). As in the case of the word "absolute", it may be desirable and necessary to redefine the concept of freedom so as to include necessity (Hegel).

(4) Faith in the occurrence of a special divine revelation lies beyond the competence of theoretical reason, but the notion of general revelation is susceptible of interpretation along the lines of Heideggerian as well as Hegelian thought. In Heidegger, the coming to presence of Being lets beings be, and the letting beings be themselves allows us to experience Being in them. Replace "Being" with "God" and we have a natural theology by which God is revealed in all that is, a revelation which is available to all men, though they might (by their own Verschlossenheit) not be able to see it.

In Hegel, the revelation of God in all that is requires, on the part of men, an ability to view things from the point of view of the whole (which is the "truth"). A thing viewed in abstraction from the whole becomes a "something" (etwas) and as such does not reveal the Spirit in it. Likewise in Heidegger, a thing viewed apart from its ownmost being-ness does not disclose the Being it has in-and-as itself: it is simply vorhanden. Insofar as men can come to himself (zu sich kommen, sich selbst werden) is he in a position to participate in the coming to be itself of Spirit in all that is.

(5) Some Christian doctrine has been heavily influenced by the Cartesian doctrine of spiritual substance.

One might say that popular Christianity generally holds that the soul is a thing, a ghost residing in a corporeal abode, though it is not a material thing. Both Hegel and Heidegger provide a welcome corrective to this sort of "vulgar" conception of the soul. The Hegelian conception may be set forth by means of the following thought-experiment:

1. I exist.
2. I am aware that I exist.
3. I am aware that I am aware that I exist.
4. I am aware that I am aware that I am aware that I exist.
5. Etc.

If this is an infinite regress, where is the soul to be located? For Hegel, the soul is the act of reflection (die Reflexion) itself, by which I move out of myself to reflect (through the other) upon myself. The first person singular is here not regarded as a substantial thing which carries out this act of reflection. The soul is that act of reflection itself. Immortality then consists of the unity of participation with the universal act of reflection which is the absolute Spirit.

In Heidegger, the notion of self is equally clearly not a substance which, by the way, carries out acts of reflection. The self of *Dasein* is that it is ontological, which is to say that it reflects upon its own Being and is that reflection. The Being of the self is the reflection. To carry this conception a bit further: the self is the reflection upon its Being. But the

possessive pronoun "its" means nothing more than the act of reflection. It is the reflection upon the reflection upon the reflection, etc. It is clearly for this reason that Heidegger prefers to speak of the self as *Dasein*, rather than as something which is de. And it is also clearly for this reason that Heidegger thinks of *Dasein* as the authentic disclosure of Being: *Dasein* is a reflection upon Being. The problem therefore does not really arise, whether thinking about *Dasein* is at the same time a thinking about Being, i.e. whether a conceptual leap is being carried out from reflection about *Dasein* to reflection about Being. The problem does not arise because *Dasein* is the reflection upon Being, since the reflection upon *Dasein* is the reflection upon the reflection upon Being.

The consequences which we have drawn for theological doctrine from these Hegelian and Heideggerian notions show, perhaps more than anything else, how close Hegel and Heidegger stand to each other. It would seem then, that for Christian theology it is important to avoid drawing the lines too sharply between Hegel and Heidegger and rather to see the common ground and to draw inspiration and stimulation from it.

NOTES

1. Heidegger to Frings: "Denn diese Frage ist es--und sie allein--die meinen Denkweg und seine Grenzen bestimmt." Manfred S. Frings, ed., Heidegger and the Quest for Truth. (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1968) p. 19.
2. Martin Heidegger, Sein und Zeit. (Tübingen: Niemeyer Verlag, 1967) p. 2 & passim. Also e.g. Identity and Difference. (New York: Harper & Row, 1969) p. 51.
3. Martin Heidegger, An Introduction to Metaphysics. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1959) Tr. by Ralph Manheim, p. 84.
4. Cf. e.g., Paul Tillich, Perspectives on 19th and 20th Century Protestant Theology. (London: SCM Press, 1967) pp. 244-5; Jean Paul Sartre, Existentialism as a Humanism. (New York: Philosophical Library, 1947); Etienne Gilson, Being and Some Philosophers. (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Medieval Studies, 1949) p. 140.
5. Martin Heidegger, Brief über den Humanismus. (Frankfurt: Klostermann, 1947) p. 17.
6. James Collins, The Existentialists. (Chicago: Henry Regnery, 1963); Werner Marx, Heidegger and the Tradition. (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1971); William J. Richardson, Heidegger: Through Phenomenology to Thought. (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1963); Thomas Langan, The Meaning of Heidegger. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1959).
7. Hans-Georg Gadamer, "Hegel und Heidegger," Hegels Dialektik. (Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr, 1971); Jan van der Meulen, Heidegger und Hegel oder Widerstreit und Widerspruch. (Meisenheim: Verlag Anton Hein, 1959).
8. Gadamer, op. cit., p. 90.
9. Cf. primarily Being and Time. Tr. John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson. (New York: Harper & Row, 1962) pp. 22-23, 480-486; Einführung in die Metaphysik. (Tübingen: Max Niemeyer Verlag, 1958) pp. 57-70;

Holzwege (Frankfurt: Klostermann, 1963) pp. 105-192;
Hegel's Concept of Experience, Tr. from Holzwege by
 K.R. Dove, (Evanston: Harper & Row, 1970); "Hegel und
 die Griechen," Die Gegenwart der Griechen im neueren
Denken. (Tübingen: Max Niemeyer Verlag, 1960) pp. 43-57.

10. Op. cit., Chapter II, III, and Being and Time, ed. cit.,
 p. 241f.
11. Op. cit., pp. 480-486.
12. Ibid., pp. 172ff.
13. Op. cit., pp. 47ff.
14. G.W.F. Hegel, The Science of Logic. Tr. A.V. Miller.
 (London: Allen & Unwin, 1969) p. 389.
15. Op. cit., pp. 30, 38, 49, 66, 69, 82.
16. Loc. cit.
17. This is Werner Marx's word (op. cit., passim).
18. Cf. John E. Smith, "Being, Immediacy, and Articulation,"
Review of Metaphysics. (Vol. 24, No. 4, June 1971)
 p. 595.
19. Being and Time (op. cit.) p. 22-24;
20. Op. cit.
21. Op. cit.
22. Frederick G. Weiss, Beyond Epistemology: Hegel's
Theory of Knowledge. (to be published by Cambridge
 University Press).
23. Op. cit., pp. 331-360.
24. Op. cit., pp. 43-71, 77-82, 168f.
25. Klaus Hertmann, Grundzüge der Ontologie Sartres in
ihrem Verhältnis zu Hegels Logik. (Berlin: W. de
 Gruyter, 1963).
26. Gadamer, op. cit., p. 83.
27. Being and Time, (ed. cit.) p. 22.
28. G.W.F. Hegel, The Phenomenology of Mind. Tr. J.B.
 Baillie. (New York: Macmillan, 1955) p.

29. Science of Logic (loc. cit.); also cf. The Logic of Hegel translated by William Wallace from The Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences. (Oxford: the Clarendon Press, 1892) p. 208.
30. Cf. also Lectures in the History of Philosophy, Gesammelte Werke, Jubiläumsausgabe, Hermann Glockner, ed. (Stuttgart: Frommans Verlag, 1949-1961) Vol. 18, pp. 161f, 298f, 318f; Vol. 17, pp. 296f.
31. Lengen, op. cit., pp. 177-8.
32. Collins, op. cit., Part VI.
33. Gilson, op. cit., pp. 132-153.
34. Klaus Hartmann, "Das Realitätsproblem," Kantstudien (Ergänzungsheft) Fall 1962.
35. Herbert Marcuse, Reason and Revolution, Hegel and the Rise of Social Theory. (Boston: Beacon Press, 1960) pp. vii, x.
36. Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences quoted by Gilson, op. cit., p. 136.
37. Ibid., p. 140.
38. Kierkegaard's Journals quoted by John Wild, The Challenge of Existentialism. (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1966) p. 31.
39. Marx's The German Ideology quoted by Marcuse, op. cit., p. 320.
40. Schellings Werke, Manfred Schroter, ed., Ergänzungsband VI, pp. 61f, 242-3; Hauptband VI, pp. 732-736.
41. Constantin Frantz, Schellings Positive Philosophie. (Darmstadt: Scientia Verlag, 1968) Part III, p. 176.
42. Schellings Werke, op. cit., Ergänzungsband VI, p. 61. "Die Wirklichkeit des Wirklichen".
43. K. Hartmann, "Das Realitätsproblem," op. cit.
44. Lectures in Munich and in Berlin (1841) which Kierkegaard reportedly heard and of which Schelling reports that "the tension (among his distinguished listeners) is unbelievable." Cf. Karl Löwith, From Hegel to Nietzsche. Tr. David Green. (New York: Doubleday, 1967) p. 117.

45. Ibid., p. 116.
46. Tillich, op. cit., pp. 244-5.
47. William A. Luijpen, Existential Phenomenology (Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 1969) p. 32.
48. Werner Marx, op. cit., p. xviii.
49. Quoted by Michael J. Buckley, Motion and Motion's God. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1971) p. 262.
50. Richardson, op. cit., p. 356.
51. Hegel's Concept of Experience, op. cit., pp. 30-31.
52. The Logic of Hegel from the Encyclopedia of Philosophical Sciences. Tr. William Wallace. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1892) pp. 91-94f.
53. Richardson, op. cit., p. 356.
54. M. Heidegger, "The Onto-Theo-Logical Constitution of Metaphysics," in Identity and Difference (and other essays). Tr. Joan Stambaugh. (Evanston: Harper & Row, 1969) pp. 46ff.
55. In their translation of Werner Marx, op. cit., e.g. p. 173.
56. In Hegel's original, the statement reads: "Denn die Methode ist nichts anderes als der Bau des Ganzen in seiner reinen Wesenheit aufgestellt." Phänomenologie des Geistes (ed. cit.) p. 40. The above rendition is von der Meulen's.
57. Phenomenology is a method which "lets that which shows itself be seen from itself in the way in which it shows itself from itself." Being and Time, ed. cit., p. 58.
58. Meulen, op. cit., p. 26.
59. Encyclopedis, ed. cit., e.g. p. 92 & passim.
60. Das Realitätsproblem, ed. cit.
61. Gadamer, op. cit., pp. 92-93.
62. Gilson, op. cit., p. 211: "We rather forget that what is at stake is neither existence nor essence, but Being, which is both." Also cf. Joseph Bobik, Aquinas on Being and Essence, A Translation and Interpretation. (Notre Dame: University Press, 1965) p. 69.

63. One possible reason why Gilson does not mention Heidegger may be that he regards Heidegger as not properly engaged in ontology, since, at least in Being and Time and the Letter on Humanism, the quest for Being turns into a phenomenology of Dasein.
64. Skip.
65. Joseph P. Fell, "Heidegger's Notion of Two Beginnings," Review of Metaphysics, (Vol. XXV, No. 2, December 1971); Hans-Georg Gadamer, Wahrheit und Methode. (Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr, 1965) p. 242; Also cf. Martin Heidegger, Nietzsche, Vol. I. (Pfullingen: Neske, 1961) pp. 25-28, Vol. II, pp. 399f, 455 ff.
66. Probably the most thorough defense of Heidegger against positivist and post-positivist criticism (Carnap, Ayer, Russell) is given by George R. Vick, "Heidegger's Linguistic Rehabilitation of Parmenides' 'Being'", American Philosophical Quarterly. (Vol. 8, No. 2, April 1971.)
67. E.g. Willard Quine, From a Logical Point of View. (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1961).
68. Being and Time, ed. cit., p. 31.
69. Ibid., p. 19.
70. Rudolph Schmitt, Martin Heidegger on Being Human, An Introduction to Sein und Zeit. (New York: Random House, 1969) p. 4.
71. Being and Time, ed. cit., p. 25.
72. Heidegger's paraphrase of Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica II, Q. 94, art. 2. in Being and Time, p. 22.
73. Introduction to Metaphysics, ed. cit., pp. 77, 82.
74. Being and Time, p. 25.
75. Plato, Meno, 80c, Euthydemus, 276e.
76. Being and Time, pp. 27, 193-4.
77. Phenomenology of Mind, ed. cit., pp. 67, 141. The same point is made in connection with Spinoza in Vorlesungen über die Geschichte der Philosophie, Vol. 19, (ed. cit.) pp. 384f.
78. Skip.

79. Science of Logic, p. 828.
80. Claude Welch, Protestant Thought in the Nineteenth Century, Vol. I. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1972) p. 88.
81. Phenomenology of Mind, p. 85.
82. Being and Some Philosophers, p. 141.
82. Science of Logic, pp. 829, 835, 842.
83. Martin Heidegger, The Question of Being. Tr. William Kluback & Jean T. Wilde. (New York: Twayne Publishers, 1958) p. 33.
84. Being and Time, p. 29.
85. Ibid., p. 26.
86. Ibid., p. 62.
87. Nietzsche I, p. 25.
88. "The Onto-Theo-Logical Nature of Metaphysics," ed. cit., pp. 47, 112-3. The Translation is that of Murray Greene in Werner Marx op. cit., p. 129.
89. Martin Heidegger, Vom Wesen des Grundes. (Frankfurt: Klostermann, 1955) pp. 5, 8. Also cf. Brief über den Humanismus, op. cit., p. 12, and Kent and the Problem of Metaphysics. Tr. J.S. Churchill. (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1962) p. 230.
90. Question of Being, p. 57.
91. Being and Time, p. 17.
92. Ibid., p. 27.
93. Cf pp 17-18 above.
94. St. Thomas Aquinas, Summe Theologica, II, Q. 94, art. 2.
95. Nicolai Hartmann, Zur Grundlegung der Ontologie. (Meisenheim: Anton Hein, 1935) p. 40f.
96. Being and Time, p. 62.
97. Aristotle, Metaphysics. Tr. W.D. Ross, Ed. Richard McKeon. (New York: Random House, 1941) 998b. See also Eric Toms, Being, Negation and Logic. (Oxford: Blackwell, 1962) pp. 20-21.

98. Being and Time, p. 23.
99. Kevin Wall, The Doctrine of Relation in Hegel. (Oakland: Albertus Magnus Press, 1963) pp. 1-2.
100. Phenomenology of Mind, pp. 108-9, 117.
101. Sidney Hook, The Quest for Being. (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1961) p. 147.
102. Parmenides' Proem in Milton C. Nahm, Selections from Early Greek Philosophy. (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1947) p. 115: "Thou canst not recognize not-being (for this is impossible), nor couldst thou speak of it, for thought and being are the same thing." Plato, Sophist, 238b: "Do you see, then, that not-being in itself can neither be spoken, uttered, or thought, but that it is unthinkable, unutterable, unspeakable, indescribable."
103. Vick, op. cit., p. 141.
104. Introduction to Metaphysics, p. 1 & passim.
105. Werke, Ergb. VI, ed. cit., p. 242.
106. Principles of Nature and of Grace, @7. Tr. Robert Latte. (London: Oxford University Press, 1968).
107. E.g., Aristotle, Metaphysics (ed. cit.), Book XII, 6, 1071b.
108. Vick, op. cit., p. 141.
109. E.g. Gabriel Marcel's The Mystery of Being. Tr. Rene Hague. (London: Harvill, 1950) Original title: Etre et Avoir. Also, e.g., B. Spinoza, Ethics. Tr. R.H.M. Elwes. (New York: Dover, 1951) Vol. II of the Chief Works of Benedict Spinoza, Propositions XV, XXIV, XXVIII, XXIX.
110. Introduction to Metaphysics, pp. 27-29; Being and Time, pp. 228ff; "What is Metaphysics?" in Werner Brock, ed., Existence and Being. (Chicago: Henry Regnery, 1949) and in J.L. Jarrett & S.M. McMurrin, eds., Contemporary Philosophy. (New York: Henry Holt, 1954).
111. Smith, op. cit., p. 595.
112. Ibid., p. 597. Plato, Sophist, 247d.
113. Phenomenology of Mind, p. 133:

114. The word 'ontology' is formed from the Greek on and logos. R. Goclenius (Lexicon philosophicum) apparently first coined the term in 1613, though ontological kinds of theorizing were obviously not new in the seventeenth century, but had been carried on under such titles as general metaphysics, first philosophy, or simply metaphysics. The term appears again in Johannes Clauberg (Metaphysica de ente, 1647 & 1656) as "that science which does not deal with this and that being,...but with being in general." After the scholastic Jean-Baptiste Duhamel (De Consensu Veteris et Novae Philosophiae), who also used the term, it was given a standard, accepted meaning by Christian Wolff (Ontologia, 1730) and A.G. Baumgarten (Metaphysica, 1740) which was also accepted by Kent (1765-66 lectures), as the "science dealing with the general properties of things." This general science is divided into three sub-sciences, viz., rational psychology, rational cosmology, and rational theology, whose concepts are presumed to apply directly to objects in so far as they are in themselves, thus applying ontologically (Cf. I. Kent, Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics. (La Salle, Ill.: Open Court, 1945, p. 90). On the history of 'ontology', cf. Johannes Hoffmeister, Wörterbuch der Philosophischen Begriffe (Hamburg: Felix Meiner, 1955); Encyclopaedia of Philosophy (New York: Macmillan, 1967), Vol. 5; New Catholic Encyclopedia (San Francisco: McGraw-Hill, 1967), Vols. 2, 10.
115. Cf. e.g., Schelling: "Erörterung über den Anfang... Verhältniss desselben...zu Spinozes Anfang... Abgelöstsein des Anfangs von dem Ende...Verhältniss der Vernunft zu dem also Anfang Gesetzten...Vortgang vom Anfang und nächste Aufgabe..." etc. Werke, Ergb. VI, (ed. cit.) pp. xiv-xv.
116. Merleau-Ponty speaks of the "living cohesion" and "life-world" and cites Heidegger in this connection. Phenomenology of Perception. Tr. Colin Smith. (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1962) e.g., p. 407.
117. For the word "to-ness" I am indebted to Prof. Kevin Wall, O.P. Also cf. Heidegger's The Question of Being (ed. cit.) p. 75.
118. Martin Heidegger, What is a Thing? Tr. W.B. Barton, Jr., and Vers Deutsch. (Chicago: Henry Regnery, 1967)
119. Hegel, Science of Logic, pp. 109f, 481f, 581f.

120. Gadamer, Hegels Dialektik, ed. cit., pp. 46-7: Im von sich selbst wissen, in der Reflexion auf sich selbst konstituiert sich das Ich als ein Seiendes.
121. Thus, "Understanding of Being is itself a definite characteristic of Dasein's Being," or "The person is no Thinglike and substantial Being." Being and Time, pp. 32, 73. Macquerrie's capitalisation.
122. Heidegger to Richardson, op. cit., p. xvii.
123. Phänomenologie des Geistes. (Hamburg: Felix Meiner, 1952) p. 550, and Baillie's translation (op. cit.) pp. 789-790.
124. F.H. Bradley, Appearance and Reality. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1951) p. 160.
125. Ibid., p. 394.
126. Hegel's Concept of Experience, ed. cit., pp. 30, 38, 49, 66, 69, 82.
127. I am indebted for this point to Professor Kevin Well, who raised it in connection with Bradley's metaphysics during private consultation.
128. Aristotle, Metaphysics, VI, I, 1026a.
129. Ibid., XII, 6, 1071b; VI, 1, 1025b-6a; XI, 7, 1064a-b.
130. Summe Theologicae, I, q. XI, a. 4; q. XIII, a. 11.
131. Exodus 3:14-15; John 13:19, 8:24, 28, 58 etc.
132. Cf. Philip B. Herner, The 'I AM' of the Fourth Gospel. (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1970).
133. Karl Barth, Church Dogmatics, Vol. II, Book I. (Edinburgh: T & T Clark, 1957) Tr. G.T. Thomson, pp. 6, 262.
134. Cf. John R. Williams, "Heidegger and the Theologians," The Heythrop Journal. (Vol. XII, No. 3, July 1971).
135. The Logic of Hegel translated by William Wallace from the Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical Sciences (ed. cit.)
136. Being and Some Philosophers, (ed. cit.) p. 136.
137. Logic from Encyclopaedia, loc. cit.

138. Summe Theologicae, I, q. XIII, s. 11.
139. For Thomas, Being is a relational concept which has as many senses as there are relations between essence and existence, substance and accident, the rational and the real. The Being of God consists of the identification of His essence and existence, while the being of creatures consists of a composition of essence and existence. The Being of God is esse ipsum because His essence is His existence. Having therefore no potentiality in Himself, His Being is actus purus. Cf. Joseph Bobik, Aquinas' On Being and Essence, A Translation and Interpretation. (Notre Dame: University Press, 1965).
140. Michael J. Buckley, Motion and Motion's God. (Princeton: University Press, 1971) pp. 254ff. Also, Gerhard Huber, Das Sein und das Absolute. (Basel: Verlag für Recht und Gesellschaft, 1955) pp. 203f.
141. In each case the word appears with quotation marks and in each case the point is made that "Its (an actual entity's) 'being' is constituted by its 'becoming'." Process and Reality. (New York: Humanities Press, 1955) p. 35.
142. In a conversation at Emory University in December 1960.
143. Charles Hartshorne, Reality as Social Process. (Glencoe, Ill.: The Free Press, 1953) p. 21.
144. Process and Reality, p. 35.
145. John Macquerrie, "Word and Idea," International Journal for Philosophy of Religion. (Vol. I, No. 2, Summer 1970) p. 72. Cf. also Plato, Sophist, 249a, in which the inclusion of becoming into being is entertained at least as an hypothesis: "Under being, then, we must include motion, and that which is moved."
146. John Macquerrie, Principles of Christian Theology. (New York: Scribner's, 1966) p. 101.
147. John E. Smith, "The Reality of God and the Denial of God," The Journal of Religion. (Vol. 51, No. 2, April 1971) p. 92.
148. Paul Tillich, Biblical Religion and the Search for Ultimate Reality. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1960) p. 16.
149. Paul Tillich, Systematic Theology. Vol. I. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1951) p. 247.

150. Tillich, loc. cit.
151. Cf. John Macquerrie, Principles of Christian Theology, ed. cit., pp. 95ff.
152. Ibid., p. 97.
153. Huber, op. cit., p. 4-5.
154. Plato, Republic, VI, 509a.
155. Plato, Sophist, 55a.
156. Macquerrie, Principles of Christian Theology, ed. cit., p. 100.
157. Although the reference is not to Kant, but rather to St. Thomas and to Heidegger, one might recall Kant's differentiation between theoretical and practical reason, where the regulative principles of pure reason become postulates of practical reason. What is not known as real in theoretical reason (the soul, freedom, and immortality) is postulated as real in practical reason.
158. Richard Niehbur, Christ and Culture. (New York: Harper, 1951) p. ii.
159. Smith, "The Reality and the Denial of God," op. cit., p. 95.
160. Martin Heidegger, Phänomenologie und Theologie.. (Frankfurt a.M.: Klostermann, 1970).
161. Brief über den Humanismus, ed. cit., pp. 36-37.
162. Phänomenologie und Theologie, ed. cit., p. 9.
163. Ibid., p. 47. : "Anwesendes braucht nicht Gegenstand zu werden; der Gegenstand braucht nicht als Objekt empirisch wahrgenommen zu werden."
164. E.g., James Collins, op. cit., "Being and God," pp. 204-210; Thomas F. O'Meara, "Tillich and Heidegger: A Structural Relationship," Harvard Theological Review. (Vol. 61, 1968)
165. Nicolai Hartmann, Die Philosophie des Deutschen Idealismus. (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1960) p. 274.
166. Smith, "The Reality of God and the Denial of God," op. cit., p. 92.

167. Although Heidegger's language is not clear in this passage, in the light of his Hegel's Concept of Experience ("Experience is the Being of beings." p. 130) he does mean of. I. Bruno Puntel goes even further: "Das Groze in Hegel's 'Phänomenologie' ist die Suche nach dem Sinn von Sein." Analogie und Geschichtlichkeit, Vol. I. (Freiburg: Herder, 1969) p. 419.

CHAPTER I

1. Compare Puntel, pp. 396-397.
2. Phenomenology of Mind, p. 69.
3. Ibid., p. 68 paraphrased.
4. Science of Logic, pp. 49, 68; Puntel, p. 397.
5. Phänomenologie des Geistes, p. 66. Translated by Beillie as "phenomenal knowledge." Phenomenology of Mind, p. 135.
- 5a. Science of Logic, p. 843.
6. As in W.H. Walsh, Metaphysics. (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, 1963) pp. 133-153, "The Origins of Hegelianism."
7. J.N. Findley, The Philosophy of Hegel. (New York: Collier Books, 1966) p. 154.
8. Science of Logic, p. 73.
9. Ibid., p. 67-8.
10. Puntel, op. cit., p. 371.
11. Hegel's distinction between Verstand and Vernunft has recently raised questions about possibilities of "formalizing" the logic of Vernunft. Howard P. Kainz has given a brief but illuminating and well documented pointer as to the direction in which such an attempt would have to go. "Perhaps the final demonstration that such formalization is 'possible' would require not only the symbolization of Hegel's logic, but also the formulation of congruent rules of inference and sets of provable and interrelated theorems." Cf. "The Future of Hegel Scholarship," American Philosophical Quarterly. (Vol. 8, No. 3, July 1971) p. 220. Kenneth Schmitz, reviewing Darrel Christensen's contribution to the Wofford Symposium: Hegel and the Philosophy of Religion (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1970) puts his finger

on the chief difficulty. Hegel's identification of Method and Notion (which we have already noted) rules out any strict distinction between an apriori formal and an a posteriori material content. A formal symbolization of dialectical logic is in danger of again reducing it to the formalism which Hegel is constantly at pains to overcome, of shifting the dialectic towards Verstand and away from Begriff. (The Owl of Minerva, Vol. 4, No. 2, December 1972, p. 2)

12. Encyclopaedia (op. cit.), e.g., pp. 148-152. Johannes Hoffmeister, Wörterbuch der philosophischen Begriffe. (Hamburg: Felix Meiner, 1955) pp. 644ff.
13. Loc. cit.
14. Encyclopaedia, p. 129.
15. Science of Logic, p. 45.
16. Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, B195-6, B266 and other places where the dependence of empirical knowledge, indeed all knowledge of objects on sensation is stressed.
17. Science of Logic, p. 67.
18. Ibid., pp. 68f.
19. Geschichte der Philosophie in Werke, (ed. cit.) Vol. 19, pp. 384ff. Also cf. Kevin Wall, op. cit., pp. 1-2.
20. Phenomenology, p. 72.
21. Encyclopaedia, p. 126.
22. Ibid., pp. 129-130.
23. Ibid., p. 128.
24. Ibid., p. 130.
25. Loc. cit.
26. Thus, for example, "The essentiality that has advanced to immediacy is, in the first instance, Existence, and an existent of the thing--as an undifferentiated unity of essence with its immediacy. It is true that the thing contains reflection, but its negativity is, in the first instance, extinguished in its immediacy; but because its ground is essentially reflection, its immediacy sublates itself and the thing makes itself into positedness." Science of Logic, p. 479.

27. Ibid., pp. 825 and ff.
28. Ibid., p. 826.
29. Ibid., p. 389.
30. Encyclopedie, p. 155.
31. Science of Logic, p. 71.
32. "Who Thinks Abstractly?" in Walter Kaufmann, ed. & trans., Hegel: Texts and Commentary. (New York: Doubleday, 1966).
33. Jacob Loewenberg, "The Comedy of Immediacy in Hegel's Phenomenology," Mind, Vol. , No. , 1935.
34. From a private discussion with Professor Wall.
35. Hartmann, Die Philosophie des deutschen Idealismus. (ed. cit.) pp. 375-389, 409-417.
36. Jacob Loewenberg, Introduction to Hegel Selections. (New York: Scribner's, 1929.)
37. W.T. Stace, The Philosophy of Hegel. (New York: Dover, 1955) pp. 84ff. Also, Nicolai Hartmann, Die Philosophie des deutschen Idealismus. (ed. cit.) pp. 371-374.
38. Ibid., p. 410.
39. Op. cit., p. 27 & passim. Also, esp. see Einführung in die Metaphysik, (ed. cit.) pp. 29-30: "Fragen: Wie steht es um das Sein?--das besagt nichts Geringeres als den Anfang unseres geschichtlich-geistigen Daseins wieder-holen (retrieve), um ihn in den anderen Anfang zu verwandeln."
40. Werner Marx, op. cit., pp. 125ff, 183ff.; Joseph P. Fell, "Heidegger's Notion of Two Beginnings," Review of Metaphysics. (Vol. XXV, No. 2, December 1971); Bruno Puntel, op. cit., pp. 456-492.
41. The history of thinking about Being is also a Seins-geschehen. It is (Being and Time, pp. 42f) a history of ways in which Dasein is and has been and can be (p. 363, the "ecstases of temporality," p. 377). The truth of Being and its concealment is not merely a matter of an "Aussehen" or "Anblick", but a Geschick des Seins. Cf. Letter on Humanism, (ed. cit.) p. 20-23. Also, Nietzsche II, Chapter V, VI.

42. Science of Logic, pp. 49, 68.
43. Nietzsche I, pp. 448-462.
44. Martin Heidegger, "Einige Hinweise auf Hauptgesichtspunkte für das theologische Gespräch über 'Das Problem eines nichtobjektivierenden Denkens und Sprechens in der heutigen Theologie.'" (Frankfurt/Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1970) pp. 44-45.
45. This is the point of phenomenology as given in the 7th section of Being and Time. "The Phenomenological Method of Investigation": "Thus 'phenomenology' means... to let that which shows itself be seen from itself in the very way in which it shows itself from itself." (p. 58) Much the same point is also made by Professor Conrad Bonifazi in A Theology of Things. (Philadelphia: Lippincott, 1967).
46. Being and Time, pp. 257ff.
47. "Das Problem eines nichtobjektivierenden Denkens...", ed. cit., p. 42; The Question of Being, (ed. cit.) (ed. cit.) p. 71.
48. "Das Problem eines nichtobjektivierenden Denkens...", loc. cit. "Thinking is rather the comportment permitting that which shows itself and how it shows itself to give to it what it has to say of that which appears." Jerry H. Gill, ed., Philosophy and Religion. (Minneapolis: Burgess, 1968) p. 63.
49. Humanismusbrief, ed. cit., pp. 5, 9.
50. Ed. cit., e.g., pp. 1-5.
51. Nietzsche, p. 450.
52. Introduction to Metaphysics, ed. cit., p. 84, where Heidegger says this about Sein und Zeit.
53. Nietzsche, p. 448.
54. Ibid., p. 452.
55. Metaphysics, ed. cit., Z, 1.
56. Nietzsche, p. 453.
57. Ibid., p. 456.
58. Ibid., p. 455.
59. Ibid., p. 457.

60. Being and Time, p. 32.
61. Nietzsche, p. 456; Being and Time, p. 24, 28 & passim.
62. Nietzsche, p. 459.
63. The Question of Being, ed. cit., p. 101.
64. Nietzsche, p. 460.
65. The Question of Being, pp. 80-107 passim.
66. E.g., Ibid., p. 97.
67. Cf. Walter Ehrlich, "Principles of a Philosophy of the History of Philosophy," Tr. Freeman, Monist. (Vol. 53, No. 4, October 1969) pp. 532-562.
68. Compare "The Problem of a Non-Objectifying Thinking and Speaking in Contemporary Theology" in Jerry A. Gill, ed., op. cit., p. 64. Also, Magda King, Heidegger's Philosophy. (New York: Dell Publishing Co., 1964) pp. 15ff.
69. Hegel, The Philosophy of History. (New York: Dover, 1956) Tr. J. Sibree, pp. 8, 11.
70. E.g. Ibid., pp. 456-7; Philosophy of Right. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1953) Tr. T.M. Knox, p. 34, where freedom is said to be "the highest category of mind."
71. Philosophy of History, p. 9.
72. Cf. Hegel's Lectures on the History of Philosophy. Tr. Haldane & Simpson. (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1968) "If the history of Philosophy merely represented various opinions in array, whether they be of God or of natural and spiritual things existent, it would be a most superfluous and tiresome science, no matter what advantage might be brought forward as derived from thought-activity and learning. What can be more useless than to learn a string of bald opinions, and what more unimportant?" (Vol. I, p. 12)
On the contrary: "Thus that which each generation has produced in science and in intellectual activity, is an heirloom to which all the past generations have added their savings, a temple in which all races of men thankfully and cheerfully deposit that which rendered aid to them through life, and which they had won from the depths of Nature and of Mind. It constitutes the soul of each successive generation...." (ibid., 3)

73. Philosophy of Right, p. 34.
74. Lectures in the History of Philosophy (ed. cit.), Vol. 1, p. 3.
75. Vorlesungen über die Geschichte der Philosophie in Sämtliche Werke (ed. cit.) Vol. 19, p. 684.
76. Ibid., p. 583. This is either Hegel's persaphrase of Kritik der reinen Vernunft B629 or taken from a strange edition perhaps available to him. Although the Akademie edition says the same thing, Hegel's phrasing is well suited to his purposes. Also compare B667, B704-5, B714.
77. This is repeatedly said by Hegel, e.g., Phenomenology of Mind, (ed. cit.) p. 805 & passim.
78. Vorlesungen über die Geschichte der Philosophie, Sämtliche Werke, (ed. cit.) Vol. 19, pp. 296-327.
79. Science of Logic. (ed. cit.) p. 107.
80. Ibid., p. 45.
81. Science of Logic, pp. 843-4.
82. Ibid., p. 70.
83. Ibid., pp. 827-8.
84. Encyclopedis, p. 27.
85. Ibid., p. 28.
86. Ute Guzzoni, Werden zu Sich, Eine Untersuchung zu Hegels "Wissenschaft der Logik". (Munich: Karl Alber Verlag, 1963)
87. This analogy was suggested to me by Thomas West in private discussions of Hegel's Logic.
88. Encyclopedis, p. 160.
89. Science of Logic, p. 399; Encyclopedis, p. 159.
90. Ibid., 160.
91. Nicolai Hartmann, Philosophie des deutschen Idealismus (ed. cit.), 391; Phenomenology of Mind, p. 115.
92. Critique of Pure Reason, B 106-7.

93. Ibid., B 95-6.
94. Science of Logic, p. 60.
95. Nahm, op. cit., p. 115.
96. N. Hartmann, op. cit., 382.
97. G.W. von Leibniz, Monadology #2 in Basic Writings, Tr. George Montgomery, (La Salle, Ill.: Open Court, 1962) p. 251. Aristotle, Metaphysics (ed. cit.) Book II, #2, p. 713.
98. Encyclopedia, p. 159.
99. Phenomenology, p. 81; N. Hartmann, op. cit., p. 382.
100. Phenomenology, p. 150.
101. Richard Kroner, Von Kant bis Hegel. (Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr, 1961) p. 365.
102. Phenomenology, p. 798.
103. Phänomenologie, p. 551.
104. Cf. C.I. Lewis, Mind and World Order. (New York: Dover, 1956) p. 76, 171, etc.; Analysis of Knowledge and Valuation. (LaSalle, Ill.: Open Court, 1962) e.g. p. 183.
105. Phenomenology, pp. 152-3. There is a play on the word "Meinung" here: "wes wir unter dem Sein meinen," "Ihre Wahrheit ist in dem Gegenstande als meinem Gegenstande, oder im Meinen," "und unsere Meinung, für welche das Wahre der sinnlichen Gewissheit nicht als Allgemeine ist..." Phänomenologie, pp. 82-3. The word seems to be used in three senses: (1) the meaning which sense-certainty proposes e.g. for the object, (2) the meaning which we know that it has, where we stand aside and look at the dialectical development of consciousness from the absolute standpoint, (3) the appropriation of the object as mine, i.e., not alien. The latter is the most important, since that is what we know in #2 and is a sublation of #1.
106. Phenomenology, p. 152. Also Cf. Paul Tillich, Perspectives on 19th and 20th Century Protestant Theology. (ed. cit.) p. 245: "Now language deals with universals. In using universals, language is by its very nature essentialist, and cannot escape it."

107. Being and Time, p. 33.
108. Hoffmeister, op. cit., p. 226.
109. This is properly Husserl's term and Heidegger does not use it. Nevertheless, it is quite legitimately used in this connection. Apparently Professor Hubert Dreyfus agrees, according to notes taken from his lectures. Heidegger's 'reduction' of conceptions arising in the "everyday" being of Dasein to existentiell intuitions is like and unlike Husserl's "reduction of the natural standpoint." It is like it insofar as the 'everydayness' of Heidegger is like Husserl's 'natural standpoint', and Heidegger's 'existentiell intuitions' are intuitions like Husserl's 'essential intuitions'. It is unlike insofar as for Husserl that which is bracketed or reduced is "neither tested nor contested" but simply put out of attention in the interest of focusing attention on what remains immanent in consciousness. For Heidegger, on the other hand, that which is reduced is definitely contested in respect of its authenticity and its derivation from the existentiell.
110. Being and Time, p. 49.
111. Ibid., p. 50.
112. Ibid., p. 55-6.
113. Ibid., pp. 52-3.
114. Ibid., p. 59.
115. Ibid., p. 50.
116. Ibid., p. 57.
117. Quentin Lauer, Phenomenology: Its Genesis and Prospect. (New York: Harper Torchbook, 1965) p. 165.
118. Being and Time, pp. 480-486.
119. Ibid., p. 485.
120. Ibid., p. 486.
121. These concepts, as well as the concept of Dasein in general, will be taken up in Part II in connection with the existentiells constituting the being of persons. For the present, they are mentioned only to recall what Heidegger takes to be the original experience of temporality.

122. Ibid., pp. 59-60.
123. Ibid., pp. 61-2.
124. Introduction to Metaphysics (ed. cit.), pp. 96-7, 136.
125. Ibid., p. 69.
126. Vick, op. cit., p. 142; Schmitt, op. cit., pp. 10-12, 55-56, 96ff.
127. Theodore Kiesiel in Werner Marx, op. cit., p. xxviii.
128. Introduction to Metaphysics, pp. 58-60, 72-73.
129. Ibid., p. 68.
130. Ibid., p. 69.
131. Ibid., pp. 53, 64.
132. Ibid., pp. 21-22.
133. Ibid., p. 58.
134. Ibid., p. 59.
135. Ibid., p. 60.
136. Ibid., p. 73.
137. We use the word "to name" here in accordance with Heidegger's suggestion that names should be found for Being. (Brief über den Humanismus (ed. cit.), e.g., p. 37.) In other contexts, we have often used the word "to express", since this also is good Heideggerian usage. It indicates that Being is "brought to language," it is literally expressed in language, rather than denoted, designated, or signified. This is Heidegger's view. The use of "to name" and "to express" also points up that no word can denote Being, where the denotation of a word is the object in extension for which it stands. A word could be said to signify or connote or designate Being only insofar as we have in mind the "essence of Being" strictly in Heidegger's peculiar sense of the word "essence", but not in the sense in which we are speaking of defining characteristics of a class of things.
138. Introduction to Metaphysics, p. 83.
139. Ibid., p. 60.

140. Ibid., p. 71.
141. Vick, op. cit., p. 150.
142. Gadamer, Hegels Dialektik, ed. cit., p. 94.
143. Ibid., p. 93.
144. Introduction to Metaphysics, p. 72.
145. Ibid., p. 91.
146. Ibid., p. 77.
147. Ibid., p. 81.
148. Ibid., pp. 120-123.
149. Ibid., p. 121; cf. also Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics, Tr. James S. Churchill. (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1962) p. 252-3.
150. Ibid., pp. 97-105 and the whole of Section Three, pp. 131-208.

II. BEING AS DETERMINATE

1. Science of Logic, (ed. cit.) p. 108. Wissenschaft der Logik, Vol. 5 of G.W.F. Hegel, Werke in zwanzig Bänden. (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1969) p. 115.
2. The sequence follows the following order:
 - I. Doctrine of Being
 1. Determinateness
 - Being
 - Being
 - Nothing
 - Becoming
 - Determinate Being
 - Being-for-Self.
 2. Magnitude
 3. Measure
 - II. Doctrine of Essence
 1. Essence as Reflection
 2. Appearance
 - Existence
 - Appearance
 - The Essential Relation
 3. Actuality

3. R.K. Revel, "An Essay on Phenomenology," Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. (Vol. XXXIII, No. 2, December, 1972) p. 216.
4. Ibid., p. 217-8.
5. What is a Thing? (ed. cit.) p. 5.
6. Edmund Husserl, Ideas I, Tr. Boyce Gibson. (London: Collier, 1969) e.g., pp. 345ff, 366ff.
7. Cf. R.S. Woolhouse, "Things," Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. (Vol. XXXIII, No. 2, December, 1972).
8. Aristotle, Metaphysics, Book I, 984a.
9. Ibid., 984b.
10. Ibid., 1001ab.
11. E.g., 1028ab.
12. Science of Logic, pp. 94-5.
13. Ibid., p. 103; Wissenschaft der Logik (ed. cit.), p. 109.
14. Science of Logic, p. 83.
15. Ibid., p. 86.
16. Ibid., pp. 82, ; Findlay, op. cit., pp. 156-7.
17. Science of Logic, p. 106.
18. Ibid., p. 111.
19. Ibid., p. 113.
20. Ibid., p. 115.
21. Professor Well, for example, distinguishes between (1) the category of relation, whose sub-categories are (a) whole and part, (b) force and manifestation, and (c) the inner and the outer, (2) the broader notion of relation, which is a movement from position and negation to reconciliation, and (3) the fundamental relations of position, negation, and reconciliation themselves. (Op. cit.)
22. Stace. op. cit., p. 191.
23. Gilson, op. cit., pp. 20-25 & Chapter I passim.

24. E.g., Philosophy of History (ed. cit.), p. 457.
25. Stace, op. cit., p. 144.
26. N. Hartmann, op. cit., p. 416.
27. Science of Logic, p. 843.
28. Cf. Puntel, op. cit., pp. 436-7.
29. John E. McTaggart, A Commentary on Hegel's Logic. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1931) p. 17.
30. Stace, op. cit., p. 138. Hartmann agrees with McTaggart. (op. cit., pp. 415-6)
31. Phenomenology, p. 191.
32. Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics (ed. cit.), p. 252.
33. Critique of Pure Reason, A-253.
34. Ibid., A-255, B-310-311.
35. Ibid., A-247, B-303.
36. Ibid., B-197.
37. Being and Time, p. 133.
38. Ibid., p. 122.
39. Ibid., p. 364.
40. Critique of Pure Reason, A-94-5.
41. Cf. Magda King, op. cit., p. 65. Her purpose seems not to be the same as ours is here, viz., to distinguish the two modes of thinking. Nor does this chart follow her distinctions very closely.
42. Being and Time, pp. 245ff.
43. A list of existentials can be given on the basis of Being and Time, and on occasion Heidegger relates them to each other according to degree of primordiality. This is a tentative list, not all of which are noted in the index. Page references are given in brackets.
Being-in (79), being-alongside (81), spatiality (83), worldhood (92), de-severance (139), making-room (146), concern (158), directionality (143), being-with (149),

solicitude (158), the they (167), state-of-mind (173, 188); thownness (174), facticity (174), understanding (182, 188, 192, 385), fearfulness (182), possibility, potentiality (183), projection (185), meaning (193), discourse (204, 209), felling (219), anxiety (230), care (244), truth (269, 343), end, death (277, 285), totality (285), the there (passim), conscience (322-3), disclosedness (315), temporality (38, 486).

44. Ibid., p. 253.
45. Cf. Puntel, op. cit., p. 381.
46. Phenomenology, p. 80.
47. Being and Time, p. 133.
48. Ibid., pp. 166, 167, 202; Introduction to Metaphysics, pp. 120ff: "Logic relieves us of the need for any troublesome inquiry into the essence of thinking." Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics, p. 252.; What is a Thing? pp. 56, 59.
49. Ibidem.
50. Being and Time, p. 32.
51. Science of Logic, p. 325.
52. Being and Time, p. 330.
53. Ibid., p. 130.
54. Brief über den Humanismus, p. 14.
55. Ibid., pp. 13, 19, 35, 37, 45.
56. Ibid., pp. 5, 9.
57. Ibid., p. 14.
58. Ibid., 15; Being and Time, p. 67.
59. Ibid., p. 183.
60. Ibid., pp. 67-8.
61. Ibid., p. 68.
62. Ibid., e.g., p. 211.
63. Ibid., p. 167.

64. Ibid., p. 289.
65. Ibid., p. 284.
66. Ibid., p. 294.
67. Ibid., p. 311.
68. Ibid., p. 173.
69. Ibid., p. 82.
70. Ibid., p. 174.
71. Ibid., p. 173.
72. Ibid., p. 175.
73. Ibid., pp. 366-368.
74. Ibid., p. 370.
75. Ibid., p. 152.
76. Ibid., p. 156.
77. Ibid., p. 161.
78. Ibid., p. 180.
79. Science of Logic, p. 137 (c)
80. Ibid., p. 149
81. Phenomenology, p. 211.
82. Murray Greene, "Hegel's Notion of Inversion," op. cit., p. 175.
83. Phenomenology, p. 211.
84. Ibid., p. 218.
85. Ibid., p. 219.
86. Ibid., p. 220.
87. E.g., Being and Nothingness. (New York: Philosophical Library, 1956) Part III; Also the novel Nauses and the essay "The Hole".
88. Phenomenology, p. 219.

89. Ibid., p. 251.
90. Ibid., p. 252.
91. Ibid., p. 790; Phänomenologie, p. 548.

III. BEING AS ABSOLUTE

1. E.g., Encyclopedia, (ed. cit.) p. 207: "the Absolute is Being"; Loewenberg, Hegel Selections, (ed. cit.) p. 285: "...the Being, known as the Absolute"; Science of Logic, pp. 842-3: "...it is also fulfilled Being," which is distinguished from "the abstract immediacy of Being"; Ibid., p. 390: "that Being which is in and for itself"; Ibid., p. 758: "The Idea has the more general meaning of true Being, of the unity of Notion and Reality."
2. Hegel's Concept of Experience, pp. 69, 70, 114 & passim. Werner Marx agrees, since he connects "Being" with "Absolute" only in reference to this text (op. cit., pp. 135-7).
3. E.g., Ibid., p. 59.
4. Hegel's Concept of Experience, esp. p. 114.
5. Gerhard Huber, op. cit., pp. 197, 199. Cf. eg. Critique of Pure Reason, A-587: "die absolute Einheit der vollständigen Realität."
6. Critique of Pure Reason, B-380, A-324.
7. Ibid., A-326.
8. Rene Descartes, "Rules for the Direction of the Mind," VI, Tr. E.S. Haldane & G.R.T. Ross, The Philosophical Works of Descartes. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1955) Vol. I, p. 15.
9. Hoffmeister, op. cit., p. 6. It seems curious that St. Thomas Aquinas does not mention it as a name of God (Summa Theologica, I, q. XIII). Nor does M. Stockhammer list the word in his Thomas Aquinas Dictionary. (New York: Philosophical Library, 1965).
10. Henry Bett, Nicholas of Cusa. (London: Methuen, 1932) p. 130.
11. J.G. Fichte, "First Introduction to the Science of Knowledge," The Journal of Speculative Philosophy,

Tr. A.E. Kroger, (Vol. I, 1867) p. 12; put out and distributed again by Prof. Rebstock, University of California, Berkeley, 1958.

12. "Philosophie und Religion," Schellings Werke, (ed. cit.) Vol. IV, p. 12.
13. Ibid., p. 14.
14. Of Human Freedom. (Chicago: Open Court, 1936)
15. Phenomenology, p. 79.
16. Of Human Freedom, (ed. cit.) pp. 23, 79.
17. Ibid., p. 78.
18. Phenomenology, p. 81.
19. Puntel, op. cit., pp. 428, 437.
20. Well, op. cit., p. 86.
21. Ibid., p. 88.
22. Phenomenology, p. 80.
23. McTaggart, op. cit., pp. 150-1.
24. Well, op. cit., pp. 92-3.
25. Encyclopaedia, p. 374.
26. As in Stace (pp. 297ff), Findley (pp. 269ff), Hertmann (pp. 475f, 483ff), McTaggart (308), Puntel (loc. cit.), Well (implicit in pp. 87ff).
27. Science of Logic, p. 531.
28. Encyclopaedia, pp. 373-4.
29. Philosophy of Right, p. 10; Encyclopaedia, p. 373.
30. Gilson, op. cit., p. 211.
31. Science of Logic, p. 536.
32. Ibid., p. 828.
33. Ibid., p. 825.
34. Puntel, op. cit., pp. 382-3.

35. Phenomenology of Mind, p. 85.
36. Science of Logic, p. 843.
37. Ibid.
38. Quoted by Beillie from the Geschichte der Philosophie in the translator's introduction to the Phenomenology of Mind, p. 31.
39. Ibid., p. 798.
40. E.g., Phänomenologie, pp. 552, 554, 378.
41. Ibid., p. 552.
42. Ibid., p. 564; Phenomenology, p. 808.
43. Ibid., p. 123.
44. Ibid., p. 80.
45. Puntel, op. cit., p. 381.
46. Phenomenology, pp. 84, 121.
47. Ibid., p. 121.
48. Science of Logic, p. 830.
49. Klaus Hartmann, "On Taking the Transcendental Turn," (ed. cit.)
50. Science of Logic, II, 1, 2.
51. Phenomenology, p. 84.
52. Science of Logic, pp. 555ff.
53. Ibid., p. 37.
54. Phänomenologie, pp. 52-3; Phenomenology, pp. 122-3.
55. Ibid.
56. Puntel, op. cit., pp. 385-6.
57. Wehrheit und Methode. (ed. cit.) pp. 415ff.
58. Phenomenology, p. 97.
59. Ibid., pp. 85-6.

60. Cf. Phänomenologie, pp. 24f: "Dass das Wahre nur als System wirklich, oder dass die Substanz wesentlich Subjekt ist, ist in der Vorstellung ausgedrückt, welche das Absolute als Geist ausspricht,--der erhabenste Begriff, und der der neueren Zeit und ihrer Religion angehört. Des Geistige allein ist das Wirkliche; es ist das Wesen oder Ansichseiende,--das sich Verhaltende und Bestimmte, als Anderseins und Fürsichsein--und (das) in dieser Bestimmtheit oder seinem Ausser-sichsein in sich selbst Bleibende; --oder es ist an und für sich."
61. Ibid., p. 20.
62. Holzwege. (Frankfurt: Klostermann, 1950)
63. Hegel's Concept of Experience. (ed. cit.) p. 27.
64. Metaphysics, IV, 1003a, 21.
65. Phänomenologie, p. 63.
66. Hegel's Concept of Experience, p. 28.
67. Ibid., 29.
68. Ibid., p. 30.
69. Ibid., p. 31.
70. Ibid., p. 33.
71. Ibid., p. 34.
72. Ibid., p. 38.
73. Ibid., p. 39.
74. Ibid., p. 40.
75. Ibid., p. 43.
76. Ibid., p. 44.
77. Ibid., p. 45.
78. Ibid., pp. 48-9.
79. Ibid., p. 145.
80. Ibid., p. 70.
81. Ibid., p. 58.

82. Ibid., p. 120.
83. Ibid., p. 69.
84. Ibid., p. 70.
85. Ibid., p. 121.
86. Ibid., p. 130.
87. Ibid., pp. 113, 143.
88. Ibid., p. 150.
89. Being and Time, p. 23.
90. Der Satz vom Grund. (Pfullingen: Neske, 1957) quoted by Laszlo Versenyi, Heidegger, Being, and Truth. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1965) p. 154.
91. Ibid., p. 154.
92. Humanismusbrief, p. 22; Nietzsche I, p. 96.
93. Humanismusbrief, p. 35; Discourse on Thinking, p. 90.
94. Humanismusbrief, p. 35.
95. Loc. cit.
96. Hölderlin and the Essence of Poetry quoted by Marx (op. cit.), p. 233.
97. Unterwegs zur Sprache (Pfullingen: Neske, 1959).
98. Humanismusbrief, p. 9.
99. What is Called Thinking? (New York: Harper & Row, 1968)
100. Humanismusbrief, p. 23.
101. Ibid., p. 5.
102. Marx, op. cit., p. 193.
103. Humanismusbrief, p. 23.
104. Being and Time, pp. 256-273.
105. Ibid., p. 270.
106. Ibid., p. 261.

107. Ibid., p. 269.
108. Ibid., p. 272; compare Sein und Zeit (ed. cit.), p. 230.
109. Being and Time, p. 273.
110. Ibid., p. 272.
111. Introduction to Metaphysics, p. 102.
112. Letter to M.S. Frings, op. cit., p. 19.
113. Phenomenology, p. 85.
114. Cf. Johannes Hoffmeister, op. cit., p. 427: "In der metaphysischen Dialektik wird der Negation eine produktive Kraft zugesprochen. Hegel spricht deshalb von der Negation der Negation als der eigentlichen Position."

IV. CONCLUSIONS

1. Cf. J.P. Sartre, "Ist der Existentialismus ein Humanismus," Drei Essays (Frankfurt: Ullstein, 1973), p. 25: "Unser Ausgangspunkt ist tatsächlich die Subjektivität des Individuums. Es ist dies die absolute Wahrheit des Selbstbewusstseins, das zu sich selbst kommt." This and other passages (e.g., "Ichheit," "Zwischen-Ichheit", p. 26) clearly show Sartre's relation to Hegel and, significantly, at the same time to Heidegger.
2. Cf. James Collins, God in Modern Philosophy. (Chicago: Henry Regnery, 1967) p. 221: "Existence is only one phase in the course of development of the absolute Spirit and, at that, too fixed and finite to be worthy of designating the supreme actuality of the Absolute. ...the Absolute is the living, self-finitizing, spiritual whole of being. The existential 'that' becomes only a transient incident.... In the Hegelian system, the existential act falls far short of the perfection of actuality as absolute Spirit in process."
3. As in Systematic Theology (op. cit.), "The Trinitarian Symbols," Vol. III.
4. E.G., the terms "primordial nature of God" and "consequent nature of God".

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